ITALY: SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL PESSIMISTIC ON MIDDLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003520

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2014
TAGS: PREL IZ IR SU IT EUN IAEA
SUBJECT: ITALY: SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL PESSIMISTIC ON MIDDLE
EAST, SUDAN

REF: A. ROME 2950

B. STATE 193154

C. ROME 3480

Classified By: A/DCM Tom Countryman for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. DCM hosted a lunch in honor of MFA Under
Secretary for the Middle East and Africa Alfredo Mantica and

SIPDIS
his Chief of Staff Paola Imperiale, along with Pol M/C and
Poloff, on September 8 . Mantica presented a fairly
pessimistic outlook for the situations in Iraq, Iran, and
Sudan. On Iraq, he found it hard to envision a greater EU
role in the near future. On Iran and Sudan, he stressed the
need for broader strategic visions. Mantica, as has become
the norm in our encounters with Italian government officials,
took the opportunity to raise Italy's concerns about UN
Security Council reform. End summary.

Skeptical on EU Role in Iraq


2. (C) Mantica noted that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's
recent remarks that Iraq would not be ready for elections by
January are not helpful and play into terrorists' hands. He
was skeptical that the EU, with 25 member states with "deep
differences," would be able to achieve consensus on EU
support for the UN in Iraq. At the recent informal meeting
of Foreign Ministers in Maastricht, he said, member states
finally agreed, but only after much negotiation, to provide
EU training for Iraqi security forces, but it was unclear how
this would develop in practical terms (the Germans offered
money, the French schools, and the Italians on-the-ground
training).


3. (C) Based on the difficulties surrounding this less
problematic issue, he said he had "no idea" how the EU could
ever agree to providing the 4,200 soldiers necessary for UN
protection. There were no formal discussions on this topic
at Maastricht and it would be a long time before the EU would
be able to provide a complete political answer, he said.
Mantica commented that even NATO had found it difficult to
reach consensus on its role in Iraq, despite the initial
enthusiasm generated by the surge in transatlantic goodwill
at Normandy. DCM replied that he hoped the EU would
accelerate its decision to support the UN in Iraq because the
"political clock is ticking" and the UN has the necessary
expertise for providing election support. The decision
shouldn't be made for the UN because of the inability or
unwillingness of the international community to provide
protection and financial support in a timely manner.

Iran -- Facing up to political realities


4. (C) Mantica argued that Iran views its nuclear program as
necessary to becoming a regional power. In Tehran's mindset
(which Mantica deemed a very coherent rationale),because it
is surrounded by countries like Pakistan, India, and Israel
that already have nuclear weapons, Iran sees no reason to
limit its own nuclear ambitions. DCM argued back that we
need to change this way of thinking and convince Tehran that
pursuing a nuclear weapons program will only freeze Iran out
of the international community and make their situation
worse. Mantica replied that Iran is a special case. Its
motivation stems not from the usual Arab rhetoric blaming the
rest of the world for its problems, but from a sense of
unusually strong national pride and "empire" that dictates
that Tehran be recognized as a regional power. Mantica noted
that one way Iran can gain international respect is by
playing an active and constructive role in stabilizing Iraq.


5. (C) Another problem, Mantica continued, is knowing "which
Iran" we are talking about. He agreed with Pol M/C's
assertion that dealing with reformers like Khatami is not
effective because they do not hold the power in Iran. Reform
efforts have failed, Mantica argued, noting that,
paradoxically, the dismal civil society situation (rampant
drug abuse, prostitution, etc.) blatantly contradicts the
fundamentalist values that Iranian leadership is trying to
promote. Italy had hoped that Khatami would be able to
change this situation, and that internal reforms would help
resolve Iran's external difficulties, but it was clear even
before the recent parliamentary elections that he had been
unsuccessful. Mantica said that Italy and Europe had now


come to the realization that the reformist experiment was
over and it is time to face new political realities in Iran,
with eyes wide open. The problem, though, is who to trust
now.


6. (C) Mantica said the EU3 initiative was unproductive and
that eventually France, Germany, and the UK would stop trying
to be the "head of the class" and let the Iran issue be dealt
with in the larger EU context where, in Italy's eyes, it
belongs. Responding to DCM's inquiry as to whether the EU is
ready to refer Iran's noncompliance with the IAEA to the UN
Security Council, Mantica said he didn't know. The problem
with consensus, he said, is that you have to go with the
least common denominator. Logically, however, he opined, the
answer should be yes, since France holds a veto in the
Security Council.

Another plea on UN Security Council Reform


7. (C) Taking advantage of the opening on UNSC issues,
Mantica asked (somewhat rhetorically) why the US didn't help
Italy. DCM responded that the USG -- including President
Bush -- is aware of the Italian position, reiterating the USG
position that the US criterion is effectiveness. Mantica
replied that the problem involves more than just the security
council, where one more vote won't make a difference, but the
entire UN system. The UN, he said, was born with a certain
political character that it was time to revisit. His
personal view was that the UN plays the role of honest
broker, but not that of a world government where a few
countries decide the fate of the others.

Sudan -- Need to look at the big picture


8. (C) On Sudan, Mantica agreed that the humanitarian crisis
in Darfur was the most immediate priority. However, he
stressed that a long-term political solution to the crisis
would only be possible by addressing the broader north-south
political problem in Sudan as a whole. The Abuja peace talks
are an important attempt to reach an overall political
solution, he said, but we must convince the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement (SPLM) to be honest about their
willingness to integrate the south in a united Sudan.
Mantica opposed the SPLM's proposal for three militaries
(African Union, Sudanese government, and SPLM soldiers) to
serve as peacekeepers in Darfur, arguing that a unified
military presence is needed to avoid a full-scale civil war.
Furthermore, he opined, it is difficult to explain
peace-keeping to Africans.


9. (C) Mantica also agreed with the US draft resolution on
Sudan, but said that not even sanctions will help resolve the
situation. He was convinced that the Khartoum government was
even more a victim of events than those who had caused them.
The important thing, he stressed, is not to cut off
discussions.


10. (C) Regarding the November 19-21 Great Lakes conference
involving Foreign Ministers and Heads of State, Mantica said
that Rwanda and Uganda are opposed to Angola's participation.
The Netherlands (as a party to the conference, not in its
role as EU President) is trying to find a compromise.


BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

Visit Rome's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m

SEMBLER


NNNN
2004ROME03520 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL