DUTCH PRESIDENCY REPLY ON BURMA/ASEM MESSAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001916 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2014 TAGS: PREL PHUM NL BM SUBJECT: DUTCH PRESIDENCY REPLY ON BURMA/ASEM MESSAGE REF: A. STATE 157147 ¶B. THE HAGUE 1836 Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Dutch Presidency Special Envoy Hans van den Broek was reportedly pleased with the results his recent trip to Hanoi, Bangkok, Beijing and Tokyo to resolve the current impasse regarding Burmese participation in the upcoming Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). The Dutch are reluctant to provide a formal readout of the trip at this time, and are prickly about describing internal EU deliberations on this issue. Informally, however, a Dutch contact told us informally that a compromise solution is in sight, in which Burma would participate at ASEM and ASEM would issue a statement of dissatisfaction with Burma's human rights record. The Dutch are clearly wary about appearing to exert pressure on either ASEAN or Burma. END SUMMARY. ¶2. POLOFF met July 29 with Eric Verwaal, Head of Asia and Oceania Department and Special Assistant to EU Presidency Special Envoy Hans van den Broek, who accompanied van den Broek on his recent trip to Asia. Noting that ref A points had been successfully conveyed to van den Broek en route, Verwaal provided the following point-by-point response: -- The Dutch take note of the U.S. interest in the situation, but cannot comment on expectations or developments at this point. -- The Dutch are aware of the upcoming Burmese chairmanship of ASEAN, but think there is "some question about the extent to which pressure will be effective." Verwaal noted that while ASEAN is "painfully aware" of the situation, having lost face when Burma did not follow through on expected steps this spring, he believed there was also substantial sensitivity among ASEAN members that external parties recognize that Burma is a full member of ASEAN. -- The Dutch believe the EU does not consider itself in a position to exert pressure on ASEAN regarding the situation (while noting there are always a variety of views among members). The EU will keep up dialogue with Asian partners who were already aware of the situation, and have contacts with all parties involved. -- The Dutch take note of the U.S. plans not to send senior representatives to attend ASEAN meetings hosted by Burma in 2006, but Verwaal noted what he saw as a possible discrepancy that Secretary Powell had attended the recent ASEAN Regional Forum in Jakarta which was also attended by the Burmese FM and defense officials. -- Finally, Verwaal said that the EU has certainly shared its view with its Asian partners that Burma must abide by international standards if it is to join the international community. He commented, however, that such a status is "not a top priority" for the Burmese junta. ¶2. (SBU) In response to Poloff's request for a readout of the trip, Verwaal said he was reluctant to discuss ongoing "delicate negotiations." Restating the delegation's initial response to a July 21 invitation to brief the Embassy upon van den Broek's return, Verwaal reminded that van den Broek would report directly and exclusively to FM Bot, who would report his conclusions at the informal "Gymnich" meeting. (Note: We were informed separately that Van Den Broek provided a readout to FM Bot on July 26.) Verwaal said that since no other partners, including within the EU, were being briefed during this initial phase, the Dutch were unable to brief the USG. Overall, however, Verwaal commented that the talks held during the trip were constructive, "discussions were very good, and the level of reception showed an appreciation for the issues involved." Verwaal added that the Dutch would be open and willing to exchange views with the U.S. and others regarding handling the approaching Burmese chairmanship of ASEAN once the EU had made a decision on the upcoming summit. ¶3. (SBU) Verwaal was apologetic about not sharing more with us at this point, but insisted that it was in the best interest of "almost all parties involved." Verwaal seemed especially sensitive about the possibility of imposing additional sanctions against Burma, stating (without being asked) that "the EU has no intention of undertaking economic sanctions." Verwaal also argued that "external pressure" on ASEAN in general would have an adverse effect since ASEAN is still struggling to develop its own balanced approach to Burma. ¶4. (C/NF) In a separate meeting June 27, Jaap Werner, Director for Political Affairs, told DCM and POLCOUNS that a compromise solution for the summit was in sight. Werner suggested that the EU would eventually agree to allow Burma to participate in the ASEM summit (albeit at a lower level) provided that ASEM clearly expressed dissatisfaction with the human rights situation in Burma. Werner indicated that Van Den Broek's brief had been along these lines. He cautioned that the EU had not yet reached consensus on the issue, but suggested that the Dutch would work toward developing one along the lines he described at the September Gymnich and GAERC meetings. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: It is unusual for the Dutch to be so cautious about sharing information. The fact that we were told both before and after Van den Broek's trip that the MFA would not be able to brief us highlights the sensitivity of this issue and the delicacy of current negotiations. As noted in previous reporting, Dutch officials -- including FM Bot and PM Balkenende -- believe the Dutch presidency will be judged in large part by the success or failure of its summits. Their top priority, therefore, is clearly is to find a "compromise solution" to ensure that the meeting takes place. END COMMENT. SOBEL