Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04THEHAGUE1935
2004-08-03 11:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

DUTCH A/POL DIRECTOR ON IRAQ: TERRORISM STATEMENT,

Tags:  PREL OPDC MOPS MARR IZ NL EUN NATO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001935 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2014
TAGS: PREL OPDC MOPS MARR IZ NL EUN NATO
SUBJECT: DUTCH A/POL DIRECTOR ON IRAQ: TERRORISM STATEMENT,
EU AND NATO MISSIONS, RECONSTRUCTION IN AL MUTHANNA
PROVINCE

REF: A. (A) STATE 167045 (NOTAL)

B. (B) AUGUST 2 DAVIES-RUSSEL TELCON AND EMAILS

C. (C) STATE 165043 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel R. Russel for reason 1.5 (b).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001935 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2014 TAGS: PREL OPDC MOPS MARR IZ NL EUN NATO SUBJECT: DUTCH A/POL DIRECTOR ON IRAQ: TERRORISM STATEMENT, EU AND NATO MISSIONS, RECONSTRUCTION IN AL MUTHANNA PROVINCE REF: A. (A) STATE 167045 (NOTAL) ¶B. (B) AUGUST 2 DAVIES-RUSSEL TELCON AND EMAILS ¶C. (C) STATE 165043 (NOTAL) Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel R. Russel for reason 1.5 (b). ¶1. (SBU) Terrorism Declaration: CDA contacted Dutch MFA A/Political Director Herman Schaper late August 2 and got confirmation that the Netherlands would support and release the Coalition Terrorism Declaration. Early August 3, A/Pol Couns provided ref A points to MFA Security Policy Director Maurits Jochems. Jochems confirmed FM Bot had no problems with the substance of the statement and that the MFA planned to publish the statement on its website concurrent with other partners on August 4. Jochems noted the slight textual changes between the versions of the statement as conveyed refs A and C. He termed these changes "improvements8 and said he would convey the revised ref A version to FM Bot. ¶2. (C) EU Mission to Iraq: Schaper said that the Dutch are pushing hard to organize the exploratory mission agreed to at the July 12-13 GAERC with Iraqi FM Zebari, despite foot dragging by the Commission and resistance by "certain members" (i.e. France, Germany, Belgium). The Dutch have penciled in August 28-29 as a window for FM Bot to visit Baghdad. This would allow him to report back firsthand to the Gymnich meeting of Foreign Ministers on September 3 and put some force behind his recommendations for accelerating and expanding the EU's role in Iraq. Seeing value in giving the mission a high profile, the Dutch are hoping to persuade Solana to accompany the FM. Schaper said he would accompany the Minister (who will be on his way back from Indonesia) and planned to stay on in Iraq for a few days to flesh out details of the proposal to EU FM's. He was sharply critical of the Commission's timidity about the mission, saying that in a conversation Friday he had "shamed" Patten's chief of staff who had assumed that due to security concerns, Schaper would delegate the visit to a junior member of his staff. While Iraq is Bot's "first priority," Schaper said that events in Darfur might require that the FM go to Sudan in late August vice Iraq. In that case, they had a second window for travel -- September 8-9, which was still in advance of the GAERC on the 13th, although it missed the �
00A;Gymnich. ¶3. (C) NATO training mission in Iraq: Schaper said that the appointment of Dutch Air Force Maj. Gen. Hilderink, RNLAF (currently Commandant of the Military Academy at Breda) as chief of the NATO training mission was well received in the GoNL and would be quite helpful politically and in terms of good EU-NATO coordination. He said he knew Hilderink well and would meet with him before the General departed to coordinate. The Dutch are keen to ensure that there is a complementary and cooperative division of labor between NATO military training and EU police training in Iraq. Schaper said that (unfortunately) it appeared unlikely the MFA would be able to assign a Dutch POLAD to Hilderink because they were "running short" of suitable candidates who know the Middle East well and speak Arabic. Separately, MOD sources spoke highly of Hilderink to Acting PolCouns, describing him as an activist, and noting that in addition to his training background, he also has international and operational experience having been heavily involved in Bosnia policy as Dutch MOD operations chief from 1995-1997. ¶4. (C) Reconstruction in Al-Muthanna Province: Schaper said that the Dutch MOD reported a serious and growing problem among the Iraqis in the Al-Muthanna Province where the Dutch battalion is deployed. With the dissolution of the CPA and the phasing out of the "commanders' program" (that provided quick funding for small local projects at the discretion of local commanders),money for reconstruction in the province is drying up. The Dutch military sees growing concern and resentment from the populace and reports an uptick in complaints that the MNF is doing nothing to promote prosperity and civil reconstruction. Local concern about economic stagnation is beginning to poison the previous good relations between the Dutch military and the population. The Dutch mission is strictly security and the GONL has no reconstruction programs or funds for Iraq. Nevertheless, as the face of the international community in the province, the peacekeepers are being held to account. Schaper said he regretted that the question had been posed in Washington by the Dutch embassy in terms of "where is the money that Amb. Bremer promised us?" The real question, he clarified, is: Who in the USG should we be talking to -- either in Washington or Baghdad -- in order to get a better understanding of what to expect in the future in terms of civil reconstruction funding in the province? CDA promised to seek guidance from Washington. ¶5. Baghdad minimize considered. RUSSEL

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