GDPR/ITALY: ITALIANS PROPOSE WORKING GROUP TO

S E C R E T ROME 003985

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR A/S BLOOMFIELD, EUR/RPM AND EUR/WE;
OSD FOR DASD HOEHN

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - TEXT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2014
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR IT NATO FORCES IN ITALY
SUBJECT: GDPR/ITALY: ITALIANS PROPOSE WORKING GROUP TO
FLESH OUT SIGONELLA SOF DETAILS

REF: A. STATE 207467

B. ROME 3933

C. ROME 2631

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Tom Countryman.
Reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (S) Summary. In October 6 discussions with Defense
Minister Martino, D/CHOD LTG Castagnetti and MFA Director
General Massolo, A/S Bloomfield and DASD Hoehn explained
where the Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR) process stood
in the U.S. and heard from the Italians broad agreement with
the U.S. view of the strategic context and the need for
rapidly deployable forces to counter emerging threats. The
Italian message was that changes underway in Naples/Gaeta and
Vicenza were not problematic and that outstanding issues
there could be resolved at a technical level. The question
of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) at Sigonella would be
highly political, would require a top-level Italian political
blessing, and before seeking that blessing, the Italians
needed to know more about what the package would contain.
Massolo proposed the U.S. and Italy form a working group to
flesh out the details needed for presentation to
highest-level Italian political powers. End Summary.

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D/CHOD - Need to Work SOF Top-Down
--------------


2. (S) On October 6, PM Assistant Secretary Lincoln
Bloomfield Jr. and DASD Andrew Hoehn held meetings in Rome on
the GDPR. They met first with D/CHOD LTG Castagnetti, who
said he was confident that Vicenza and Naples/Gaeta issues
could be solved, but that Sigonella was very sensitive and
Italy lacked specific information on U.S. thinking about
basing SOF there. The Italian decision on that would be "100
percent political." The use of SETAF out of Vicenza also had
a political component to it, but since SETAF was a
NATO-assigned force, it would be easier to manage.
Castagnetti said that military-to-military talks could go
forward to offer recommendations to the politicians for
decisions on Vicenza and Naples/Gaeta, but for Sigonella, he
said, a bottom-up approach was not feasible. Its sensitivity
required a top-down effort. A/S Bloomfield assured
Castagnetti that the U.S. wanted to be together with Italy at
every step. He said he was sure that together we could frame
terms of discussion that would get us to agreement.


3. (S) Castagnetti replied that one problem would be
translating the SOF concept for Sigonella into writing. If
something is not strictly connected to NATO, he said, Italy
must know about and approve it in advance. SOF operations by
definition could not be known in advance. A/S Bloomfield
countered that SOF was not of a different legal character
than other forces; but some exigencies required timely action
that might not wait for formal deliberative processes. The
U.S. was seeking Italy's advice, as both the U.S. and Italy
undersood that latitude was needed to deal with crisQs we
might face. NATO was certainly a art of the picture, and
was likely to be involved at some stage in future
contingencies, even if not at the outset (such as Iraq and
Afghanistan). We shouldn't tie our hands in this respect.
Castagnetti agreed that NATO had a role in new conflicts.
DASD Hoshn noted that we had a close partnership in all
dimensions with Italy in the Global War on Terror (GWOT),and
that training and other joint work would allow us both to be
more effective. The U.S., he said, understood the need to
agree on parameters.


4. (S) Castagnetti asked what the projected number of SOF was
for Signoella and was given rough estimates, but was told
that SOCEUR would be meeting with IDGS on Oct. 7 and would
have more detail. He said there was concern that Sicily did
not have the right facilities for SOF, and especially for SOF
training as it would be too visible. When DASD Hoehn
mentioned the possibility of joint training, Castagnetti was
intrigued, but said that so far he was unaware of any
discussion of reciprocity in training. Castagnetti said "I
would be the happiest man in the world if you could get my
Foreign Minister and Defense Minister together with yours on
this issue." He said Italy would be very open and
cooperative in the continuing discussion of SOF at Signoella.


A/S Bloomfieldthanked him for his advice and for his
positive outlook regarding U.S.-Italian cooperation on this
matter.

--------------
DefMin - Work etails and We'll Support You
--------------


5. (S) The Deegation was joined by Ambassador Sembler for
heir call on Defense Minister Martino. Martino noted that
Italy had its most pro-U.S. government since World War II.
It approved of U.S. goals in the GDPR and would do what it
could, but operated under strict constitutional and political
constraints. He promised to "analyze with sympathy" U.S.
proposals and see how he could help. He stated that any
approach that required modifying existing agreements risked
resulting in less than is available now. A/S Bloomfield said
the U.S. agreed and would not seek to re-open the existing
agreements.


6. (S) Martino directly stated that the only problem is
Sigonella, due to political sensitivity and a shortage of
training facilities in Sicily. DASD Hoehn pointed out that
there were other training sites in the region that could be
used by SOF stationed at Sigonella. Ambassador Sembler added
that there could be great opportunities for joint training
with U.S. SOF there. Martino agreed that other training
locations could be worked out and said joint training would
be excellent as it would develop feelings of friendship and
understanding of procedures, and would be a "great investment
of goodwill." DASD Hoehn told him that the U.S. wanted
Allies to be inside of the transformation envisioned in the
GDPR, a position with strong Congressional support.


7. (S) A/S Bloomfield asked about LTG Castagnetti's advice in
seeking a top-down approach on the SOF discussion. Martino
replied that the SOF at Sigonella issue was not insoluble but
needed to be worked carefully. Italy, he stressed, does not
want there to be too much visibility. If the numbers were
not large, it would not be a problem. He said that once the
military technical issues related to SOF at Sigonella were
worked out, the U.S would have his full support and that of
the GOI. He underscored that this would be represented by a
strong and cohesive GOI and parliamentary majority.


8. (S) Martino said Italy recognized that we faced a common
global threat and that we were all involved. One could not
step back and say "let others take care of it." A/S
Bloomfield added that 9/11 and developments since
demonstrated the need to react quickly, sometimes without the
luxury of time for extensive debates back in capitals. The
new environment included unpredictable dangers that required
speed, and decisive operations before threats could grow
worse. Martino replied that speed of deployability was a
political, not a technical issue, and a system was needed to
allow for rapid decision making. However, there was a
trade-off between possibilities for quick action and
democratic control. We all want both. "Everyone," he said,
"is interested in increased usability of forces." He pointed
out that Italy has been a leader in a transformation of
usability, with total number of forces going down
significantly while increasing the number available for
deployment outside Italy four-fold. DASD Hoehn noted that it
was no accident that we sought to work most closely with
countries like Italy who take the threat and the need to
change to meet it seriously. Martino added that Italy, like
the rest of NATO, had a free ride on the shoulders of the
U.S. taxpayer in terms of defense for 50 years, and saved
over USD 750 billion in defense spending because of US and
NATO protection since the founding of the Alliance. Now,
however, the answer is not defense as such, it is security
against terrorism threats. Martino said that once the
military-to-military work is done, we could talk about how to
support the U.S. plans politically.
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MFA's Massolo Proposes Working Group
--------------


9. (S) MFA Director General for Multilateral and Political
Affairs Giampiero Massolo told A/S Bloomfield and DASD Hoehn
that Italy was pleased to hear the President's speech on GDPR


in August (which he said was well-received by the Italian
public) and to have the delegation in Rome to follow up.
DASD Hoehn asked Massolo for his sense of the way forward
with Italy, asking at what level the discussion should take
place and in what terms. A/S Bloomfield noted that mil-mil
discussion on Sigonella was ongoing, but that it was not yet
ready to provide detailed planning information for the
consideration of the top political level. We would, he said,
be able to be more specific soon.


10. (S) Massolo said he could give a positive reaction and
feedback, including on behalf of the Foreign Minister. Italy
understands the general U.S. perspective and considerations
and interprets them in a positive way. He urged the U.S. to
continue on the same public diplomacy path opened by the
President's August speech. That, he said, would help secure
support in the Italian Parliament. We would soon need to
pass from the general to the specific and explain some
details of U.S. thinking. Vicenza and Naples/Gaeta were
"certainly not problems," the issues there could be handled
on a technical level, and public reaction would not be
problematic. Plans for SOF at Sigonella would have to be
better understood by the Italian side. Decisions about
Sigonella would be political ones, but first, Massolo said,
it must be very clear what will be said to the political
level players. What is the aim? What does the U.S. mean by
flexibility? What will Sigonella look like in 5 or 10 years?
These questions, he said, needed to be answered before the
matter goes to the political level.


11. (S) Massolo then suggested establishing a U.S.-Italy
working group, without publicity, to clarify from a military
and MFA perspective the content of the "SOF package" that the
Italians would eventually move forward for top-level
political blessing. He asked for the USG to send a group for
informal and direct talks. "We must explain that there will
be forces hosted in Italy that will have to leave for
missions from Italy and that it is known and understood that
there is a procedure of informed consent for them." He asked
to what extent the new security situation would require new
elements in this context. He added that his presentation was
a result of MFA/MOD/IDGS consultation. A/S Bloomfield
replied that the U.S. was ready to support establishing a
working group. SOF numbers would be made clear in mil-mil
discussions. Post-9/11 the U.S. changed our conceptual view
of national security, as we were attacked asymmetrically by
non-state actors. He paraphrased Australian PM Howard,s
remarks soon after the Bali bombing, saying that any leader
would be derelict if he knew a terrorist attack was coming
and did not act to stop it, even outside the nation,s
territory. This notion needed to be incorporated in our
national security concepts. It explains the need to act
quickly. And such action must be viewed as legal and
legitimate. We may not have time to go to the NAC or
Parliaments for a vote. Recognizing this was sensible
preparation for the future.


12. (S) Massolo closed by saying Italy broadly shared the
U.S. view of the new strategic context and the necessity for
rapid strategic action. However, he needed a procedural hook
on which to hang it. We cannot, he said, allow a just and
shared cause be made to sound illegal. Once we figure out
how to do that, the rest will be relatively simple "Not all
of the machinery needs to be exposed to the public, but the
explanation must be waterproof." He also noted that Italy
needed to do some public diplomacy work with Italians talking
to Italians about the coming changes. He said that bases are
seen as a contribution to stability, but asked that U.S.
commanders on the bases refrain from discussing the changes
publicly for the time being. A/S Bloomfield responded that
here the U.S. would follow Italy's lead on the process and
thanked Massolo for his advice. DASD Hoehn cautioned that
there may be public discussion in the U.S. of some details
and that we would keep Italy informed about our thinking in
this regard. Massolo said he would inform the GOI's public
affairs officers to sharpen their antennae. A/S Bloomfield
closed the session by saying the USG would let the GOI know
what goes up to Congress, would provide more detail on SOF
Sigonella issues via mil-mil channels, and would form a U.S.
team for the working group.


13. (U) A/S Bloomfield has cleared thQs message.

SEMBLER


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2004ROME03985 - Classification: SECRET