SANAA EAC MEETING - 19 JUNE 2004

S E C R E T SANAA 001490

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA,
NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2014
TAGS: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER YM EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - 19 JUNE 2004

REF: A. SECSTATE 135081

B. SECSTATE 135017

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alan G. Misenheimer for reasons
1.5 (B) and (D)


1. (S/NF) Summary: Ambassador convened an EAC 6/19 to
discuss the security situation for official and non-official
Amcits in light of the killing of Amcit Paul Johnson in
Riyadh (ref a). ORCA reported no specific threat information
for Yemen. Post disseminated a Warden Message 6/19
containing the public announcement in ref b, and EAC decided
to hold a town meeting on 6/23. EAC also discussed security
ramifications related to rental cars for Embassy personnel
and made several recommendations for RSO follow-up. EAC
decided that no change to the Embassy's current stringent
security posture for official Americans was warranted. Key
offices and personnel represented included: AID, CDA, CONS,
DAO, FPD, MSG, MO, OMC, ORCA, PD, POL/ECON, OCE-Yemen, and
RSO. End Summary.


2. (SBU) EAC discussed the security threat to non-official
Amcits in light of the killing of Paul Johnson (ref a),the
public announcement warning (ref b) and the risk of "copycat"
attacks. Post released the public announcement as a Warden
Message early on 6/19. EAC decided to hold a town meeting on
6/23 to reinforce the Warden Message. The meeting will reach
out to the wider community, with increased efforts to
encourage persons beyond the wardens to attend, particularly
representatives of American-affiliated NGOs and businesses.

3. (SBU) Ambassador requested that the RSO develop
wallet-sized laminated security guidance cards to disseminate
at the town meeting, to include important reminders such as
vary routes and times, be vigilant, pay attention to any
surveillance attempts, avoid Western-affiliated areas and
places, etc.


4. (S/NF) EAC discussed the security issues related to
rental cars driven by Embassy personnel. RSO agreed to
explore removing any stickers or other identifying marks from
rental vehicles, hold security dialogues with Hertz and
Europcar on how they can spot any attempt to use the
companies as a source for terrorist targeting information and
double-check to ensure that license plates contain no
indication that the car is a rental. EAC also decided to
look into whether it would be prudent to have Embassy car
rental contracts be signed with only the Embassy on the
contract and not any individual's name.
HULL