Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ROME2885
2004-07-26 12:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

GOI RESPONSE TO NPT PREPCOM III

Tags:  PREL PARM KNNP IT NPT 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002885 

SIPDIS


FOR NP/MNA, AC/ISN, VC/FO; USUN GENEVA FOR AMB. SANDERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2014
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IT NPT
SUBJECT: GOI RESPONSE TO NPT PREPCOM III

REF: STATE 139286

Classified By: (U) Political Minister-Counselor Tom Countryman for Reas
on 1.4 b/d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002885

SIPDIS


FOR NP/MNA, AC/ISN, VC/FO; USUN GENEVA FOR AMB. SANDERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2014
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IT NPT
SUBJECT: GOI RESPONSE TO NPT PREPCOM III

REF: STATE 139286

Classified By: (U) Political Minister-Counselor Tom Countryman for Reas
on 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) Summary. Italy judged PrepCom III as failing to
deliver on both substantive and organizational issues. The
GOI welcomed US explanations of the US Article VI record, but
suggests that the US now should also seek more concrete steps
to convince Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries of its
progress in disarmament. For priorities at the 2005 RevCom,
Italy will work within EU channels to advocate strengthening
verification and seeking effective means of enforcement. End
Summary.


2. (U) Following reftel request, Pol-Mil Officer called on
Counselor Piero Sardi of the Italian MFA's Office for
Disarmament, Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation on July 23.
The meeting's purpose was to sound out Italy's response to
the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom III)
for the 2005 Review Conference (RevCom) of the NPT. Points
below respond to questions posed at the end of Reftel, Para.

7.


3. (C) Sardi, who attended PrepCom III, stated that the
session had been, on the whole, a failure. He had expected
at least some progress on substantive issues, but there was
absolutely none. Sardi did not believe that there was an
adequate discussion of ways to strengthen the NPT, nor did he
feel that the PrepCom led to a clear understanding of
substantive priorities for the 2005 RevCom. Sardi also
expressed surprise and dismay at the PrepCom's failure to
agree on all but a few organizational issues in preparation
for the RevCom. This overall lack of progress, according to
Sardi, reflected deep differences between states and groups
of states.


4. (C) Sardi welcomed the USG's explanations at PrepCom
III of its Article VI record, but he suggested that taking
more concrete steps would also be helpful. Italy itself does
not see the US record on disarmament as problematic. For NAM
countries, however, the story is different. Sardi explained
that NPT's effectiveness rests on three pillars: disarmament,
non-proliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. NAM
countries expect their cooperation in non-proliferation to be
balanced by N-5 progess in disarmament. The USG
explanations, while certainly helpful, are not by themselves
enough to answer NAM countries' objections over the US
arsenal. The USG should look for concrete steps that it
might take to strengthen its Article VI record and so
convince the NAM countries that everything possible in the
way of disarmament is being done.


5. (U) In accordance with EU non-proliferation policy, Italy
believes that proliferation concerns related to Iran's
nuclear program should be addressed, as well as
non-compliance by the PRK.


6. (C) Italy adheres to EU non-proliferation policy and
will participate in RevCom on that basis. Looking ahead to
the RevCom, Sardi said that Italy will advocate a unified EU
position in two priority areas: 1) strengthening
verification; and 2) seeking effective means for enforcement.
Italy believes that more states need to sign and implement
the IAEA Additional Protocols. Italy shares the US position
that export of Nuclear-Suppliers Group-controlled items
should be allowed only to those states in which the
Additional Protocols are in force. It will be important,
Sardi added, to avoid discriminating against states seeking
nuclear technology for purely peaceful purposes.


7. (C) The RevCom must also seek progress on the matter of
enforcement, Sardi said. Ability to enforce the NPT is the
necessary complement to better verification; hence we must
find a way of interpreting the NPT that allows us to deal
effectively with non-compliance.

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2004ROME02885 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL