CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): RABTA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 THE HAGUE 001845 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR JOECK WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL AG CM ER UK IT KE MO SF TS YM SU GM FR GR KS CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): RABTA CONVERSION This is CWC-89-04. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) In the aftermath of EC-37, delegation has been working closely with UK, Italy, and Libya, to facilitate and garner support for Libya's proposed change to the Verification Annex of the CWC, to enable the conversion of its former CW production facility at Rabta. In particular the delegations noted have been attempting to secure co-sponsors for the proposal, an effort that achieved some degree of success with 12 SPs co-sponsoring. As indicated below, a number of others have become co-sponsors since. ¶2. (SBU) Germany and France continue to express disagreement with the approach taken by the US, UK, Italy, and Libya, albeit in a rather passive manner. It remains unclear the depth of their opposition and whether they would actually break with consensus when the issue comes before the next session of the Council. ¶3. (SBU) Based on conversations with the OPCW legal advisor, delegation believes the OPCW will show solid support for the proposed technical change. We have been informed that a paper is already in the works that will provide a legal case supporting the proposal. Delegation believes this document will be of critical importance in reassuring delegations who pay enough attention to these matters to actually care, but who lack the resources and/or inclination to conduct a legal analysis themselves. -------------- MEETING OF PROSPECTIVE CO-SPONSORS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) On Tuesday, 13 July, the delegation of Libya convened a meeting at the OPCW, the purpose of which was to energize select delegations to co-sponsor the Libyan proposal for a technical change to Article V of paragraph 72 of the Verification Annex of the CWC. The meeting was attended by US, UK, Italy, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, South Africa, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Japan, Peru, Korea, and Serbia-Montenegro. Invited but not present were Panama, Netherlands and Greece, while Bulgaria and Serbia-Montenegro attended at their own initiative, having not been on the initial list of invitees. Commentary from each of the delegations, where applicable, is as follows: -- Sudan: Expects veterans of the OPCW, and the TS, to "help Libya find its way" now that it is in the OPCW. Supports this request and the onus is on all of us to find a way to allow the conversion to go forward. No instructions yet, but expect to be able to co-sponsor as soon as tomorrow (Note: Sudan has now in fact joined the list of co-sponsors. End note.). -- Tunisia: Tunisian delegate was the most effective speaker in the meeting. She said Tunisia's view is very simple; they are looking at the aim and purpose of this change. While it is good to have support from others like the US to address the AIDS and other disease issues on the African continent, ultimately African countries must take action themselves. Tunisia does not want to see this issue become highly politicized and thus blocked. They hope for consensus. Libya is still new to the OPCW and thus does not know the legal and political intricacies of the OPCW, that is why the US, UK, Italy and others have been helping, and Tunisia welcomes this. But there needs to be more support in the form of co-sponsors. All African countries would be grateful for such support. -- Morocco: Co-sponsors this initiative and enjoins others to do likewise. -- Algeria: Full support and have already co-sponsored. Must work to convince others, especially in Africa, to support also. This is a humanitarian issue on which Africa should find unanimity. -- South Africa: Co-sponsor and support this initiative. -- Kuwait: Support the initiative, but do not have instructions. Anticipate having them in 3-4 days (Note: A week later Kuwait still does not apparently have authorization to co-sponsor, and has been notably unresponsive to attempts by the UK delegation to contact them to enlist Kuwaiti support. End Note.) -- Saudi Arabia: Awaiting instructions, but anticipates being able to co-sponsor as soon as tomorrow (Note: Despite this comment at the meeting, Saudi Arabia has still not co-sponsored the proposal). -- Japan: Supports the idea of making a change to permit conversion of Rabta, but have not received final instructions. Is still looking at political/legal implications of proposal. Informally, UK and US lobbied hard for support of this particular change and against France. UK is being very candid in portraying French dissent as unfounded and politically motivated. Japan