EXTRANCHECK REPORT: PRE-LICENSE CHECK FADEL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001191 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR EB/ESP; U.S. CUSTOMS HG FOR STRATEGIC INVESTIGATIONS; ROME FOR CUSTOMS ATTACHE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC YE SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK REPORT: PRE-LICENSE CHECK FADEL AL-HUSSEINI REF: A. USDOC 01535 ¶B. SANAA 00823 ¶C. USDOC 00982 ¶1. (u) Summary. Reftel c requested a pre-license check (PLC) of the cargo trucks and spare parts of the Republican Guard of Yemen. Despite repeated attempts, Post did not get the full cooperation of the Republican Guard and was not able to access facilities to conduct the PLC as requested by Department of Commerce (DOC). Over a period of 60 days, with the help of a four-week extension (ref a) on the original deadline (ref c),Post explained the PLC process and consequences of noncompliance to the Republican Guard of Yemen through both diplomatic and military liaison channels. After having consulted with DOC officials, Post will send a diplomatic note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Republican Guard outlining the possible repercussions, including loss of the license to receive these export commodities. End Summary. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (u) Post received original PLC request in reftel c on March 8. The purchaser is the Fadel Al-Husseini Trading Group. The enduser is the Republican Guard of Yemen. The enduser site is the training and storage facilities of the Yemeni Republican Guard camps. ¶3. (sbu) In reftel b, Post requested an extension of four weeks to pursue investigating the extrancheck request. USDOC granted a four-week extension until May 10 (ref a). -------------- ATTEMPTS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS -------------- ¶4. (u) Starting March 13, Emboffs made repeated attempts through emails, telephone calls, and faxes (per Republican Guard request) to arrange a pre-license check visit (ref b). On March 31, Post submitted a diplomatic note to the Republican Guard through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) requesting cooperation on the extrancheck. Post repeatedly notified all parties that the extrancheck is a requirement of the agreement to purchase these commodities. Emboffs contacted many parties at the MFA and the Republican Guard including the following: Major Walid al-Eryani, Deputy Office Manager of the Commander Ali's office; Zaid al-Wareeth, MFA Protocol; and, Hadi Haidarah Qassem, MFA Protocol. In their comments, the parties demonstrated 
understanding but did not allow Emboffs to inspect any cargo trucks or the maintenance shop for the trucks. ¶5. (u) Based on consultations with DOC officials, Post will send a diplomatic note to the MFA and the Republican Guard informing them of the consequences of noncompliance, which include placement on the interagency list of "unverified parties" and potential non-issuance of this or future licenses. -------------- ATTEMPTS THROUGH MILITARY LIASON CHANNELS -------------- ¶6. (sbu) Post recruited the assistance of the Operational Control Element in Sanaa (OCE-S) from the United States Special Operations Force. Jeffrey Cuiper, Officer in Charge of OCE-S, and James Holmes, OCE-S Chief of Operations, train and supply military equipment to the Special Operations Force of Republic of Yemen (Y-SOF). The head of the Yemeni Special Operations Force is also the head of the Republican Guard, Ahmed Ali, son of President Saleh. Since April 13, OCE-S has made repeated requests to Ahmed Ali's office through Captain Rajeh, liason officer of Y-SOF and the Republican Guard. With our assistance, OCE-S provided all vehicle identification numbers (VINs) of the cargo trucks the Republican Guard has already received from American companies through the Al-Husseini Company. Post requested to see any five cargo trucks of 17 VINs provided. OCE-S's requests for inspection of parts and cargo trucks has so far gone unanswered despite notification that if the Republican Guard blocks this inspection, this order may not be shipped and that all future military equipment from the U.S. Department of Defense may also be jeopardized. -------------- CONTACTS WITH DOC -------------- ¶7. (u) In a April 3 teleconference, Emboff consulted Mary O'Brien, Department of Commerce employee in Abu Dhabi, regarding the extrancheck. Post faxed her the bills of lading and other documents provided by Fadel Al-Husseini. She indicated that inspection of cargo trucks and spare parts in the maintenance shop are essential to this pre-license check. ¶8. (sbu) Per a May 11 teleconference with Tom Andrukonis, DOC Office of Enforcement, Post obtained an outline of possible consequences of noncompliance with the pre-license check. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (sbu) Despite being notified of the potential consequences of non-compliance, the Republican Guard has been uncooperative with Post's requests to allow the pre-license check. Post utilized multiple channels of inquiry to assist the Republican Guard with this purchase. Nevertheless, the Republican Guard failed to allow access to the facilities and equipment as requested. Post has limited confidence that this most recent diplomatic note will improve the situation. End Comment. HULL