HONDURAN AIR INTERDICTION PROCEDURES, U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 000289

SIPDIS

STATE FOR INL, L/LEI, WHA, WHA/PPC, AND WHA/CEN
SOUTHCOM FOR GENERAL HILL AND GENERAL BISHOP
JIATF-S FOR RADM SIROIS
SECDEF FOR EFROTHINGHAM
NSC FOR JBJOSTAD
DOJ FOR MLWARREN AND DKOFFSKY
ONDCP FOR BCRANE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2014
TAGS: SNAR MOPS PINS PREL MCAP PINR HO
SUBJECT: HONDURAN AIR INTERDICTION PROCEDURES, U.S.
INFORMATION SHARING, AND RISKS TO U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS
WITH HONDURAS

REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 209


B. TEGUCIGALPA 203

C. TEGUCIGALPA 193

D. STATE 15961

E. TEGUCIGALPA 179

Classified By: Ambassador Larry Palmer;
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The policy statements and standard
operating procedures outlined below are keyed to questions
posed in ref D and based on discussion with the joint
State/DOD team that visited Honduras on February 2-4. Post
wishes to underscore that U.S. information sharing with
Honduras has proven to be a critical element in the enormous
increase in Honduras interdiction efforts. In 2003, Honduras
seized over 5,700 kilos of cocaine and 13 kilos of heroin,
representing more than all combined cocaine/heroin seizures
during the previous five years. During the first month of
2004, Honduras seized 1,128 kilos of cocaine and 13 kilos of
heroin, putting the country on track to exceed last year's
record seizures. Any interruption in U.S. information
sharing would most certainly result in significantly reduced
Honduran interdiction capabilities. In addition, there are
important bilateral military-to-military interests that could
be put at risk, including continued Honduran willingness to
support U.S. initiatives to promote increased regional
military cooperation by hosting combined exercises with other
Central American countries and, even, to extend the Honduran
troop deployment in Iraq for a second year. Honduras has
been a strong supporter of U.S. foreign policy goals in the
UN, Summit of the Americas, and CAFTA negotiations. Post
recommends that Washington policymakers adopt a uniform
approach to information sharing with all countries in the
region. END SUMMARY.

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WRITTEN ASSURANCE OF NO SHOOT-DOWN POLICY
--------------


2. (C) As reported in ref D, post received written assurance
from General Jose Isaias Barahona, the Chief of the Joint
Staff of the Armed Forces, that Honduras does not have a
policy of shooting down civil aircraft. The Government of
Honduras does reserve the right to defend itself from any
threat from any unlawful civil air flight linked to
international terrorism.

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STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR AIR INTERCEPTION/USE OF
WARNING SHOTS
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3. (C) During its visit, the INL/DOD team only partially
received requested documentation. The Honduran Air Force
(HAF) did not provide copies of the HAF standard operating
procedures (SOPs) for air interception and firing of warning
shots. The HAF Commander, Col Manuel Enrique Caceres Diaz,
maintained that such air order of battle documents are
classified. They referred the team to General Barahona's
January 26 letter as illustrative of the SOPs used by the
HAF. However, HAF officials did provide ICAO procedures that
they use to intercept unidentified aircraft. (COMMENT:
Mission elements question whether HAF has comprehensive,
fully articulated, and widely distributed SOPs. END COMMENT.)

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INCIDENT REPORT
--------------


4. (C) HAF Commander faxed copies of this report on January

26. Mission is seeking original copies.

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CIRCUMSTANCES FOR FIRING WARNING SHOTS
--------------


5. (C) HAF Commander told the INL/DOD team that the air
defense crews only consider, in consultation with the HAF
operations center, the option of firing warning shots after
completing all of the required ICAO signals and procedures.
Such warning shots are then only fired from along side of
(parallel to) the intruding aircraft. They execute such
warning shots without putting at risk either the life or
safety of the occupants of the intruding aircraft. They also
avoid shooting over populated areas in order to protect the
safety of people on the ground.

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REASONS FOR FIRING WARNING SHOTS
--------------


6. (C) The goal of warning shots is to establish
communication with the flight crew of the intruding aircraft
after all other ICAO methods have been exhausted. According
to the HAF Commander, the HAF interceptors must be able to
communicate with intruding aircraft in order to identify
positively the aircraft and to give them directions for
landing their aircraft at a Honduran air field.

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AUTHORITY FOR FIRING WARNING SHOTS
--------------


7. (C) The air defense pilots must seek authorization for
firing warning shots from the Commander of the Air Force, who
in turn is authorized to issue such an order only by the
Chief of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces. Each and every
individual volley of warning shots must be authorized through
this chain of command.

-------------- -
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR SHOOTING DOWN CIVIL AIRCRAFT
-------------- -


8. (C) According to the HAF Commander, only the President of
Honduras can give the order to shoot down a civil aircraft,
which would only be undertaken if the aircraft posed a threat
of terrorism to the civilian population.

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PUBLIC NOTICE TO CIVIL AVIATION
--------------


9. (C) The Government of Honduras does not provide any
notice to airmen of its air intercept guidelines and expects
all airmen to follow ICAO procedures.

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COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) COMMENT: Post wishes to underscore that U.S.
information sharing with Honduras has proven to be a critical
element in the enormous increase in Honduras interdiction
efforts. In 2003, Honduras seized over 5,700 kilos of cocaine
and 13 kilos of heroin, representing more than all combined
cocaine/heroin seizures during the previous five years.
During the first month of 2004, Honduras seized 1,128 kilos
of cocaine and 13 kilos of heroin, putting the country on
track to exceed last year's record seizures. Any
interruption in U.S. information sharing would most certainly
result in significantly reduced Honduran interdiction
capabilities. In addition, there are important bilateral
military-to-military interests that could be put at risk,
including continued Honduran willingness to support U.S.
initiative to promote increased regional military cooperation
by hosting combined exercises and, even, to extend the
Honduran troop deployment in Iraq for a second year.
Honduras has been a strong supporter of U.S. foreign policy
goals in the UN, Summit of the Americas, and CAFTA
negotiations. Post recommends that Washington policymakers
adopt a uniform approach to information sharing with all
countries in the region. END COMMENT.
PALMER