ITALY - HIGH-LEVEL CONCERN RE UNSC REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002745 SIPDIS DEPT FOR P, EUR, IO, IO/UNP, EUR/WE, EUR/AGS, EAP/J E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2014 TAGS: KUNR PREL GM JA FR RS IT UNSC SUBJECT: ITALY - HIGH-LEVEL CONCERN RE UNSC REFORM REF: A. STATE 135590 ¶B. ROME 02168 ¶C. ROME 01425 ¶D. ROME 00548 Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) This cable contains action requests. Please see para ¶8. ¶2. (C) Summary: The Government of Italy is becoming increasingly concerned about any UN reform that could result in a permanent UNSC seat for Germany and/or Japan. The Italians fear that an increase in the number of peranent UNSC seats would result in a less efficien UN, a Security Council less amenable to the intrests Italy shares with the US, and, ultimately,would relegate Italy to a permanent second tier rle in Europe. The Italians believe that Germany ill present a plan that will have a reasonable chace of getting the two-thirds majority necessary o amend the Charter. Italy is focusing its lobbyng efforts on the major regional powers that the German plan would exclude; the medium-sized state interested in protecting their regional standin; and the US and China, which would have to ratify any amendment, along with the other P-5, before t could enter into force. Italy seeks, at a minimum, US public neutrality on the issue and a privae assurance that "Italy's vital interests and th efficient functioning of the UNSC" will be take fully into account by Washington. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Government of Italy is becoming increasingly concerned about any UN reform that could reult in a permanent UNSC seat for Germany and/or apan, but not Italy. The Italians consider this issue one of their highest foreign policy priorities and are using every possible opportunity to enlist U.S. support for their position, as evidenced in the June 16 meeting between U/S Grossman and Italian Ambassador Vento (ref A),the June 4 meeting between A/S Jones and MFA Political Director Giampiero Massolo (ref B),the February visit of G-8 Political Director Davies to Rome (ref C), ongoing exchanges with Embassy officers and repeated public statements by high level officials, most recently FM Frattini in London June 22. This concern has also been raised with President Bush by both PM Berlusconi and President Ciampi. ¶3. (C) The nominal Italian argument is that UN reform resulting in an increase in the number of permanent UNSC seats would mean a less efficient UN, and a Security Council less amenable to the interests Italy shares with the US. Their mostly unspoken but more potent fear is that granting Germany a permanent seat would relegate Italy to a permanent second tier role in Europe and also weaken the G-8 (ref C). Embassy has encouraged the Italians to focus on UN reform in broader terms, and has stressed that Security Council reform is likely to be so contentious that consensus will be difficult. ¶4. (C) The Italians agree that it will be a difficult process, but believe that Germany is focused on presenting a plan to the UNGA in early 2005 that has a reasonable chance of getting the two-thirds majority necessary to amend the Charter. Retired Ambassador Paolo Fulci (Permrep to the UN during the last serious discussion of expansion in the mid-90s) explained to POL MC how the Germans hope to avoid the regional rivalries that stymied consensus and prevented any proposal from reaching a vote in the 90s. Ten years ago, South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt had arguably equal claims to a permanent African seat; now, South Africa was clearly ascendant over the others in terms of GNP and regional influence. Similarly, Mexico and Argentina were no longer equal rivals with Brazil for a permanent Latin American seat. In this circumstance, the Germans believe it possible to cobble together a package of permanent seats that would attract the necessary 130 votes, despite the vociferous objection of those members that would miss the cut. ¶5. (C) With no hope of swaying those major regional powers who stand to benefit from the expected German plan, Italy is focusing its own lobbying effort in three directions: -- those major regional powers the German plan would exclude; -- medium-sized states which may fear diminution of their regional standing if a neighbor is promoted to permanent membership; -- and the two permanent members -- the US and China -- which the Italians believe should have reason to be opposed to expansion (China solely because of its rivalry with Japan) and which would have to ratify any amendment, along with the other P-5 countries, before it could enter into force. In seeking to influence the medium-sized and smaller states, we can expect the Italians to be as blatant as they claim Germany is in promising bilateral economic and political benefits to those who support them, while arguing that once the Germans have their seat, they will have no incentive to keep their promises. ¶6. (C) As an alternative to permanent seats for named countries, Italy will argue that there should be additional rotating regional seats. FM Frattini's deputy chief of staff told DCM that Italy could accept that such rotating seats be weighted so that states like Germany and Japan (and Italy) could have more frequent turns than smaller states. With their EU partners, particularly the smaller ones, Italy is prepared to argue (though apparently has not done so yet) that there should be no expansion until ratification of the EU Constitution at which time the EU could claim a new permanent seat. It attributes French and UK endorsement of German aspirations to a desire to head off the EU-seat option, lest it lead other EU members to try to force UK and France to cast their votes on an EU, rather than national, basis. For France and the UK, accepting a permanent German Security Council seat is a lesser evil than establishing a single EU seat. The possibility of an EU seat effectively dies if Germany has its own seat. Without the support of at least one of the "big three" the single seat proposal would have no chance of success, even under qualified majority voting ¶7. (C) The Italian government recognizes that, in an eventual UNGA vote, the US will have the same official weight as Luxembourg, and that a two-thirds vote in UNGA is required to amend the Charter. The Italians also recognize that all the P-5 members must ratify the amendment and thus, in theory, any one of the five ultimately holds veto power after the two-thirds vote in the General Assembly. The Italians do not want to get to this point and are working to avoid the possibility of an UNGA vote. Therefore, as the neuralgic reaction reported in ref A indicates, the Italians fear that any USG signal of support for expansion will be taken by Berlin as bolstering its case and adding an air of inevitability to the process. Italy seeks from the US -- at a minimum -- public neutrality on the issue, and a private assurance that "Italy's vital interests and the efficient functioning of the UNSC" be taken fully into account by Washington. A/S Jones' assurance (ref B) that we will look closely at UNSC reform clearly resonated with Italian policy makers. ¶8. (C) Action Requests: -- for USUN: Embassy Rome would welcome comment on the expected role of the Eminent Persons Panel report expected this fall. -- for Department: Not only Italians, but Germans and Japanese, plus officials of other regional powers may raise this issue with increasing frequency. We recommend that Department provide worldwide guidance that can be used with all interlocutors. From our point of view, it would be wisest not to allow anyone to take either our support or our opposition for granted. Rather, we suggest that our position make clear that we will examine carefully any specific proposal for expansion with an eye to judging whether it would enhance the effectiveness of the Security Council. -- for all posts: Embassy Rome would appreciate being included in any reporting on your host nation's view on UNSC expansion. Visit Rome's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/rome/index.cf m SEMBLER NNNN 2004ROME02745 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL