Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04TEGUCIGALPA874
2004-04-16 03:10:00
SECRET
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Cable title:  

HONDURAS SEEKS BETTER INFORMATION SHARING AS

Tags:  PREL MOPS MARR IZ HO 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000874 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA, WHA/PPC, AND WHA/CEN
STATE FOR PM, PM/RSAT, AND PM/PMAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2014
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR IZ HO
SUBJECT: HONDURAS SEEKS BETTER INFORMATION SHARING AS
TREPIDATION RISES AMID ONGOING VIOLENCE IN IRAQ

REF: A. USDAO TEGUCIGALPA IIR 68419867 04

B. TEGUCIGALPA 858

C. SECSTATE 83947

D. SECSTATE 80156

E. SECSTATE 79427

F. WARSAW 1011

G. TEGUCIGALPA 804

H. SECSTATE 74537

I. TEGUCIGALPA 782

J. TEGUCIGALPA 642 (ALL NOTAL)

Classified By: Political Counselor Francisco Palmieri;
reasons 1.4 (a),(b),and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000874 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA, WHA/PPC, AND WHA/CEN STATE FOR PM, PM/RSAT, AND PM/PMAT E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2014 TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR IZ HO SUBJECT: HONDURAS SEEKS BETTER INFORMATION SHARING AS TREPIDATION RISES AMID ONGOING VIOLENCE IN IRAQ REF: A. USDAO TEGUCIGALPA IIR 68419867 04 ¶B. TEGUCIGALPA 858 ¶C. SECSTATE 83947 ¶D. SECSTATE 80156 ¶E. SECSTATE 79427 ¶F. WARSAW 1011 ¶G. TEGUCIGALPA 804 ¶H. SECSTATE 74537 ¶I. TEGUCIGALPA 782 ¶J. TEGUCIGALPA 642 (ALL NOTAL) Classified By: Political Counselor Francisco Palmieri; reasons 1.4 (a),(b),and (d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request; please see paragraph 9. ¶2. (S) Summary: Trepidation in Honduras continues to rise amid press reports that U.S. troops are preparing an assault on the city of Najaf, Iraq, to arrest and/or kill Muqtaba al Sadr and put an end to the armed uprising by his militia. The 369 Honduran troops that make up Task Force Xatruch remain primarily confined to their immediate surroundings on the outskirts of Najaf. The Government of Honduras has stated that they will not/not participate in any type of offensive combat operations. On April 14, Honduran Minister of Defense (MOD) Federico Breve announced publicly that Honduran troops would be withdrawn from Iraq if the situation becomes intolerable, but that for now Honduras would stay the course. He stated that essential information regarding events in Iraq is not reaching the GOH. Please see paragraph 9 for action request from MOD Breve. End Summary ¶3. (C) Trepidation with the Government of Honduras (GOH) and the Honduran populace continues to rise amid reports that U.S. troops remain poised to strike Najaf in an effort to kill and/or arrest Muqtaba al Sadr and end the armed uprising by his militia. While the GOH announced that Honduran troops will not participate in any offensive combat missions, the GOH remains nervous about the prospect of Honduran casualties, particularly since polls consistently indicate that over 70 percent of the general public remains substantially opposed to Honduras' participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). MOD Breve also stated on April 14, that Honduras would withdrawal its troops from Iraq if the situation becomes intolerable, but reiterated that for now Honduras would stay the course. (Comment: Any significant Honduran casualties related to a U.S. offensive in Najaf would probably result in widesp
read domestic calls for an immediate withdrawal of Honduran troops from Iraq, placing intense political pressure on President Ricardo Maduro. End Comment.) ¶4. (SBU) At the request of the National Congress, during the week of April 19, MOD Breve is scheduled to deliver a brief on the events unfolding in Iraq to the legislative body. President of the National Congress, Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo, has generally been supportive of the troop deployment, but since violence erupted around Najaf, he has begun to back away publicly from his previous stance. Embassy expects MOD Breve to assure Congress, in keeping with the congressional authorization to participate in OIF, that Honduran forces will not participate in offensive combat operations and that the GOH's mission in Iraq will remain limited to humanitarian and reconstruction operations. In keeping with this commitment, Honduran troops currently remain confined to patrolling