DUTCH/EU: FM BOT ON IRAQ, CHINA, ASEM, SUDAN, AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001717 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2024 TAGS: PREL PARM EAID NL IZ CH SU EUN SUBJECT: DUTCH/EU: FM BOT ON IRAQ, CHINA, ASEM, SUDAN, AND CANADA REF: A. THE HAGUE 1701 ¶B. SECSTATE 1... 18563 2004-07-09 04THEHAGUE1717 Embassy The Hague SECRET 04THEHAGUE1701 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001717 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2024 TAGS: PREL PARM EAID NL IZ CH SU EUN SUBJECT: DUTCH/EU: FM BOT ON IRAQ, CHINA, ASEM, SUDAN, AND CANADA REF: A. THE HAGUE 1701 ¶B. SECSTATE 147536 Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL. REASONS: 1.4(B) AND (D). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Ambassador Sobel met with Dutch Foreign Minister Ben Bot on July 7 to preview the agenda for the July 12-13 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) in Brussels. Bot anticipated that the GAERC would agree to take positive steps with regard to Iraq and Sudan, although he expressed concern that the EU was not receiving full credit for ongoing activities in Sudan. In separate meetings with Finance Minister Zalm and at the MFA, EB A/S Wayne pressed for greater EU engagement on Iraq debt reduction and assistance. Bot said the China Arms Embargo probably would be discussed at the September Gymnich, but made clear that holding a successful Chinese summit is a top priority for the Dutch Presidency. Burma remains a ticklish issue for the EU which puts the ASEM summit at risk; for other reasons, the EU-Canada summit probably will not take place either. END SUMMARY. IRAQ -------------- ¶2. (S) According to Bot, agreeing on a plan for EU support for Iraq would be high on the GAERC's agenda. Iraqi President Allawi, he said, had confirmed his intention to attend the session and would join the ministers for lunch. For security reasons, however, this information was not being circulated widely. (Note: We were subsequently told by a Dutch MFA contact that Allawi later decided not to attend the session. End Note). Bot stressed that the EU sincerely wanted to be helpful to the new Iraqi government and would look to Allawi for input in identifying critical needs. The Solana-Patten letter of June 9, 2004, he added laid out general areas in which the EU felt comfortable making contributions, i.e. supporting the political process (including elections),promoting security and stability in Iraq and the region, and engaging with Iraq to lay the foundations for longer-term relations. ¶3. (C) Bot noted that he had recently had dinner with NATO SYG Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and supported his efforts to involve NATO in training and other activities inside Iraq. It will be important, he noted, to ensure that NATO and EU efforts do not interfere with one another. ¶4. (C) In separate meetings July 7 with Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm and MFA Director General for Political Affairs Hugo Siblesz, visiting EB A/S Tony Wayne pressed for greater Dutch and EU engagement on Iraq debt reduction and assistance. A/S Wayne explained that the USG planned to work through the Core Group, which includes the EU, to coordinate closely with the UN on supporting political transition and economic reconstruction in Iraq. The USG hoped for concrete actions by the year's end. Additional USG commitments would be based on IMF sustainability analysis. A/S Wayne urged the Dutch to use their role as EU President to support EU adoption of a similar pragmatic approach. While agreeing that such a non-political approach was best, Zalm said that additional bilateral Dutch pledges, including debt reduction, would need to be drawn from the country's development assistance funds, currently capped at 0.8 percent of GDP. Any additional funds directed toward Iraq would mean a cut in assistance to currently funded programs in other countries with possibly greater needs. Siblesz said the EU was clearly interested in hearing directly from Allawi; his input on the situation on the ground in Iraq could help to engage the EU and reluctant Members States (i.e., France). Siblesz added that there would be a meeting this week of Member States with assistance programs in Iraq to examine how such programs could be expanded on an EU-basis in such areas as police training, rule of law, and electoral support. CHINA ARMS EMBARGO -------------- ¶5. (S) Ambassador Sobel reiterated to Bot the strong U.S. interest in avoiding a decision to lift the China Arms Embargo. Noting that the issue was not on the agenda for the upcoming GAERC, Bot said that it probably would be discussed at the September 13-14 Gymnich instead. As EU president, the Dutch were working to strengthen the code of conduct while encouraging China to make progress on human rights. Personally, Bot said, he wished that the Dutch had not inherited this difficult and emotional issue from the Irish presidency, but they would have to deal with it one way or another. Lots of EU member states, he added, were pushing to abolish the embargo, and as president the Dutch had to remain objective. Bot made clear that his top priority was to ensure that a successful China-EU summit occurred during the Dutch presidency; he was explicitly less concerned with what steps would be necessary to make this happen. Bot indicated that France and China were suggesting that the summit might be canceled unless action was taken on the embargo. Ambassador Sobel stressed that we did not want to be surprised in this area. ASEM SUMMIT AND BURMA -------------- ¶6. (S) Noting that Burma was another ticklish issue for the EU, Bot said that he hoped for a compromise that would allow the EU-ASEM summit to go forward as planned. The Burmese, he said, needed to make some sort of credible good-will gesture with regard to Aung Sang Suu Kyi to move the process forward. The parliament and NGO community in the Netherlands was following this issue closely; even though they were not as influential as in Britain, he added, the GONL still needed to take their concerns seriously. So far, the EU had been unable to agree on a compromise solution for the ASEM summit, such as agreeing to let Burma participate in a lesser capacity. Having the Burmese represented at the ministerial level, for example, would still be too high according to Bot. Bot said that he had discussed this issue with Secretary Powell in Istanbul and had sought his support in SIPDIS influencing Indonesia and other Asian countries to put pressure on Burma to be more accommodating. SUDAN -------------- ¶7. (C) Turning to Sudan, Bot said that the EU is already doing a lot with regard to the Darfur crisis but does not get credit for it. Noting that the Dutch have been pushing this issue within the EU, Bot said the GAERC would consider not only additional steps, but also how to publicize those measures the EU is already taking. Bot noted that he had discussed this issue briefly with Secretary Powell in Istanbul. CANADA -------------- ¶8. (C) Bot noted with some exasperation that the EU-Canada summit scheduled for the Dutch Presidency probably would be postponed. The Canadian Prime Minister, he said, was worried about his domestic political situation and had proposed impossible dates for the summit. Unless they could come up with better dates, Bot said, the summit would not take place. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (S) The Dutch presidency has barely started, and already faces the possibility of three failed summits: ASEM, Canada, and China. Of the three, the Chinese is clearly the most important -- and the one by which the Dutch presidency is most likely to be judged. Bot's determination to hold a EU-China summit at almost any cost, and his insistence that the Dutch must remain objective on the Arms Embargo question reinforces the message we have heard elsewhere that the Dutch will not take a leading or facilitating role in delaying a decision on lifting the arms embargo if the Chinese (and, Bot suggested, France) make it a precondition for a summit. SOBEL