ROYG FORCES KILL REBEL CLERIC AL-HOUTHI IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002421

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2014
TAGS: MARR MOPS MCAP PGOV PREL PINR PTER YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: ROYG FORCES KILL REBEL CLERIC AL-HOUTHI IN
SEPTEMBER 10 RAID

REF: SANAA 2225 AND PREVIOUS.

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Anti-American rebel Shi'ite cleric
al-Houthi was killed on September 10 in an early morning raid
on his cave hide-out in the Sa'da Goverornate. The ROYG has
announced an end to the 10-week insurgency, which resulted in
well over 1000 deaths. ROYG forces have already begun
redeployment from the north, although it remains unclear
whether or not al-Houthi supporters will regroup. End
Summary.


2. (S/NF) Rebel cleric Hussein Badr Eddine al-Houthi was
killed early morning on September 10 near Haidan in the Sa'da
Goverornate. His death came at the end of a two-day siege
conducted by Yemeni Central Security Forces (CSF) on caves
defended by al-Houthi supporters near Haidan. A USG-trained
CSF Counter Terrorism (CT) team led the operation, resulting
in the fatal shooting of al-Houthi and the loss of one member
of the CT unit, and two regular CSF. After identification by
family members, al-Houthi's body was transported to an
undisclosed Army medical facility in Sanaa.

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Saleh Healing Inter-Service Wounds
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3. (U) Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh officially
congratulated ROYG Military leaders on their victory over
forces of rebel cleric Hussein Badr Eddine al-Houthi on
September 10, declaring an end to the 10-week long rebellion.
In his statement, Saleh commended the Minister of Defense
Alaiwa, Minister of Interior al-Alimi, Commander of the
Northwest Region Al-Ahmar, Commander of the Air Force Mohamed
Saleh, and Central Security Forces (CSF) Chief Yahya Saleh.


4. (S/NF) The failure of ROYG forces to quickly and
decisively end the rebellion when it broke out in June sent
shockwaves through the military and security apparatus.
During the increasingly bloody conflict, MOD sources reported
bitter finger pointing between President Saleh's cousin,
al-Ahmar, and his son and Commander of the Special Forces
Ahmed Saleh, as well as clashes between the MOD and MOI on
field tactics and deployment techniques.

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Premature Redeployment?
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5. (S) Anxious to put this painful episode to bed, the ROYG
leadership was quick to declare victory. CSF were redeployed
to Sana'a on September 11. It will take longer for the 7000
Army troops to redeploy from the north, but efforts are
already underway. No fighting was reported since al-Houthi's
death, but it may be premature to assume all pockets of
al-Houthi supporters will fade back into their surroundings.
(Comment: Al-Houthi's religious teachings may not resonate
widely with the Yemeni population, but his rebellion may have
enjoyed some public support due to anti-Americanism or latent
anti-regime sentiment. It is premature to rule out the
possibility remnants of al-Houthi supporters could regroup to
exploit ROYG weaknesses, or even target western and/or
foreign interests should the opportunity arise. End Comment).

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MOI Please, But Downplaying Role of USG CT Assistance
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6. (S/NF) Minister of Interior Alimi told DCM that
commanders in the field attributed the victory directly to
USG CT training. "Had it not been for your training the CSF
unit that stormed the cave, we could have suffered more than
forty casualties." The evening of September 11, however,
DATT was visited in his home by a representative of the
Directorate of Military Intelligence who asked that any
public credit for ending the long and bloody conflict go to
MOD and not MOI. (Comment: It will be interesting to see if
Saleh, who has publically tried to spread his praise, will
privately acknowledge the role of U.S. assistance. End
Comment).


7. (S/NF) Other channel reporting confirms a minimum of 135
CSF casualties due to just one incident of friendly fire,
indicating severe weaknesses in ROYG forces tactical
coordination and command, control and communication
capabilities. (Comment: Future FMF and security-assistance
programs should consider addressing these shortcomings in
ROYG forces' abilities. End Comment).
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ROYG vulnerabilities revealed
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8. (S/NF) Although the actual number of dead and wounded
soldiers, rebels, and civilians is unknown, Post believes the
number to be in the low thousands. ROYG officials complained
to Emboffs and senior U.S. officials throughout the conflict
that their forces were ill prepared for this fight, asking
repeatedly for intelligence and security assistance.
President Saleh told visiting A/S for Political Military
Affairs Bloomfield that ROYG forces were not properly
equipped to defeat al-Houthi, and confided to CENTCOM
Commander General AbiZaid that the fighting in the north had
become unbearable in human, material, and political cost.

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Comment:
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9. (S) While al-Houthi and his followers may not have had
the capability to severely or permanently weaken the regime,
the ongoing and costly nature of the conflict demonstrated
ROYG vulnerabilities which either remaining al-Houthi
supporters or other regime rivals, be they tribal or
ideological, may still seek to exploit. Requests made by
President Saleh and other senior ROYG officials for U.S.
security assistance and intel sharing (reftels) should not be
dismissed due to al-Houthi's death. Post recommends these
requests be reviewed in the context of U.S. interests in
regime stability and increased U.S.-Yemeni cooperation in the
GWOT. End Comment.
KRAJESKI