HONDURAN OIL TRUCKERS' STRIKE BLOCKS NORTHERN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 001985

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EB/ESC, WHA/EPSC, DRL/IL, AND WHA/CEN
DOL FOR ILAB
TREASURY FOR DDOUGLASS
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2014
TAGS: ECON ENRG ELAB PGOV KMCA HO
SUBJECT: HONDURAN OIL TRUCKERS' STRIKE BLOCKS NORTHERN
HIGHWAY FOR A DAY

REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 1439

B. SAN JOSE 2297

C. SAN JOSE 2339

Classified By: Economic Chief Patrick Dunn; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary: Striking oil truckers blocked the main
highway to Puerto Cortes in northern Honduras for 19 hours
from the night of August 30 to the afternoon of August 31,
before Honduran police cleared the road and detained two
strike leaders. The strike was triggered by a contract
dispute with Texaco, but also was also fueled by discontent
over high fuel prices, wage demands, and complaints that
firms are seeking to hire foreign truckers over Honduran
firms. The Honduran authorities acted relatively quickly to
end the strike and open the highway, which is the only
transportation artery linking Honduras' industrial zones with
its major port. End Summary.


2. (U) More than a thousand truckers went on strike the night
of August 30, blocking heavy cargo traffic at four different
key points of the country. The most significant blockade was
on the toll road between San Pedro Sula and Puerto Cortes,
approximately 5 kilometers south of the main entrance to the
port. Striking truckers allowed private cars and small
trucks to pass through, but not tractor-trailers or
containerized shipping. The strike came to a peaceful end
Tuesday afternoon August 31 when the National Police arrived
on the scene and detained the two leaders of the strike,
Erasmo Flores of the National Transportation Union of Heavy
Cargo (NTUHC),and Celin Aranky of the Honduran Independent
Transporters' Union (UTIH). The other striking truckers
dispersed without incident or violence.


3. (C) Econoff met with Minister of Transportation Jorge
Carranza on the margins of another meeting on August 31 and
raised the matter of the strike. Minister Carranza said
Texaco is the only one of the four major gasoline companies
operating in Honduras (Esso, Dippsa, and Shell are the
others) that does not own its tanker fleet. Instead, they
have contracted with about 75 private haulers since 2001.
Starting at the end of this year, they wish to move to a
five-year contract, but only with trucks that are well
maintained and operators that are trained and safe. Those
criteria led Texaco to sign with only 45 of the current
operators, while rejecting 30 more. Those 30 promptly went
on strike, and demanded that the GOH force Texaco to renew
their contracts as well. Carranza said he has no intention
of doing so, and that furthermore the businessman in him is
appalled at the demand. Carranza said that he had met with
President Maduro the morning of August 31 over the issue and
offered his good offices to at
tempt to reach an amicable resolution, but he said he would
not pressure Texaco to sign for services with unsafe haulers.


4. (U) Press statements made August 30 by strike leader
Erasmo Flores of the NTUHC support this version of the
origins of the strike, explicitly stating that one goal of
the strikers was to pressure Texaco-Chevron to renew the
transportation contracts of the two transport companies.
However, the broader appeal of the strike (which included up
to 1,000 drivers) was likely due to an expanded set of
striker demands. Flores called on the GOH to increase
salaries for drivers, and complained of high fuel costs.
Flores also alleged that Texaco's true motive in failing to
renew certain transport companies' contracts was their
preference to work with Salvadoran and Nicaraguan haulers.
Flores complained that Salvadoran and Nicaraguan transport
companies are not paying their share of the new fuel taxes.
(Note: Honduras' fuel taxes, and consequently its fuel
prices, are the highest in the region. If haulers from
neighboring countries are fueling up in Nicaragua and El
Salvador prior to making their runs to the reg
ional Atlantic port of Puerto Cortes, then their lower fuel
costs could indeed provide them with a competitive advantage.
End Note.)


5. (SBU) EconOff spoke with President of the Honduran
Manufacturers' Association, Jesus Canahuati, who expressed
his satisfaction with the relatively prompt response of the
GOH authorities to this strike. (During previous strikes in
June and July near Tegucigalpa, (reftel A) the GOH had
allowed roads to remain blocked for longer periods of time
before taking action.) The highway from San Pedro Sula to
Puerto Cortes is the most economically important stretch of
road in the country, as the entire maquila sector relies on
Puerto Cortes for imports and exports, as do most other
sectors of the Honduran economy (the major exception being
agricultural products exported by Dole, which use the
facility at Puerto Castilla near Trujillo). Canahuati
reported that several U.S. companies were concerned about the
strike, but pleased to see it dispersed peacefully and, by
Honduran standards, quickly.


6. (S) Comment: It is worth noting that Costa Rica just went
through a week of similar troubles over similar issues (in
their case, relating to the fees charged to inspect tankers
and the high failure rate of trucks -- mostly for brakes).
On August 31, the GOCR caved in to protesters' demands
(reftels B and C) following several days of road blockages
and resultant gasoline shortages. The GOCR alleges that
"foreign powers" (read Venezuela or Cuba) might have been
involved in fomenting the protest. To date Post has heard
nothing to suggest that this week's truckers' strike in
Honduras was the work of external forces, though Post does
not fully discount that possibility. More likely, however,
is the possibility that Honduran truckers, at a competitive
disadvantage from high fuel costs, might simply have seen
that the tactic worked in Costa Rica and adopted it for
themselves. End comment.
Palmer