HONDURAN AIR INTERDICTION PROCEDURES, U.S.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 000289 SIPDIS STATE FOR INL, L/LEI, WHA, WHA/PPC, AND WHA/CEN SOUTHCOM FOR GENERAL HILL AND GENERAL BISHOP JIATF-S FOR RADM SIROIS SECDEF FOR EFROTHINGHAM NSC FOR JBJOSTAD DOJ FOR MLWARREN AND DKOFFSKY ONDCP FOR BCRANE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2014 TAGS: SNAR MOPS PINS PREL MCAP PINR HO SUBJECT: HONDURAN AIR INTERDICTION PROCEDURES, U.S. INFORMATION SHARING, AND RISKS TO U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS WITH HONDURAS REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 209 ¶B. TEGUCIGALPA 203 ¶C. TEGUCIGALPA 193 ¶D. STATE 15961 ¶E. TEGUCIGALPA 179 Classified By: Ambassador Larry Palmer; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The policy statements and standard operating procedures outlined below are keyed to questions posed in ref D and based on discussion with the joint State/DOD team that visited Honduras on February 2-4. Post wishes to underscore that U.S. information sharing with Honduras has proven to be a critical element in the enormous increase in Honduras interdiction efforts. In 2003, Honduras seized over 5,700 kilos of cocaine and 13 kilos of heroin, representing more than all combined cocaine/heroin seizures during the previous five years. During the first month of 2004, Honduras seized 1,128 kilos of cocaine and 13 kilos of heroin, putting the country on track to exceed last year's record seizures. Any interruption in U.S. information sharing would most certainly result in significantly reduced Honduran interdiction capabilities. In addition, there are important bilateral military-to-military interests that could be put at risk, including continued Honduran willingness to support U.S. initiatives to promote increased regional military cooperation by hosting combined exercises with other Central American countries and, even, to extend the Honduran troop deployment in Iraq for a second year. Honduras has been a strong supporter of U.S. foreign policy goals in the UN, Summit of the Americas, and CAFTA negotiations. Post recommends that Washington policymakers adopt a uniform approach to information sharing with all countries in the region. END SUMMARY. -------------- WRITTEN ASSURANCE OF NO SHOOT-DOWN POLICY -------------- ¶2. (C) As reported in ref D, post received written assurance from General Jose Isaias Barahona, the Chief of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, that Honduras does not have a policy of shooting down civil aircraft. The Government of Honduras does reserve the right to defend itself from any threat from any unlawful civil air flight linked to international terrorism. -------------- -------------- STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR AIR INTERCEPTION/USE OF WARNING SHOTS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) During its visit, the INL/DOD team only partially received requested documentation. The Honduran Air Force (HAF) did not provide copies of the HAF standard operating procedures (SOPs) for air interception and firing of warning shots. The HAF Commander, Col Manuel Enrique Caceres Diaz, maintained that such air order of battle documents are classified. They referred the team to General Barahona's January 26 letter as illustrative of the SOPs used by the HAF. However, HAF officials did provide ICAO procedures that they use to intercept unidentified aircraft. (COMMENT: Mission elements question whether HAF has comprehensive, fully articulated, and widely distributed SOPs. END COMMENT.) -------------- INCIDENT REPORT -------------- ¶4. (C) HAF Commander faxed copies of this report on January ¶26. Mission is seeking original copies. -------------- CIRCUMSTANCES FOR FIRING WARNING SHOTS -------------- ¶5. (C) HAF Commander told the INL/DOD team that the air defense crews only consider, in consultation with the HAF operations center, the option of firing warning shots after completing all of the required ICAO signals and procedures. Such warning shots are then only fired from along side of (parallel to) the intruding aircraft. They execute such warning shots without putting at risk either the life or safety of the occupants of the intruding aircraft. They also avoid shooting over populated areas in order to protect the safety of people on the ground. -------------- REASONS FOR FIRING WARNING SHOTS -------------- ¶6. (C) The goal of warning shots is to establish communication with the flight crew of the intruding aircraft after all other ICAO methods have been exhausted. According to the HAF Commander, the HAF interceptors must be able to communicate with intruding aircraft in order to identify positively the aircraft and to give them directions for landing their aircraft at a Honduran air field. -------------- AUTHORITY FOR FIRING WARNING SHOTS -------------- ¶7. (C) The air defense pilots must seek authorization for firing warning shots from the Commander of the Air Force, who in turn is authorized to issue such an order only by the Chief of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces. Each and every individual volley of warning shots must be authorized through this chain of command. -------------- - CIRCUMSTANCES FOR SHOOTING DOWN CIVIL AIRCRAFT -------------- - ¶8. (C) According to the HAF Commander, only the President of Honduras can give the order to shoot down a civil aircraft, which would only be undertaken if the aircraft posed a threat of terrorism to the civilian population. -------------- PUBLIC NOTICE TO CIVIL AVIATION -------------- ¶9. (C) The Government of Honduras does not provide any notice to airmen of its air intercept guidelines and expects all airmen to follow ICAO procedures. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) COMMENT: Post wishes to underscore that U.S. information sharing with Honduras has proven to be a critical element in the enormous increase in Honduras interdiction efforts. In 2003, Honduras seized over 5,700 kilos of cocaine and 13 kilos of heroin, representing more than all combined cocaine/heroin seizures during the previous five years. During the first month of 2004, Honduras seized 1,128 kilos of cocaine and 13 kilos of heroin, putting the country on track to exceed last year's record seizures. Any interruption in U.S. information sharing would most certainly result in significantly reduced Honduran interdiction capabilities. In addition, there are important bilateral military-to-military interests that could be put at risk, including continued Honduran willingness to support U.S. initiative to promote increased regional military cooperation by hosting combined exercises and, even, to extend the Honduran troop deployment in Iraq for a second year. Honduras has been a strong supporter of U.S. foreign policy goals in the UN, Summit of the Americas, and CAFTA negotiations. Post recommends that Washington policymakers adopt a uniform approach to information sharing with all countries in the region. END COMMENT. PALMER