Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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04TELAVIV6385 | 2004-12-16 09:06:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tel Aviv |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 006385 |
1. (C) SUMMARY: National Security Advisor Giora Eiland told Codel Hagel/Biden that the GOI is trying to avoid repeating the "mistakes" it made when PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas was prime minister in 2003. In order to help Abbas succeed this time, the GOI, he said, will have to be "more flexible" about pursuing militants from the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, who present Abbas his foremost security challenge. Eiland also advocated GOI transfer of security authority to the PA in areas where the PA says it can take over; a direct message to the Palestinian people from Israel's leadership, perhaps in a post-election speech to the PLC; trilateral negotiations about an Israeli withdrawal from the Philadelphi Strip ahead of disengagement; and, steps to boost the Palestinian economy. Eiland complained that Egypt is unwilling to offer jobs to Palestinians in QIZs that could be built in the Sinai, and asserted that Arab leaders, in general, want to perpetuate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which they see as protection against pressure for reform. Senator Feinstein pressed Eiland about Israeli settlement expansion. Eiland reported that the GOI will change the route of the separation barrier, but that a Cabinet debate on route changes has been repeatedly postponed because of the political environment. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) Senators Chuck Hagel, Joseph Biden, Dianne Feinstein, and Lincoln Chafee (Codel Hagel/Biden) queried National Security Advisor Giora Eiland about the Israeli approach to the new Palestinian leadership in a December 1 meeting in Jerusalem. Eiland's staff member, Gabi Blum, joined the meeting, as did Charge, poloff, and Senate staff and military escorts from the codel. -------------------------- Helping Abbas Succeed -------------------------- 3. (C) In recounting the Codel's November 30 meeting with PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, Sen. Feinstein commented that Abbas seemed prepared to do all that Prime Minister Sharon had told the Codel, in another November 30 meeting (septel), that he expected of the PA. Eiland remarked that the GOI is trying to avoid the "mistakes" it made during Abbas's brief term as PA prime minister in 2003. Asked for examples of GOI mistakes, Eiland cited public statements GOI officials made about their expectations for the PA, notably a weakened Arafat. Such statements, he said, embarrassed Abbas and helped set Arafat against him. Another "mistake" Eiland cited was GOI reluctance to take the security risks that would have left ordinary Palestinians with a sense of change in their lives. "We weren't generous enough," he said, quickly adding that deficiencies in the GOI approach were not the main cause for Abbas's failure as prime minister. He blamed instead Arafat, Hamas, and the armed Fatah factions for Abbas's resignation. 4. (C) Sen. Feinstein said that Abbas had told the Codel that he wished to see disengagement linked to the three phases of the roadmap. Expressing surprise, Eiland said that the GOI does not believe that disengagement relieves the PA of its security obligations under Phase One of the roadmap. The GOI accepted the roadmap, he said, only because its sequencing, contrary to that of Oslo and other earlier peace efforts, placed action on security before negotiations over final status issues. 5. (C) Stressing his recognition that an outsider could make policy recommendations but that Israel had to contend with terrorism and would bear the consequences of a policy failure, Sen. Biden expressed the view that Arafat's death provides the first opportunity in over 30 years for realizing a two-state solution. The new PA leaders, he said, "appear enlightened" and "appear to recognize the need for a two-state solution," but their constituency is small. Abbas, moreover, has no control over Iran and Hizballah, who, Biden noted citing GOI figures, instigate 80% of planned terrorist attacks emanating from the West Bank. Biden noted that he had asked Sharon in the November 30 meeting whether the PM had refined his security expectations for the PA given Abbas's inability to control Iranian/Hizballah interference. Biden asked for Eiland's views of Abbas's security capabilities. 6. (C) The GOI has to change how it thinks and makes decisions about security, Eiland replied. Abbas's primary security challenge, he said, comes from the armed wing of Fatah, principally the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Unlike Hamas, which can rely on its social activities to sustain its political and financial support during a cease-fire, al-Aqsa depends entirely on the use of violence for its support. Abu Mazen can dissuade al-Aqsa from using violence and accepting financial assistance from Iran only if the GOI is "more flexible" and "creative" in its approach to pursuing wanted members of al-Aqsa, Eiland said. Biden praised Eiland's pragmatism. 