ITALIAN ELECTIONS: A SETBACK FOR BOTH BERLUSCONI

UNCLAS ROME 002280

SIPDIS


SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV IT ITALIAN POLITICS ITALY NATIONAL ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: ITALIAN ELECTIONS: A SETBACK FOR BOTH BERLUSCONI
AND PRODI

REF: A. ROME 2245

B. 03 ROME 2674

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED; NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION.

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SUMMARY AND COMMENT
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1. (SBU) Based on close-to-final results from the European
Parliament and local elections, center-right and center-left
ran almost a dead heat in Italy, with vote shifts occurring
within coalitions. Voters rebuked Prime Minister Berlusconi;
his Forza Italia party dropped fairly significantly.
European Commission President Romano Prodi did not do so
well, either, however. The "Prodi List" coalition of
moderate center-left parties fared little different from its
1999 showing. Small parties gained, notably Communist
Renewal (RC) on the left and Union of Christian Democrats of
the Center (UDC) on the right. There was little evidence of
a backlash stemming from opposition to Italy's involvement in
Iraq.


2. (SBU) Taken as a predictor for national elections, the
voting emphasizes the left's inherent instability. A
center-left government in Italy can only win a majority if
moderate parties form a coalition with far left parties such
as RC and the Greens. A center-right coalition is more
stable )- but this one is going to have to work to keep its
electorate. Berlusconi is under pressure to acknowledge UDC
and larger coalition partner National Alliance's stronger
showings. Some reallocation of government spoils and
priorities is certain, but coalition allies have indicated a
willingness to work with Berlusconi to avoid constituting a
new government. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

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NO LANDSLIDES, JUST COALITION REGROUPING
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3. (SBU) Their hoped-for landslide in favor of the
center-left in Italy's European Parliament and local
elections did not happen, undermining Romano Prodi's vaunted
leadership and ability to unite the center and moderate left.
Forza Italia also fell, challenging Silvio Berlusconi's role
as the center-right's primary vote getter. Votes shifted
from one party to another within coalitions, with overall
totals on the left and right staying much the same as in 1999
European Parliament elections. (NOTE: Final tallies are not
yet in, but the implications are clear and allow us to
analyze the election's impact. We will report details of
returns septel when final results are in.)


4. (SBU) On the center-right, Forza Italia (FI) lost ground
against coalition partners National Alliance (AN, Deputy
Prime Minister Fini's party) and UDC. While UDC's results
appear more significant, AN's are also noteworthy. The
party's results are about the same as last time, but AN lost
a splinter faction, Alessandra Mussolini's Social
Alternative. While it's not clear how much of Mussolini's
paltry 1.2 percent came from AN's far-right flank, it is
evident Fini increased AN's draw in the center, and likely
from FI )- a long-term goal. The Northern League also went
up slightly )- a victory especially in light of the serious
and prolonged illness of party leader Umberto Bossi. In sum,
the governing coalition seems to have received about the same
percentage of the vote as in the 1999 European elections.


5. (SBU) Considering the extreme personalization of his
electoral campaign, leading the ticket in every district and
confidently predicting FI would earn 25 percent of the vote,
Berlusconi the campaigner and coalition leader took a blow.
He is under pressure (starting even with last year's local
elections, Ref B) to acknowledge UDC and AN's stronger
showings. Some government reallocation is certain, although
coalition allies have indicated a willingness to work with
the PM to avoid formation of a new government. (Berlusconi
wants to avoid a full cabinet reshuffle, which would require
a new authorization vote in Parliament. He wants his current
Government, already the longest-serving in post-war Italy, to
continue into 2006, thereby setting another record as the
first post-war government to serve its full term.) The
center-left may seek to use a reshuffle to push for a vote of
confidence, but it lacks the means to force a Government
fall. The Government retains its Parliamentary majority and
ultimately will call the shots.


6. (SBU) A shift in Government priorities is also possible,
perhaps milder tax reduction, more welfare and support to
southern Italy, or other moves in keeping with AN's and UDC's
more populist programs -- although these demands will clash


with the Government's need to bring economic revitalization.
Finally, Berlusconi may have to break with his character and
seek to work more as part of a team with his coalition
partners. While we aren't certain he can do it, he needs to
try less grandstanding and more coalition building. The good
news for the Government is that Italy did not register the
large anti-government vote seen in other European countries,
nor did Berlusconi suffer the defeat of Blair, Chirac, and
Schroeder. There will be some reorganizing, but the
Government will likely live to see the end of its five-year
term.


7. (SBU) On the center-left, the "Prodi List's" break with
tradition to run as a coalition failed to garner a hoped-for
windfall. It, too, scored about the same as its member
parties did in 1999, like the left overall. Prodi's
inability to break an unstated threshold of some 33-35
percent calls into question his leadership of a moderate,
reformist center-left and his ability to unite the moderates
and those further left. There are few on the scene who could
lead a united left coalition, and these elections may make
the prospects for forming one in the next national elections
more challenging. (Rome Mayor Walter Veltroni, who handled
the recent visit of President Bush with balance and tact, may
be positioning himself as a possible challenger. He has
earned the respect of even some of Rome's center-right
voters, allowing ample freedom to the left without ignoring
centrists.)


8. (SBU) On the left, Communist Renewal was the notable
winner, gaining perhaps two percentage points over its 1999
performance, an approximately fifty-percent increase. The
elections once again confirmed that any center-left coalition
remains hostage to the parties of the far left -- RC, the
Greens, and the Italian Communist Party (PDCI) -- which
together garnered some 11 percent of the vote. These groups,
in turn, are beholden to pacifist and more extreme leftist
social groups. This also underscores the inherent
instability of a center-left government. The untenable (from
the perspective of a responsible national government) demands
of RC were what ultimately brought down the 1996 Prodi
government.

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WHAT DREW THE VOTERS?
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9. (SBU) Italians voted in record numbers compared to their
European counterparts, with a turnout of some 73 percent.
(High voter turnout is the norm in Italy; previous EP
elections registered 70.8 percent voter turnout.) This
turnout was not motivated by interest in European issues, but
by domestic interests. Opposition to Italy's involvement in
Iraq does not appear to have weighed on the elections as much
as had been expected, although an effort to send a vote in
favor of "peace" may have accounted for some of the left vote
going to Communist Renewal, the Greens and others that
consistently opposed Italy's involvement in Iraq. Left
voters wanted first and foremost to "send Berlusconi home."
Some may have also sought to send a message to the Democrats
of the Left (DS),the majority component of which has been
seeking a more centrist path and has thus not taken a
clear-cut stand on leftist (not only Iraq) issues. Given the
decision by DS, Daisy, Italian Socialists, and the European
Republicans to run under a single ticket, it is difficult to
say which entity lost votes. The fact remains, however, that
RC, PDCI, and the Greens all gained.


10. (SBU) Center-right voters in the end seemed to show
appreciation, not disdain, for the Government's
accomplishments, but there was also a distinct rebuke to
Berlusconi. This could have been prompted by his perceived
arrogance, a perceived inability to follow through on
campaign pledges, or a perception that FI is more responsible
than its partners for failing to improve Italy's economic
performance. In the end, Italians voted for the parties they
like; they did not heed the call of Berlusconi and Prodi to
ignore the little parties and increase the "bipolarization"
of the Italian political system. A "bipolar" scene may make
for less political chaos, but it apparently doesn,t make for
a happy Italian electorate.

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