MINISTER OF DEFENSE REITERATES NO SHOOT-DOWN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000209 SIPDIS STATE FOR P, INL, L/LEI, WHA, WHA/PPC, AND WHA/CEN SOUTHCOM FOR GENERAL HILL JIATF-S FOR RADM SIROIS SECDEF FOR EFROTHINGHAM NSC FOR JBJOSTAD DOJ FOR MLWARREN AND DKOFFSKY ONDCP FOR BCRANE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2014 TAGS: SNAR MOPS PINS PREL MCAP PINR HO SUBJECT: MINISTER OF DEFENSE REITERATES NO SHOOT-DOWN POLICY AND SHARES AIR DEFENSE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 203 ¶B. TEGUCIGALPA 193 ¶C. STATE 15961 ¶D. TEGUCIGALPA 179 Classified By: Ambassador Larry Palmer; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Minister of Defense (MOD) Frederico Breve delivered a document to the Ambassador on January 27 which explains the Honduran Air Force's (HAF) standard operating procedures for intercepting intruding civil aircraft violating Honduran airspace and the use of live ammunition, including warning shots, against suspected narcotrafficking aircraft or other suspect aircraft flying in Honduran airspace. The Government of Honduras (GOH) also provided copies of the incident reports for the 1/20 plane crash in the department of Lempira. The MOD and the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated unequivocally, and in writing, that the GOH has a strict policy of not shooting down civil aircraft. Breve welcomed the possible visit of a U.S. team to discuss air interdiction policy issues. He stated forthrightly that the GOH has nothing to hide in this case. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) At a luncheon with the Ambassador on January 27 Minister of Defense (MOD) Frederico Breve delivered a document to the Ambassador on January 27 which explains the Honduran Air Force's (HAF) standard operating procedures for intercepting intruding civil aircraft violating Honduran airspace and the rules of engagement for the use of live ammunition, including warning shots, against suspected narcotrafficking aircraft or other suspect aircraft flying in Honduran airspace. The GOH had provided on January 26 copies of the incident reports for the 1/20 plane crash in the department of Lempira, which will be reported septel. Breve presented the information as a matter of fact and entertained follow-up questions from the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, USMILGP Commander and Defense Attache. ¶3. (C) The 2-page document, which is signed by General Isaias Barahona, the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF),explains HAF air defense intercept policy and reiterates that the HAF has discarded any procedure which would result in the firing on a civil aircraft with the intention of shooting it down. The document begins by explaining that the HAF uses the ICAO international procedures for the interception of unidentified aircraft. (Independently, the HAF Command Staff provided the Embassy with the specific pages from the ICAO Annex A that they use to signal intruding aircraft in Honduran airspace.) The document then adds that the HAF has established standard operating procedures (SOP) for this type of operation. ¶4. (C) According to the document, the HAF SOP employs a series of established tasks from its First Air Defense Squadron's Normal Operations Plan prior to a HAF aircraft intercepting another aircraft. In Chapter B--The Procedure for Unknown/Suspicious Aircraft, the SOP establishes the following procedure (informal translation): ¶A. In the case of having to detain or having information about unknown/suspicious aircraft. The Watch Officer in the HAF Operations Center (aka COFAH) shall take the following steps: ¶1. immediately shall inform the HAF General Command, the Chief of the Air Force Staff (aka JEMGA),and the Commander of the First Air Defense Squadron (aka PEDA), ¶2. shall place on alert all air bases or the air base on stand-by alert according to its role, and ¶3. shall contact air control agencies about transiting aircraft and flight plans in order to obtain information about the aircraft. ¶B. In the case of issuing orders from the HAF General Command for the take-off of interceptors, all necessary coordination shall be done in order to provide tactical air control of the intercepting aircraft within the air defense system. ¶C. If the unknown/suspicious aircraft proceeds towards another neighboring country, the Watch Office in the COFAH shall contact the respective operations center of that country or the Liaison Officer and shall facilitate relevant information about said aircraft, such as velocity, flight path, altitude, time, actual position, and characteristics of the aircraft, if there was a visual identification. ¶D. In the case of the interception of the unknown/suspicious aircraft, the Watch Officer shall give this information to the appropriate DEA agent, according to the list of names provided and to the U.S. Air Force Area Mission Chief. ¶5. (C) The document explains further "during their execution of an interception, the air crews will faithfully observe the regulations established by the ICAO Annex 2 and the HAF's air regulations manual." Only after completing all of the ICAO signals and procedures, the document states, may the air crews consider, in consultation with the COFAH, the option of firing warning shots from along side of (parallel to) the intruding aircraft without putting at risk either the life or safety of the occupants of the intruding aircraft. 6 (C) Finally, the document closes with a series of observations and policy statements. First it notes that the actual violations of Honduran airspace are not coming from other States and are incompatible with civil aviation norms, such as drug-trafficking and other illicit flights without corresponding flight plans. It says that, given this situation, Honduran pilots are obliged to make visual contact, to comply with all established procedures, and to try to visually check, if possible, if the illicit aircraft is carrying cargo. The document further explains it is important to emphasize that these intruding aircraft are not on commercial routes but on routes that are utilized by drug-trafficking aircraft as identified by JIATF, which through its intelligence systems has been able to define a very constant pattern to the routes being used by drug-trafficking aircraft. ¶7. (C) The closing paragraph states that the GOH has discarded any policy of opening fire with the intention of shooting down an illicit aircraft. It reaffirms that the policy of the HOAF high command is based on the agreement between our two nations to confront drug trafficking. The last sentence maintains the right of the State of Honduras to protect its security in the face of a threat from an illicit flight connected to international terrorism. ¶8. (S) COMMENT: This document tracks closely other conversations with HAF base commanders and pilots and cites specific confidential HAF SOPs. Breve welcomed the possible visit of a U.S. team to discuss air interdiction policy issues. He stated forthrightly that the GOH has nothing to hide in this case. Post invites State and DOD to send an inter-agency team to Honduras to confirm the GOH's written assurances and to further discuss the GOH's air interdiction policy. However, the team should be prepared to respond to specific questions from the GOH about the specific counternarcotics intelligence sharing arrangements in place with its other Central American neighbors. END COMMENT. PALMER