closed its commentary by noting that if SPs choose to pursue this change, obtaining consensus would be important (Note: In the days following the meeting, Japan indicated it will not co-sponsor the Libyan proposal, and even its support for the proposal now seems lackluster. Delegation believes Japan has no particular concern over the proposal itself, but is waiting for the politics to play themselves out before supporting any particular course of action. End note.). -- Korea: No formal instructions, but asked two (unhelpful) "clarifying" questions: 1) Is it accurate to say in the last sentence that all other provisions continue to apply? Wouldn't para 66 and 69, for example, continue to apply. UK pointed out that para 66, and others, were in fact being changed and that the text said that "except for". Para 69 would continue to apply. After the meeting, Korea approached delegation and delegation assured him that we, UK and Italy, had done a thorough legal analysis and that it was literally true that all other provisions would continue to apply. To say simply, as he was proposing, that "other" (sans "all") provisions apply, might beg questions about which do and which do not continue to apply. Korea seemed to accept this. 2) Shouldn't we use the phrase "earliest practicable" in reference to the EC setting a deadline for submission of a request to convert? Delegation explained that the phrase earliest practicable was both accurate and useful in the second instance (of CSP action) since technical and operational factors would have to be taken into account to determine how quickly an SP could effect a conversion. However, in the case of the EC setting a date for submission of a request, the same clause would actual have the opposite effect by possibly begging arguments about what constitutes "earliest practicable" in this context. Again, Korea seemed to accept the point. -- Czech Republic: is reviewing the document and considering it positively, but no final instructions. -- Ukraine: Made no comment during the meeting, nor since. -- Bulgaria: Is interested in the subject, but only asked one clarifying point about when Libya's actual extension request would be submitted. -- Serbia-Montenegro: Does not oppose the initiative, but have no instructions yet. ¶5. (SBU) In addition, Yemen and Cameroon provided Libya with letters of co-sponsorship prior to the meeting. -------------- DELIVERY OF THE PROPOSAL BY LIBYA -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Subsequently, on Friday 16 July, Libyan Ambassador Zakia Abdussalam M. Sahli presented Libya's request for a technical change to the Director General. Included in the package (all faxed to State AC/CB on Friday, 16 July) were Ambassador Sahli's letter containing the request for a technical change, an Annex containing the actual text of the proposed change, an Annex providing additional information about the proposal, an Annex listing co-sponsors, and finally letters from States Parties that had co-sponsored prior to the formal request being made. The co-sponsoring SPs at the time of the submission were Algeria, United States, United Kingdom, Cameroon, Eritrea, Italy, Kenya, Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia, Yemen, and Sudan. ¶7. (SBU) Since the formal submission, Greece has indicated it will co-sponsor the proposal, and the delegation has been advised by Korea that it anticipates providing its letter of co-sponsorship sometime during the week of 19 July. ¶8. (SBU) Delegation is aware that the Libyan Ambassador is lobbying hard on a bilateral basis, to include working on Iran, which we're told supports the idea but is not in a position to co-sponsor yet. Some mention has also been made about her meeting with the Bulgarians, which could represent an interesting turn of events. Czech Republic speculated to the delegation that Bulgaria's interest and desire to attend the 13 July meeting stems from its interest in discussing Rabta, but also the fate of Bulgarian medical personnel who are apparently under a death sentence in Libya for allegedly deliberately spreading HIV. ¶9. (SBU) While co-sponsorship to date has been satisfactory, delegation believes that follow-up effort with some delegations may yet prove fruitful. In particular, delegation intends to lobby Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and possibly Netherlands, to co-sponsor. In addition, it has become clear that UK also continues to actively court other delegations, notably Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. -------------- GERMANY AND FRANCE -------------- ¶10. (SBU) UK has informed delegation that Germany and France continue to disdain the proposal, though delegation does not believe they have taken any specific action locally other than to express disagreement. Also via the UK delegation, Germany has stated, purely informally and not/not as an expression of a change in Germany's