7. (C) Saying she was startled by the poor conditions, unhappy faces, and ethnic separation she saw while being driven through Abu Dis the day before, Sen. Feinstein pointed to the need for Israel to give hope to the "occupied." Eiland replied that a number of GOI steps along these lines were possible, although the GOI would generally refrain from action before the PA elections. He advocated the following steps: -- Transfering security authority to the PA for those towns in which Abbas says the PA is ready to assume control. Abbas will have to take big risks in doing so, Eiland commented, adding that "Arab" leaders, in general, are averse to being held accountable. -- Having "Israeli leadership" address the Palestinian people directly, perhaps in an address to the Palestinian Legislative Council after the PA elections. -- Giving Abbas "achievements" beyond the withdrawal of Israelis from the Gaza Strip, a step that all know Israel will take regardless of the Palestinian leadership. Eiland advocated, in particular, Israeli-Palestinian-Egyptian cooperation leading to the IDF evacuation of the Philadelphi Strip prior to completion of the disengagement plan. An IDF withdrawal from Philadelphi, he said, would allow Abbas to say that he had convinced Israel to depart and thereby to abandon its intention to keep Gazans in "jail." Abbas could, moreover, claim responsibility for returning to Gazans the freedom that they have not known since 1948, Eiland said. -- Promoting Palestinian economic improvements. Blum listed economic dimensions in which she said that the GOI has already made commitments to the World Bank: upgrading passages in and out of both Gaza and the West Bank; developing industrial zones; and, transferring settlement assets. On the latter point, Blum noted that the GOI understands that PA Prime Minister Ahmed Querei'a has told World Bank officials that the PA does not wish to take over private homes on the Gaza settlements. This PA attitude, she said, would facilitate GOI plans to dismantle the homes. In response to Sen. Feinstein's question, Blum said the GOI also planned to dismantle synagogues and transfer cemeteries. 8. (C) Sen. Feinstein asked for GOI views on Egyptian proposals to increase the number of Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) in Egypt. The GOI, Eiland replied, believes that QIZs in the Sinai could provide jobs for Palestinians, but gave up pursuing the issue after the GOE had insisted on limiting employment in the QIZs to Egyptians. Blum said that the "official" GOE reasons for refusing proposals to employ Palestinians in Sinai QIZs included wage gaps between Egyptians and Palestinians, the high unemployment rate among Sinai residents, and local content laws. Eiland charged that the unspoken GOE rationale is that it does not want Palestinians coming to Egypt. -------------------------- -------------------------- Promoting a Constructive Approach from the Arab World -------------------------- -------------------------- 9. (C) Eiland complained about the "less than constructive" attitude of the Arab world in general to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arab leaders, he charged, do not want to see an end to the conflict because the conflict provides them their "ultimate excuse" for resisting post-9/11 reform pressures from the U.S. and EU. He claimed that mostly official, Saudi sources continued "until recently" to account for 70% of the funding going to Hamas. Sen. Feinstein asked what the U.S. could do to change Saudi behavior. Eiland said the U.S. should point to the real nature of Hamas "charities" to urge the Saudis to stop funding Hamas. -------------------------- Dealing with Settlement Expansion -------------------------- 10. (C) Sen. Feinstein asked Eiland why, especially in light of the opportunities of the moment, the GOI continues to "add" settlements. Eiland denied that the GOI is "adding" settlements. Internal Israeli political realities, he said, limit how far PM Sharon can now go with settlement removals. As long as settlers remain in the territories, the GOI must protect and support them. 11. (C) Sen. Feinstein noted that she had seen new housing going up in Jewish areas as she was en route to Ramallah the day before, and that she had heard about the GOI demolition of a Palestinian-owned hotel in Abu Dis. Why, she asked, does the GOI continue to complicate chances for peace in the future? Why does the GOI not stop all settlement activity? Eiland replied that the GOI does not consider construction anywhere in Jerusalem as settlement activity, adding that he would not comment on the wisdom of building Jewish neighborhoods so close to Palestinian areas. Later in the meeting, Sen. Biden, emphasizing that Israel has no better friend than him in the Senate, asserted that there is widespread belief that Israel is "expanding settlements." This has a real impact, both politically and psychologically, on Americans, the vast majority of whom, not just Jews and Evangelical Christians, are committed to the well-being of Israel. -------------------------- Update on Separation Barrier -------------------------- 12. (C) In response to a query about the West Bank separation barrier, Eiland reported that the GOI has not yet taken any final decisions, either officially or in internal deliberations, about changes to the route of the fence. Everyone understands, however, that the Israeli High Court decision invalidating sections of the route, along with international pressure including "understandings" with the USG, would require the GOI to change the route, Eiland said. He predicted that route changes would soon be presented to the Cabinet. A Cabinet debate has been repeatedly postponed "week to week," he said, because of "political sensitivities." 13. (U) Codel staff cleared this message. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** KURTZER |