their immediate surroundings. (Comment: On numerous occasions the GOH has indicated that Honduras would not participate in offensive combat operations. Honduran troops are neither trained nor equipped for a combat role. End Comment.) ¶5. (C) MOD Breve privately stated to EmbOffs serious reservations regarding unfolding events in the Najaf area. He indicated that although Honduran forces in Iraq have tried to get information regarding upcoming U.S. operations in the Najaf area through the regular chain of command, essential tactical information regarding planned operations has not/not been shared with the Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF). MOD Breve is concerned that Honduran troops near Najaf do not have sufficient force protection and are vulnerable, particularly should U.S. forces launch offensive operations there. He added that Honduran troops lack sufficient force protection material to construct an adequate defensive perimeter. MOD Breve had phoned DCM several times during the Holy Week holidays for updates on the situation in Najaf, following local press report of a U.S. withdrawal from the city. DCM related the most recent information he had received from CENTCOM. ¶6. (C) MOD Breve also informed EmbOffs that while he understands that the anticipated June 30 handover of power to the Iraqi Governing Coalition is a sensitive diplomatic issue, the GOH has no idea how that will effect Honduras' role in Iraq. He mentioned that President Maduro has sought information from him on this transition phase, but to date, has been unable to generate any answers. MOD Breve reiterated to PolCouns that he is not looking for a detailed roadmap, but that he would like a sense of the U.S.'s strategic approach on the issue in order to adequately prepare for a change in Honduran policy toward Iraq, should that become necessary. ¶7. (C) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Jose Isaias Barahona told EmbOffs that if Honduras were to further participate in OIF, a decision would have to be made by May 1 in order to allow sufficient time to adequately prepare for a third deployment. He also noted to PolCouns that Honduras has yet to be approached formally by the U.S. as to whether the U.S. wants Honduras' continued participation in OIF. (Comment: Although the HOAF has indicated an initial willingness to continue in Iraq (refs F & I),recent unrest in the Najaf area has somewhat dampened this interest (ref A). ¶8. (U) The Honduran press has reported that Task Force Xatruch's compound near Najaf has come under six different mortar attacks, but, so far, no injuries or damage has been sustained. In remarks to the press, the Honduran commander in Iraq, Colonel Wilfredo Calderon Canales, has stated that contrary to some local press reports, only one Honduran has been injured in the latest outbreak of violence and none have been taken hostage. He also told the press that the situation around Najaf was returning to normal. ¶9. (S) Action Request for WHA/PM: Embassy requests guidance on how to respond to the following issues raised by MOD Breve: (a) what are U.S. strategic designs for Task Force Xatruch and Battalion Plus Ultra in the run up to, and after, the June 30 transfer of power; (b) what role does the U.S. anticipate for Honduran forces in Najaf if different from the current mission; and, (c) should the Embassy seek an extension of Honduran participation in OIF? Embassy notes that refs C, D, E, H address security conditions and violence in Iraq, but requests that more detailed information be provided to further inform the GOH of events directly affecting their troops in Najaf. ¶10. (C) Comment: Embassy notes that Honduras has more troops in Iraq than NATO allies such as Norway, Portugal, and the Czech Republic and that the GOH has steadfastly supported U.S. efforts in Iraq. While President Maduro remains deeply concerned about the political ramifications of Honduran casualties in Iraq (ref B),and it appears unlikely the GOH will seek Congressional authorization for a third deployment, a window of opportunity continues to exist if the U.S. is prepared to act quickly. The passage April 15 of the Honduran-drafted UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) resolution on CUBA gives the GOH a victory and is a setback to President Maduro's political opponents in the short-term. End Comment ¶11. (U) Minimize considered. PALMER

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