position, that its preference would be to see Rabta simply destroyed rather than converted. What's more, UK has said German resistance to the proposal is strong in Berlin, and that Germany shares France's objections to the proposal. It therefore appears that the more moderate tone Germany struck in our meetings may be hardening. ¶11. (SBU) Delegation also recalls that on the margins of the EC session, Germany delegate Peter Beerwerth stated that Rabta represented a dilemma for German politicians, because of past "illegal" transfers of equipment to Libya, and the attendant political fallout. Specifically, Germany would need to see the actual Libyan conversion plan before agreeing to any course of action. Delegation therefore recommends conveying, with Libya's concurrence of course, a copy of the conversion plan to Germany at the earliest possible date. -------------- VIEWS OF OPCW LEGAL ADVISOR -------------- ¶12. (SBU) On Wednesday, 21 July, del rep had a lengthy discussion with the OPCW legal advisor, Santiago Onate on, among other things, the Rabta conversion request. During the conversation it became clear that both Onate and the OPCW Director General are very favorably disposed to the Libyan proposal for a technical change, and delegation expects senior OPCW leadership will continue to be a positive force in this process. Onate stated he was in the process of developing a legal paper supporting the proposition that the change being sought in the Libyan proposal was indeed "technical", and did not require an Amendment to the Convention. In various conversations Onate had become aware that some delegations were questioning whether a change of this nature could honestly be considered "technical". The TS position is that it is indeed and Onate's charter therefore is to make the legal case to support that position. Onate expected that at least some elements of his legal paper would be included in the DG's opinion when it is eventually proffered. Del rep assured Onate we viewed this as a positive course of action and agree that making the legal case would be an important element of our future success. The legal view of the TS was likely to carry a great deal of credence with delegations that lack either the resources or the inclination to conduct their own legal analysis, but who nevertheless want assurance that they are subscribing to a "legitimate" course of action. ¶13. (SBU) In the course of the conversation, Onate expressed his belief that there would be a lot of value added in approaching GRULAC countries, who would have a natural affinity for this kind of action (because of the humanitarian element) but who may not understand the issues. Del rep concurred that while there was widespread "support" for the initiative, it was support borne, in many cases, of ideological affection rather than real understanding of what was being proposed. If another SP seriously called into question the validity of the approach, such supporters might waiver. All that would need to happen to see the process hamstrung would be for them to request more time to consider the proposal. Del rep noted that in that sense, perhaps more time should be spent solidifying and shoring up the support of those who have already expressed their support, but expressed hesitation at the idea of the US or UK or Italy approaching GRULAC, as this was a Libyan proposal and the optics of that could be a bit dubious. On the other hand, Libya had demonstrated that it did not have, at least not here in The Hague, the depth of understanding of the issues and the proposal, to educate others and convince them that this is a supportable proposal. Onate responded that perhaps the TS could fill the expertise void created by the absence of the three main co-sponsors. A presentation by, for example, Mr. Trentadue, who is Argentine, and himself, would be particularly well received. He suggested arranging a meeting of GRULAC for Libya to make a presentation to, again supported by the TS. As a final observation on this aspect of the issue, Onate stated his belief that the Guatemalan Ambassador would also be an excellent advocate with GRULAC countries. He knows OPCW business and enjoys a very good reputation. ¶14. (SBU) Onate indicated he had heard no direct feedback from either France or Germany, though he was familiar with their positions on the proposal. He gave no indication that he or the DG were particularly concerned about the prospect of facing criticism from France or Germany over support for this initiative. In a surprising aside, however, he indicated that Charge de Cabinet Rafael Grossi had spoken to French delegate Sophie Moal-Makame the day before (20 July) and had subsequently stated, apparently with some degree of confidence, that the French "would come around". Onate could not elaborate on the specifics of the conversation or the cause for Grossi's optimism. ¶15. (U) Kellogg sends. RUSSEL