Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04SANAA622
2004-03-17 14:51:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:  

SANAA EAC MEETING - 16 MARCH 2004

Tags:  ASEC AMGT PREL PTER YM EAC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000622 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA,
NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2013
TAGS: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER YM EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - 16 MARCH 2004

REF: A. STATE 57476

B. SANAA 589

Classified By: DCM Alan G. Misenheimer, for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000622 SIPDIS NOFORN DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2013 TAGS: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER YM EAC SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - 16 MARCH 2004 REF: A. STATE 57476 ¶B. SANAA 589 Classified By: DCM Alan G. Misenheimer, for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Ambassador convened an EAC meeting on 3/16 to review security conditions for Embassy personnel and the general American community in light of the recent thwarted attack on the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan. EAC examined Post's already stringent and comprehensive security procedures and proposed additional security measures. Key offices and personnel represented included: AID, AMB, CONS, DCM, FPD, MSG, MO, OMC, ORCA, PD, POL/ECON, RSO, and SOCE-Yemen. End Summary. ¶2. (S/NF) DCM and ORCA briefed EAC on the details of the 3/14 bombing attempt in Karachi, noting that security personnel observed small but significant details that led them to expose the attack in progress. RSO gave an update to EAC on the recent review of security arrangements at other sites associated with the Embassy, particularly the Sheraton Hotel in Sanaa. ¶3. (S/NF) EAC discussed the security measures in place and the potential threat posed to residences and other Embassy-related compounds by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) concealed in large, high-capacity load vehicles such as water-tank trucks. EAC outlined three areas for further planning: (1) to consult with the ROYG on plans and capabilities for defusing vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs); (2) to reassess and address risk from residential water deliveries; and, (3) to explore if additional controls for the post-managed butane canister delivery system were necessary. -------------- --- RAPID RESPONSE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) -------------- --- ¶4. (S/NF) EAC agreed that RSO would take the lead in working with the ROYG to identify and, as possible, strengthen current explosive ordnance disposal capabilities in the military and/or police forces. Post will examine options for U.S. assistance in the training of rapid-response Yemeni EOD personnel. RSO will also plan a drill or exercise based on the Karachi consulate attack scenario. -------------- WATER DELIVERIES TO RESIDENCES -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) EAC discussed residential water deliveries from outside contractors and ways to further minimize potential risk. As a first step, the Embassy will adjust the schedule of water deliveries to weekday work hours to minimize exposure to embassy personnel. Also, families, members of household and any personal household staff will be made aware of the water truck delivery schedule and will continue their vigilance of suspicious or out-of-schedule deliveries. Post will also examine options for transferring water delivery services to Post management if deemed necessary. -------------- WARDEN MEETING -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) EAC decided to hold a warden meeting to discuss the security situation with the wider community (scheduled for 3/22). EAC noted nervousness among community members because of the Madrid attacks and the subsequent statement of the Abu-Hafs Al-Masri Brigades (ref b),although the much-publicized al-Qaeda videotape (ref a) contains references to seven other countries but not Yemen. DCM concluded that these developments, as well as recent CT operations in Abyan, provided a powerful reminder of the importance of ongoing vigilance and sound personal security practices -- even though all available information contains no/no reports of specific threats or attack planning in Yemen. -------------- TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS -------------- ¶7. (U) In addition to security, the DCM noted the continuing dangers of traffic accidents as the biggest risk faced by Embassy Sanaa personnel. RSO briefed on details of a catastrophic traffic accident near the Embassy on 3/15, in which a large truck went out of control and caused multiple fatalities. An embassy employee was in the car just behind the one demolished by the truck. RSO reminded EAC members that all Embassy personnel should keep radios with them at all times for traffic warnings and alerts, in addition to security measures. HULL

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