CSB PLANS MAJOR CROSS-STRAIT OVERTURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003077 SIPDIS STATE PASS AIT/W E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV TW SUBJECT: CSB PLANS MAJOR CROSS-STRAIT OVERTURE REF: A. TAIPEI 1445 ¶B. TAIPEI 3002 Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary: President Chen Shui-bian announced ON October 3 that he will use his October 10 National Day address make a "major statement" ON cross-Strait relations that will serve Taiwan's long-term security and normalize relations across the Taiwan Strait. Chen pledged to use the speech to respond to the PRC's May 17 statement ON Taiwan policy. Presidential aides say that Chen's 10/10 speech will "go beyond" his May 20 inaugural address, and will include concrete assurances that Taiwan will not move towards de jure independence. They hope a positive gesture by the president now will help START off relations with a consolidated Hu Jintao government ON a positive footing. Details of the October 10 text are yet to be finalized, but officials promise to keep AIT abreast of the process. End Summary. Beyond May 20 -------------- ¶2. (C) President Chen Shui-bian told a group of Mainland-based Taiwan business people (Taishang) ON October 3 that he will redouble efforts to create a stable environment for cross-Strait relations. According to a text provided to AIT by the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) before the speech, Chen said that his government remains committed to moving forward with direct transportation links and renewed dialogue in order to build a basis of trust across the Taiwan Strait. Chen said his government's main goal is to create an environment under which the PRC could achieve its goal of a "peaceful rise" without upsetting regional stability. Chen reiterated his May 20 formulation that his government would not rule out any form of future relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland as long as it is acceptable to the Taiwan people. ¶3. (C) In this context, Chen announced that in "seven days," he would make an "important statement" (zhongyao tanhua) that would further Taiwan's long-term security interests and help "normalize" cross-Strait relations. Chen said that this statement would include a response to the PRC's May 17 Taiwan policy platform (Ref A). Chen stated that his October 10 speech would be in the spirit of his May 20 inaugural address and would not be influenced by domestic political factors. During his October 3 remarks, Chen also made reference to Taiwan's efforts to strengthen its self-defense capabilities. While warning against harboring "illusions" over PRC intentions, he stated that Taiwan's defense modernization was aimed at protecting the island's democracy and economic growth, not provoking a cross-Strait arms race. Seizing an Opportunity -------------- ¶4. (C) Chen advisors say that the president's October 10 speech will aim to provide PRC President Hu Jintao a basis for making a reciprocal goodwill gesture during his anticipated January speech to mark the 10th anniversary of Jiang Zemin's "Eight Points" ON Taiwan policy. National Security Council (NSC) Senior Advisor (and long-time Chen senior speechwriter) Lin Jin-chang told AIT that the president believes there is a unique opening for improved cross-Strait ties in the wake of Jiang's sudden departure from the Central Military Commission (CMC). "He wants to use this occasion to mark a 'new beginning' in relations between the two sides," Lin remarked. Lin added that Chen is willing to tone down the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) campaign plan for the December legislative election to achieve this goal, even if it means losing votes to the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). Direction Set: Devil in the Details -------------- ¶5. (C) NSC Senior Advisor for cross-Strait policy Chen Chung-hsin told AIT that while there is agreement over the direction for the president's October 10 address, the text has not been finalized. Chen said that the president has told his staff that he wants to "go beyond May 20" in terms of tone and substance, but added that there is still an ongoing internal discussion over whether to offer specific policy proposals or simply send a generalized goodwill message. Chen asserted that the important point will be to address the "first part" of the May 17 PRC statement, which demanded that Taiwan accept "one China" and cease Taiwan independence activities. Chen said that finding a workable formula ON "one China" may be difficult, but he is pushing hard for the president to borrow language from the 1979 U.S.-China communique and declare that Taiwan "acknowledges the PRC position that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China." Chen said that NSC Secretary General Chiou I-jen has responded positively to this suggestion, but noted that the initiative has not yet been cleared by the Presidential Office. ¶6. (C) Even more important than finding a "one China" formula, Chen continued, would be for the president to signal on October 10 his resolve not to move towards de jure independence. Chen said the president has been concerned that recent statements by the premier (Ref B) and Foreign Minister may have given Beijing the perception that the DPP government is drifting in more extreme directions. Chen asserted that the best way for the president to address this concern will be to strengthen his May 20 pledges over future constitutional reforms. ¶7. (C) Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Senior Secretary Jan Jyh-horng said that AIT would be kept informed as the text draft is firmed up. Jan expressed hope that the drafting process would be done in a more methodical way than President Chen's October 3 speech text, which was prepared in the span of a few hours. Jan noted that the president was not originally scheduled to attend the October 3 dinner hosted by the SEF. It was not until late Saturday evening (October 2) that Chen informed MAC Chair Joseph Wu that he wanted to deliver the keynote address in Wu's place. Jan said that Chen told Wu that he felt the need to personally set the record straight following the string of "confusing" statements made by senior officials in his government. Comment: Good Intentions, Uncertain Follow-Through -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) It is encouraging that Chen has decided to seek an early opportunity to send a goodwill message to the PRC leadership. However, we will watch carefully how he follows through ON these good intentions. In the past, many of Chen's attempts to send positive signals have been so ill crafted as to produce the opposite result. An over-ambitious offer that appears out of line with other recent policies or statements is likely to be dismissed by Beijing as a mere PR ploy. Chen will also need to resist the temptation to mix his October 10 messages to please different constituencies. Chen's timing and specific points may prove critically important in light of recent indications from travelers to Beijing and Hong Kong press reports that the PRC is renewing an offer of dialogue. We will closely FOLLOW the drafting process over the coming days and encourage the Chen government to seize real opportunities if they emerge and avoid past pitfalls. PAAL