COMBATING RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM; USG-GOI DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001568 SIPDIS UNVIE FOR IAEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2014 TAGS: PTER TSPL PARM IS COUNTERTERRORISM ISRAEL RELATIONS SUBJECT: COMBATING RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM; USG-GOI DISCUSS JOINT ACTIVITIES REF: 03 TEL AVIV 7234 Classified By: DCM Richard LeBaron for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) U.S. and Israeli delegations discussed efforts to combat radiological terrorism during February 24-25 talks held in Israel. The parties reviewed existing institutional structures and technologies as well as strategy and approaches for research, development, testing and evaluation. Also discussed was the role of science and technology in support of operational and public affairs challenges in responding to a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) event. The need to develop advanced technologies to detect RDD's and respond to such an event was of paramount concern, as well as the training of first responders and avoiding public panic. Both sides agreed that an RDD event -- designed for mass disruption rather than mass destruction -- could have devastating economic and psychological impacts in excess of direct damage to human health. ¶2. (C) Further collaboration on radiation detection, dispersion modeling, performance standards, testing protocols and unconventional explosive detection will be considered under the umbrella of the Joint Counterterrorism Group Working Group on Homeland Security. Israel is among few countries undertaking serious research and development toward combating an RDD event, and would be a logical USG partner for further cooperation. End Summary. ¶3. (C) The USG delegation was led by Robert Harward, Director for Strategy and Defense Issues, Office of Combating Terrorism, NSC, and Dr. Holly Dockery, Director of International Affairs, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It included officials from DHS, the Department of Energy (DOE),National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST),and Embassy Tel Aviv ESTHoff. The Israeli delegation was led by Gideon Shavit, Director of External Relations, Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC),and included officials from the IAEC, Ministry of Defense, National Security Council, Israeli Police, Ministry of Environment, Israeli Security Agency, Israeli Defense Forces, and Israeli Institute of Biological Research. -------------- WORKSHOP FOCUS ON S&T ROLE IN RDD EVENT -------------- ¶4. (C) The meetings were held at the Soreq Nuclear Research Center outside of Tel Aviv, the centralized location in Israel for radioactive detection capabilities (explosive detection is centralized at Police/Israeli Security Agency facilities, and chemical/biological detection at the Israeli Institute of Biological Research). The parties reviewed existing institutional structures for RDD detection and management of an RDD event, and explained the results of recent Table Top Exercises conducted to simulate responses to such an event. The principal lessons learned included the need to better train first responders, the development of refined standards for decontamination ("how clean is clean?"),and the public affairs challenges in preventing panic and media frenzy. Additionally, the USG team emphasized the need for science and technology representatives to be engaged from the start in exercise planning, and not just in assessing the performance of existing technologies. This would optimize data collection and evaluation of technological performance. -------------- GOI HIGHLIGHTS CARGO RISK TO CIVIL AVIATION -------------- ¶5. (C) A session on aviation security reviewed the latest systems and technologies in detecting RDD as well as other explosive devices. Ram Arnon of the Israeli Security Agency explained that the GOI is now moving to 100 percent physical screening of cargo, a change from past practice of screening based on profiling and the bill of lading. In Arnon's view, given the stepped-up screening of passengers, the next large aviation event is more likely to occur from cargo placed aboard passenger jets. The U.S. delegation reviewed advances in aviation security technologies, as well as new screening systems and technologies being evaluated at the test bed of the Port Authority of NY/NJ. -------------- CLEAN-UP STANDARDS: HOW CLEAN IS CLEAN? -------------- ¶6. (C) On mitigation and decontamination issues, both delegations reviewed existing standards both for permissible radiation exposure to first responders as well as acceptable levels for post event clean-up. The USG del explained our policy that decontamination levels be considered on a site-specific basis, with the guiding principle of attaining as low a contamination level "as reasonably achievable" (ALARA). DHS officials noted the importance of separating an RDD event from normal environmental clean-up standard when assessing proper decontamination levels. The GOI briefed the US delegation on their new standards for acceptable dosage limits for first responders, bringing them more into accord with current international standards. These new limits recognized the distinction between those applicable to remedial action and those for life saving activities, the latter having a higher threshold. -------------- PUBLIC AFFAIRS CHALLENGES -------------- ¶7. (C) The IAEC gave an extensive briefing on public affairs issues and working with the media, having recently held a seminar on these issues with local media and other policymakers. They emphasized the general lack of knowledge in the public concerning RDD (and association with nuclear devices),and the potential for media frenzy and panic. The GOI is identifying and preparing a list of speakers to address key issues and avoid a vacuum filled by "experts" who might send an inappropriate message. Dr. Dockery indicated that the GOI analysis dovetailed with the USG analysis, although we have yet to hold a formal exercise on this issue. Dockery noted that in the U.S., like Israel, public attitudes about radiation are very backward, and emphasized the need for a consistent and coordinated governmental message should an event occur. She added that in many cases of public disasters (e.g. earthquakes),the local media outlets provide more helpful, practical advice to the public than the national media, which tends to focus more on dramatic visual images. -------------- FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES -------------- ¶8. (C) The GOI del presented a proposal for follow-up activities that included the following: table top exercise on public affairs, a meeting on dispersion models, a USG seminar to Israeli first responders, a follow-up meeting on technologies for detection of illicit trafficking of radioactive materials, a discussion of USG decontamination doctrine and procedures, and mutual visits to exercises. Dockery and Harward explained that certain of these issues were beyond the purview of this delegation (comprised of S&T officials),but that we would pass their suggestions on to the appropriate offices and agencies. The USG would be prepared to consider, however, certain follow-up under the auspices of the Homeland Security Working Group of the JCG. Specifically, we would look into the suggested follow-up on dispersion models in association with an MOD-Department of Defense meeting planned for April, as well as further discussions concerning detection of unconventional explosives. Additional areas of cooperation suggested by the US del include linkages between explosives and RDD detection, as well as the use of the Soreq testing facilities to conduct joint experiments and testing of RDD devices. ¶9. (C) Comment. The meetings were useful and both delegations accomplished internal goals. The GOI has for some time expressed interest in establishing closer links with civilian USG counterparts engaged in homeland security issues. The Israelis view DHS as a newly established counterpart in this respect, and this RDD meeting represents an inroad into further collaboration. For the USG, there are few countries which share the same risk profile concerning RDD events and which are actively engaged in the R&D required to combat this form of terrorism. Israel would be a logical partner for increased collaboration given their interest and technical expertise in this field. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** KURTZER