NATO-AFGHANISTAN: DUTCH STAND FIRM ON GOING TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001240 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2014 TAGS: MARR MOPS AF NL NATO SUBJECT: NATO-AFGHANISTAN: DUTCH STAND FIRM ON GOING TO BAGHLAN REF: A. STATE 111287 ¶B. THE HAGUE 1210 (NOTAL) Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE DANIEL R. RUSSEL FOR REASONS 1.5 (B AND D) ¶1. (C) In recent conversations with FM Bot, PM Foreign Policy Advisor Swartbol, and CHOD ADM Kroon, Amb. Sobel discussed request (outlined in ref A) for the Dutch to consider leading a PRT in western Afghanistan instead of Baghlan. PolMilOff separately raised ref A points with MFA Security Policy Operations Chief Rob Gabrielse on May 19. The GONL remains firm, however, in its determination to lead a PRT in Baghlan. Following discussions with his German counterpart on May 17, Minister of Defense Kamp publicly announced that the Dutch will go to Baghlan and that this would be the only PRT the Netherlands would lead. MFA sources claim Struck "agreed with the Netherlands going to Baghlan." MFA contacts advise that the Germans are viewed as trusted partners by the Dutch parliament, which will facilitate the GONL's efforts to gain parliamentary support. Contacts also noted that PM Balkenende and Chancellor Schroeder agreed in April to pursue Dutch-German cooperation in Afghanistan. ¶2. (C) Comment: There are strong domestic political arguments behind the Dutch preference for Baghlan. As noted ref B, the GONL is currently preoccupied with renewing the deployment of its approximately 1300 troops (whose regularly scheduled six month rotation is set to expire July 15) in Iraq. This is not yet a done deal, and some members of the governing coalition have expressed public doubts about the wisdom of an extension. Dutch governments always prefer to make military deployments backed by the broadest possible political consensus. Given that the Iraq decision may well be divisive, the Balkenende government would prefer to make the PRT case as non-controversial as possible. In addition to the political advantages of working in proximity to the German operation in Konduz, the Dutch are, as always, focused on having very clearly defined medevac and in extremis support arrangements (a legacy of their 1995 fiasco in Srebrenica). MFA sources note that the fact that the Dutch Apache helicopters currently flying ISAF support out of Kabul could also reach Baghlan would be useful in parliamentary debate. In view of these factors, a deployment to Baghlan, between Kabul and the German-led PRT in Konduz, would be a much easier sell for the GONL in parliament. End comment. RUSSEL