Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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04TELAVIV2360 | 2004-04-23 14:48:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tel Aviv |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 002360 |
1. (C) EU Special Envoy Marc Otte told Ambassador Kurtzer April 23 that European officials are beginning efforts to identify steps that will allow the Palestinians to succeed following an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. He agreed that the international community can identify appropriate roles and work up a terrific plan, but the effort needs a committed Palestinian partner. Beyond that, the community needs to be able to call on PM Sharon to remove identified roadblocks to its efforts on economic and security enhancement, the two inseparable pillars on which Gaza's success depends. Otte said he had told PA PM Abu Ala'a that the Palestinians have international sympathy, but that sympathy is limited by the impact of attacks in Madrid and elsewhere. In addition, the PA needs to identify one empowered interlocutor, not five. Abu Ala'a, and, separately, Saeb Erekat and Salam Fayyad, all agreed that a strategy with a positive agenda is necessary to make Gaza succeed after withdrawal, he said. 2. (C) In general discussion of internationals' roles, Ambassador Kurtzer gently noted Israel's firm opposition to any role for internationals on security -- what he termed "almost a showstoppper for Israel." Otte noted the "real problems" with the Palestinian security services at this time, and suggested that the Palestinians will need to be persuaded that this is what they want to do. In the coming months, he said, the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee can develop a "bag of goodies to make it work." Asked about possible roles for Egypt, Ambassador Kurtzer said he thought the Israelis' idea of any Egyptian role is inflated. He also noted that some initial thought had been given to a role for the Multinational Force and Observers, but the idea needed considerable fleshing out. 3. (C) Ambassador Kurtzer pointed out that Israel's commitments to the President, as outlined in the Weissglas letter to NSA Rice, will not go away, and form a key part of the overall package. With that, he saw no reason not to share as much information as possible between the Europeans and the USG on monitoring, as the sides did during last summer's Roadmap monitoring mission. He acknowledged that the prohibition on travel of USG personnel to Gaza leaves the Embassy dependent on long distance contacts and information from others. 4. (C) Otte said he would be seeking Palestinian assurances that PA security forces would seek to prevent Gazan actions that would trigger IDF reprisals, and Israeli assurances that IDf actions would not target international projects. He offered as one possiblity for mitigating such incidents the establishment of a joint situation room manned by Israelis, Palestinians and internationals. 5. (C) Otte noted that the UNRWA emergency appeal has secured only about half of its stated need because of donor reallocations to Iraq. Beyond aid, though, he said that trade, access, job creation and standard of living had to be improved to the extent that Gazans wold be able to say "life is not so bad here." The Ambassador noted that at the time of Oslo, the sides hoped that expatriate Palestinian businessmen would invest in Gaza, but they never got the necessary cooperation from the Palestinian leadership. Nonetheless, he added, Gaza and the West Bank have a capable business communities. 6. (C) On the political scene, Otte and the Ambassador agreed that Abu Ala'a must be pressed to act like a real prime minister, and, if he does, the international community can support him. On the Israeli side, the picture should be clearer by the end of June, by which time it will be clear whether the current coalition of another constellation will be in place. After that, Israel will need three to six months to pass necessary legislation to facilitate the withdrawal. The international community should use that time to plan its own moves. One key, Otte said, is "convince Israel that we really want this to work. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** KURTZER |