SANAA EAC MEETING - 19 JUNE 2004

S E C R E T SANAA 001490 SIPDIS NOFORN DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2014 TAGS: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER YM EAC SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - 19 JUNE 2004 REF: A. SECSTATE 135081 ¶B. SECSTATE 135017 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alan G. Misenheimer for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Ambassador convened an EAC 6/19 to discuss the security situation for official and non-official Amcits in light of the killing of Amcit Paul Johnson in Riyadh (ref a). ORCA reported no specific threat information for Yemen. Post disseminated a Warden Message 6/19 containing the public announcement in ref b, and EAC decided to hold a town meeting on 6/23. EAC also discussed security ramifications related to rental cars for Embassy personnel and made several recommendations for RSO follow-up. EAC decided that no change to the Embassy's current stringent security posture for official Americans was warranted. Key offices and personnel represented included: AID, CDA, CONS, DAO, FPD, MSG, MO, OMC, ORCA, PD, POL/ECON, OCE-Yemen, and RSO. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) EAC discussed the security threat to non-official Amcits in light of the killing of Paul Johnson (ref a),the public announcement warning (ref b) and the risk of "copycat" attacks. Post released the public announcement as a Warden Message early on 6/19. EAC decided to hold a town meeting on 6/23 to reinforce the Warden Message. The meeting will reach out to the wider community, with increased efforts to encourage persons beyond the wardens to attend, particularly representatives of American-affiliated NGOs and businesses. ¶3. (SBU) Ambassador requested that the RSO develop wallet-sized laminated security guidance cards to disseminate at the town meeting, to include important reminders such as vary routes and times, be vigilant, pay attention to any surveillance attempts, avoid Western-affiliated areas and places, etc. ¶4. (S/NF) EAC discussed the security issues related to rental cars driven by Embassy personnel. RSO agreed to explore removing any stickers or other identifying marks from rental vehicles, hold security dialogues with Hertz and Europcar on how they can spot any attempt to use the companies as a source for terrorist targeting information and double-check to ensure that license plates contain no indication that the car is a rental. EAC also decided to look into whether it would be prudent to have Embassy car rental contracts be signed with only the Embassy on the contract and not any individual's name. HULL