RAZALI REP SAYS UNSYG WILL PURSUE BURMA MEETING AT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000914 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV BM SUBJECT: RAZALI REP SAYS UNSYG WILL PURSUE BURMA MEETING AT UNGA REF: A. RANGOON 862 ¶B. KUALA LUMPUR 2765 Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Leon de Riedmatten, UN Special Envoy Razali's representative in Rangoon, says that UNSYG Kofi Annan hopes to organize a consultative group meeting on Burma on the margins of the upcoming UNGA to discuss next steps and strategies. The UNSYG will most likely invite traditional consultative partners on Burma--including the U.S., EU members, and Japan--as well as other "influential" countries such as China. An invitation to the GOB is being considered, but is not certain. Meanwhile, de Riedmatten says it is highly unlikely that the GOB will allow Razali to return to Burma in the near future, perhaps not even before the end of ¶2004. De Riedmatten, usually a source of optimism and energy, says he is frustrated by the unresolved stalemate in Burma and has run out of potential solutions. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Following a July 19 Martyr's Day commemoration at NLD headquarters (septel),COM and P/E chief met with Leon de Riedmatten, local representative for UN Special Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail. De Riedmatten had recently returned from a trip to Bangkok where he joined Razali for Burma-related meetings on the margins of the international AIDS conference. ¶3. (C) De Riedmatten said that he and Razali had met with UNSYG Kofi Annan in Bangkok to discuss developments in Burma and to consider a U.N. strategy for next steps. According to De Riedmatten, the SYG was "very well briefed" on Burma and used the meeting to press Razali to be more proactive with his diplomatic efforts, rather than simply react to SPDC-controlled events inside Burma. Implementing this advice, Razali and de Riedmatten flew to Vientiane to meet with the GOL and found the Lao "well informed about the SPDC version of events, but nonetheless inquisitive about all developments in Rangoon." ¶4. (C) The UNSYG also encouraged Razali to support Thailand's diplomatic efforts to engage the regime. Razali subsequently met with PM Thaksin and found the RTG enthusiastic about pursuing the Bangkok process, despite being "burned" by the regime in April when the GOB pulled the plug on the Bangkok II meeting. ¶5. (C) According to de Riedmatten, UNSYG Annan was receptive to Razali's pitch to organize a Burma meeting among interested foreign ministers in late September on the margins of the upcoming UNGA (ref B). In fact, de Riedmatten said, the UNSYG committed to using UN Secretariat resources to pull the consultative meeting together. The UNSYG would likely invite not only traditional participants in previous Burma meetings--including the U.S., EU members, and Japan--but would also reach out to other "influential" countries such as China and perhaps others in the region. De Riedmatten said that an invitation for Burmese participation was not yet certain. ¶6. (C) Turning to the Burmese political stalemate, de Riedmatten said it was unlikely the SPDC would allow Razali to visit Burma anytime soon, perhaps not even before the end of 2004. He observed that the generals are "very comfortable" with the status quo and are not feeling any particular international pressure. To the contrary, de Riedmatten said, ASEAN's tepid statement at the ARF had given the GOB a free pass (Note: De Riedmatten said he had seen an early draft of the ASEAN statement which was "fairly hard hitting" until the GOB succeeded in getting a watered-down final version. End note.) ¶7. (S) De Riedmatten said he continued to be perplexed by the lack of communication from Aung San Suu Kyi, who remains under house arrest but has an ongoing, proven ability to communicate clandestinely. De Riedmatten, a long-time confidant of ASSK's, said he regularly sends in briefing and background papers, but in recent months has rarely heard anything in response. "She shows no sign of impatience or frustration," said de Riedmatten, "and perhaps I even detect resignation." He noted that he had at one point in the last few months recommended that ASSK consider civil disobedience as a tool to apply internal pressure on the regime. ASSK turned down the option because in her view the NLD would not be able to secure widespread support for any acts of disobedience. ¶8. (C) Comment: De Riedmatten, usually optimistic about new possibilities and options, was unusually downbeat during our July 19 meeting. "I've completely run out of ideas," he said, "and I am at a loss about we can do next." He was particularly frustrated with the NLD CEC, observing that their decision to take a pass on the National Convention was "perhaps a sound and strategic decision, but in the interim they have done nothing and have failed to present any alternative strategy to the NC process." He opined that the consultative meeting in New York could "help to reinvigorate an international consensus" but quickly added that such a meeting would not likely produce any meaningful results inside Burma. End Comment. Martinez