SANAA EAC MEETING - OCTOBER 26, 2004

S E C R E T SANAA 002869

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS,
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2014
TAGS: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER EAC COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - OCTOBER 26, 2004

Classified By: RSO Tim Laas, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Begin Summary: On October 26, 2004, the Chief Of
Mission chaired a core Emergency Action Committee meeting
with COM, DCM, ORCA, DATT, FPD, LEGAT, SOC-Yemen, OMC, CONS,
POLECON, PDO and RSO in attendance. The topic of discussion
was the possible release of 138 prisoners from Republic of
Yemen (ROYG) custody that has been held on various charges to
include indigenous and transnational terrorism. EAC members
reviewed what if any negative impact such a release would
have on the American community and the current security
profile. It was the consensus of EAC members that some of
the prisoners on ROYG,s list were particularly dangerous and
their release could seriously and negatively impact security.
No new security measures have been recommended. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) EAC members reviewed the security impact of the
Republic of Yemen,s prisoner release program noting:
- The release could expose western personnel to terrorist
acts perpetrated by released detainees who are angry over the
perceived influence that the American government had
regarding their length stay in prison and/or driven by
extremist ideology.

- LEGAT listed several instances where Yemen detainees
committed terrorist acts against American citizens and
interests after being released.

- Terrorists planned attacks in 2002 and 2003 against
American and British interests but were interdicted by ROYG
and US counter-terrorism efforts.

- A warden message was determined to be appropriate with
possible modifications to Yemen,s Travel Advisory.

- The initial stand-down of various US government
programs outside of the capital city to lower the exposure of
US citizen contractors in remote or isolated areas.

- RSO noted soft targets within Sanaa where NGO programs
are concentrated but EAC members did not see an immediate
threat in the capital city not requiring Sanaa based programs
to scale back.

- Embassy officers are unable to verify who is actually
detained and who is moving in and out of the penal system
despite ROYG claims regarding specific detentions.

- Travel by USG personnel should continue to be reviewed
by RSO prior to approval to better ensure proper security
consideration in a changing security environment.



3. (S/NF) The EAC had no specific threat information
associated with the release of detainees.

4.(S/NF) The COM advised the EAC that follow-on EAC meetings
would be required as the security situation unfolded in light
of ROYG decisions on prisoner releases.


5. (S/NF) RSO met with the MOI Chief of Staff Brigadier
General Sunidar following the meeting. BG Sunidar confirmed
ROYG deliberations to determine who would be among released
detainees and assured RSO that past release programs were
successful and did not result in any recidivism by &reformed
and released8 detainees. (RSO: Comment USG statistics show
that in fact released prisoners have in the past been
involved in terrorism following their release by Yemen
authorities.


6. (S/NF) The Ambassador concluded the EAC meeting by
stating that follow-up EAC meetings would be held as
necessary to adjust security programs to the impact of any
releases by ROYG and impact to bi-lateral relations by USG
actions in light of the releases. The COM directed the RSO
to ensure visible security measures as appropriate to the
current threat environment.
KRAJESKI