BURMESE REGIME'S STRATEGIC VIEWS OF U.S. AND CHINA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000647 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2014 TAGS: PREL SNAR PINR BM CH SUBJECT: BURMESE REGIME'S STRATEGIC VIEWS OF U.S. AND CHINA REF: RANGOON 131 Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ; REASON 1.4(D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The United States wants to dominate Burma in order to penetrate China's soft underbelly, according to Burmese Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt. The PM, speaking with a visiting ethnic leader, laid out his strategic views of the United States and China. Burma must resist U.S. pressure, Khin Nyunt went on, as China would never stand for it and Burma could be destroyed. While this view may strike some observers as ludicrous, Chinese and U.S. Cold War policies in the region -- specifically, alleged USG support for KMT remnants operating from Burma and Chinese aid to the ethnic guerrillas of the Communist Party of Burma -- continue to influence Burmese military views of U.S. intentions and potential Chinese reactions. Khin Nyunt's tight relationship with the Wa and Kokang narco-warlords along the Sino-Burmese border, most of whom were members of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB),in part may reflect the GOB's concerns that a perceived Chinese and U.S. rivalry could embroil Burma. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Post has recently viewed a video of the December 2003 meeting between Khin Nyunt and Karen National Union leader Bo Mya. Post linguists deem an exile-produced translation of the dialogue to be generally accurate. General Khin Nyunt is usually very formal and highly protocol conscious. However, in this bizarre discussion Khin Nyunt and Bo Mya get quite personal, revealing that they both dye their hair while debating whether they should call each other "uncle/nephew" or "older brother/younger brother." ¶3. (SBU) After nearly a half hour of familial banter, General Khin Nyunt provides the following strategic overview of U.S. intentions toward Burma and China: Begin Translation: "America on the other side is exerting pressure. That is because they want Myanmar to be their follower. Only when Myanmar becomes their follower will they be able to penetrate China from the side ("using the side door"). Myanmar is a very important country or a strategic nation for America, Pha Tee ("uncle"). That is why America wants Myanmar to be their follower or keep it under its influence." "If Myanmar accepts that status, America will be able to use Myanmar as a staging ground to penetrate China. That is the reason why America is exerting a lot of pressure on our nation. Hence, we do not have the slightest bit of trust in America. We will not be their follower, Pha Tee. If we do that, our country will be destroyed. Why would China stand for it? Am I right? If America were to penetrate China from our borders, China will not accept it, and our country will be in trouble." "Hence, in order to prevent our country from getting into trouble and make it stable, we have to associate with the Kala (derogatory term for Indian) and the Chinese. But we cannot associate with America because it is exerting immense pressure on us. We have to make friends with ASEAN countries and with neighboring countries." End Translation. ¶4. (SBU) A number of senior Burmese leaders have made their politico-military careers fighting the mutant legacies of USG-supported KMT units that retreated into northern Burma after the Chinese civil war a half-century ago. In January Emboffs participating in a GOB tour of Shan State (reftel) noted that the five GOB cabinet ministers, all senior military officers, grew excited as the aircraft prepared to land at an isolated outpost. One of the senior military officers turned to an embassy officer and explained, "This next stop is where the Commerce Minister led a successful attack against one of Khun Sa's last strongholds in 1995." (Note: The Mong Tai Army, led by drug lord Khun Sa, evolved from ethnic insurgents with previous links to the KMT remnants in Burma. End Note) ¶5. (C) Part of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt's political (and financial?) clout comes from his close relationship with the Kokang and Wa cease-fire groups located along the Sino-Burmese border. With 25,000 troops under arms, these groups control much of the legitimate and smuggled border trade with China. Until its implosion in 1989, the CPB's formidable Peoples Army was manned by many Wa and Kokang troops and supported by the Communist Party of China. Khin Nyunt's success of binding the border-straddling Wa and Kokang groups firmly to Burma has been one of his major accomplishments. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) is currently led by a former member of the CPB Central Committee and is headquartered in the same town as was the CPB. That the UWSA is the biggest narcotics outfit this side of Afghanistan means Khin Nyunt mingles with some pretty shady characters on a regular basis. In August 2003 when Khin Nyunt lost the Secretary 1 title, UWSA troops went on full alert for two days, fearful that their main patron in Rangoon was being ousted. ¶6. (SBU) The National League for Democracy's leadership has also been affected by this dynamic. The NLD's deputy chairman, U Tin Oo, earned his military reputation as a field-grade officer fighting KMT units; his rise to Minister of Defense meant that when he joined the NLD he was seen as a man of clout and influence. He met his wife, an army doctor, after being wounded in combat against a KMT unit decades ago, he told us last year. ¶7. (U) SPDC spokesman Colonel Hla Min, in the April 2004 edition of his work "Political Situation of the Union of Myanmar and Its Role in the Region," articulates the SPDC line that the United States seeks to dominate Burma in the context of U.S. strategy vis--vis China. He writes: "Therefore, from the western point of view, Myanmar could be deemed to be the weak link in the regional China containment policy as primarily advocated by the United States. Their attempt to turn Myanmar into a satellite state of the West by their blatant interference in Myanmar's internal affairs under the much abused and misused pretext of human rights and democracy is quite obvious." ¶8. (C) Comment and Conclusion: The regime's seemingly reflexive anti-Americanism may in part be based on this time-warped strategic view of U.S. intentions toward China and the fear that Burma would be caught in between. This strategic misperception is reinforced by the current, entirely deserved criticism the USG regularly levels at the junta. It is perhaps understandable that during the height of the Cold War era the Burmese military may have viewed the KMT units in Burma as America's surrogates and saw the CPB's Wa and Kokang guerrillas as China's proxies. Paradoxically, if the Burmese regime's embrace of China is meant to help it maintain its sovereignty in the face of perceived American efforts to make Burma a U.S. satellite, this poses a substantial risk to Burma's future -- Chinese trade, investment, cultural, and political inroads, especially in northern and northeastern Burma, are becoming increasingly dominant. End comment. Martinez