IAEA: ITALY AGREES TIME IS RUNNING OUT FOR IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003285

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2014
TAGS: IR PREL IT IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA: ITALY AGREES TIME IS RUNNING OUT FOR IRAN

REF: A. STATE 182534

B. ROME 2950

C. CANBERRA 1597

Classified By: POL M/C Tom Countryman for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. The Italian MFA continues to prefer a
strategy that avoids risking breaking off all dialogue with
Iran, but at the same time acknowledges that the situation in
the IAEA is getting worse. While Italy did not explicitly
say it would vote against a referral to the UNSC, it does not
see it as a move that would produce the desired results,
i.e., full compliance with the IAEA, and fears that a vote
could either backfire -- in Tehran's favor -- or put Tehran's
back against the wall to the point where it would pull out of
the NPT altogether. End summary.


2. (C) Poloff met with MFA Office Director for Disarmament
Giovanni Iannuzzi and Iran Desk Officer Federica Ferrari
Bravo to discuss Iran-related points of Ref A demarche on
August 26. Iannuzzi, summarizing his understanding of the
talking points, said that the most important point seemed to
be that time is running out for Iran. Poloff reiterated that
we have already had four strong BOG resolutions condemning
Iran's behavior and yet it continues to fail to comply fully
with the IAEA and now is defying commitments made to the EU3
regarding suspension of enrichment activities. To be
credible, the BOG needs to take stronger action.


3. (C) Both agreed the situation for Iran is worse now than
it was during the June BOG meetings. However, they continued
to insist on the need to keep the dialogue open, keep up IAEA
pressure, and not throw away the good work and progress that
has been accomplished by IAEA inspections. Iannuzzi noted
that the inspections have discovered some "skeletons in the
closet," albeit no outright NPT violations. He added that
Iran's progress in ratifying the Additional Protocol is at a
standstill, hostage to Tehran's efforts to secure more
favorable terms from the IAEA. At the same time, Iran is
applying it when necessary to satisfy inspectors.


4. (C) Ferrari Bravo noted that Italy continues to prefer to
play a role as mediator, as always, but she agreed with
Iannuzzi that time is running short. However, our MFA
interlocutors said they were not convinced that serious
action in the form of a referral to the UNSC is warranted.
On the contrary, it could spur Iran to take action of its
own. Ferrari Bravo, who spent four years in Italy's Embassy
in Tehran, explained that maximum pressure does not frighten
the Iranians, who face even greater pressure internally.
They need to feel they are part of a process; if they feel
they are up against a wall, they will balk -- probably by
leaving the NPT.


5. (C) Referral to the UNSC, they said, would be an "extreme
measure" (Iannuzzi) and "last resort" (Ferrari Bravo).
Furthermore, they argued, it is unlikely a majority of BOG
members would vote in favor of a referral, in which case Iran
wins. When pressed as to whether Italy would vote in favor,
Iannuzzi sidestepped the question by responding that even if
all the EU members of the BOG voted in favor along with the
US, Canada, and Australia, they were still very unlikely to
reach a majority of the votes.


6. (C) Regarding the EU3 initiative, Iannuzzi and Ferrari
Bravo both agreed that it had failed. Iannuzzi said,
although he wished the initiative had worked, pressure from
three European countries was doomed to lack the effectiveness
of pressure from all 25 (i.e., an EU initiative),and that it
had been clear for at least the last month that the process
wasn't working. At the last meeting between the EU3 and the
Iranians in Paris, the two sides had basically agreed to
disagree. (Ferrari Bravo said each side blamed the other for
failing to keep its promises, to which poloff interjected
that the burden should be on Iran, not the EU3). Iannuzzi
opined that, contrary to their promise to the EU3, the
Iranians had never really suspended enrichment activities,
using private industry contracts already in place as an
excuse for having their hands tied.


7. (C) (Strictly protect) Iannuzzi and Ferrari Bravo both
agreed, and specifically asked poloff not to make written
note, that the Iranians believe things will change after the
upcoming US presidential election, regardless of who wins.
They believe that after November 6 the US will have a clearer

interlocutor for Iran, making it easier to engage in
productive discussion. As part of Iran's post-US election
strategy, Ferrari Bravo noted that Iranian Secretary of the
Iranian Supreme National Security Council Rowani is planning
to visit European countries in the next few months, just as
he is doing now in Asia (Ref C).


8. (C) Ferrari Bravo said Italy is in constant dialogue with
the Iranians, both publicly and privately, and consistently
sends a strong message on the nuclear issue. They believe
the message is getting through to their interlocutors,
however much denial they profess. Ferrari Bravo commented,
"It must be very difficult to be an Iranian diplomat."


9. (C) On human rights, Ferrari Bravo noted the strong
statement put out by the EU after its most recent human
rights dialogue with the Iranians. She added, however, that
human rights was not Italy's greatest concern with respect to
Iran at the moment -- the nuclear issue is.


10. (C) Note: Both Iannuzzi and Ferrari Bravo accompanied
Under Secretary for Africa and the Middle East Alfredo
Mantica on his recent trip to Iran (Ref B). They said,
despite what the Iran press reports about his meetings,
Mantica delivers a tough message and has even been criticized
by the Iranians for being too tough.

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2004ROME03285 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL