NATIONAL CONVENTION RECONVENES WITHOUT NLD AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000612 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV BM NLD SUBJECT: NATIONAL CONVENTION RECONVENES WITHOUT NLD AND ETHNIC PARTIES REF: A. RANGOON 611 ¶B. RANGOON 600 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Burmese regime's National Convention reconvened on May 17 with over 1,000 hand-picked delegates in attendance, but without the participation of the NLD and the UNA nor the presence of the U.S. and EU missions. The NLD, on the basis that its existing demands are reasonable and that SPDC Chairman Than Shwe shows no signs of relenting on the release of ASSK, sees little room for a late compromise that would allow NLD participation in the Convention. The UN Special Envoy has not abandoned hope, however, and we should continue to support UN efforts aimed at a compromise. However, if by the end of this week the SPDC continues to charge ahead without the democratic opposition, we should call a spade a spade and denounce the Convention process. End Summary. ¶2. (U) On May 17, the SPDC reconvened the National Convention for the purpose of drafting, as attempted without success in 1993-1996, a "firm and enduring Constitution." Noticeably absent from opening ceremonies at the isolated "Nyaunghnapin" (Two Banyon Trees) Camp north of Rangoon were the NLD and members of the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA) ethnic party coalition (ref B). The GOB also invited diplomatic missions to participate in the opening ceremonies; those who declined the invitation included the U.S., EU members, and Israel missions. ¶3. (SBU) The opening day of the Convention was devoid of substantive discussions and invited dignitaries were shepherded around the Convention site, a tightly-controlled USDA training center, to view the recently refurbished facilities, including gift shops and a golf driving range. According to several participants, 1,076 registered delegates were present to kick off the Convention. Military intelligence transported most delegates by bus on May 13-14 and authorities advised delegates that they would stay at the Convention site for at least two months and would only be allowed to depart on weekends with "special permission." ¶4. (U) In an unusual statement issued on May 14, the GOB acknowledged the NLD non-participation and observed that the party had decided not to attend because the NLD "has no faith in the National Convention" and because "U Tin Oo and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi are not able to travel freely and the NLD is still unable to reopen its offices." In that same statement, the GOB said it had asked the NLD leaders to "wait patiently" (under house arrest) while the government gave "priority to stability and peace." ¶5. (C) We met with NLD spokesman U Lwin on May 17 at NLD headquarters, where authorities had apparently cut the party's phone lines earlier in the day. U Lwin affirmed that UN Special Envoy Razali, through his Rangoon-based intermediary Leon de Riedmatten, had approached NLD leaders with a view to helping continue negotiations between the SPDC and the NLD (ref A). U Lwin said that there was little to discuss, given: a) that the NLD had already demonstrated great flexibility, even to the point of being willing to begin the Convention on the basis of promised dates from the regime for the future release of ASSK and U Tin Oo and for the future reopening of NLD offices; and b) that SPDC envoys had indicated Senior General Than Shwe was dead set against releasing ASSK (ref A). ¶6. (C) U Lwin welcomed the Department's May 14 statement, and noted the party's ire over the regime's desire to accommodate the cease-fire groups, "who used to shoot at the Burmese army," but not negotiate with the peaceful NLD. U Lwin said that the real focus should now be on the United Nations and Kofi Annan. The UNSYG, U Lwin said, "is the man for the moment and he has the responsibility to follow through on his pronouncements (that Burma should be democratic by 2006)." U Lwin said that the UNSYG needed an effective envoy for the job, observing that "Razali, like (senior UN official and former envoy) de Soto before him, has failed." ¶7. (C) The NLD and others must now contend with a possible regime crack down on parties which are boycotting the Convention by invoking "Law Number 5/96," a decree issued by SPDC Chairman Than Shwe in 1996 following the departure of the NLD from the first Convention. Under that draconian law, individuals and organizations are prohibited from delivering unauthorized speeches or statements about the National Convention or the draft Constitution. Violators, including those who refuse an invitation to attend the Convention, are subject to up to 20 years imprisonment and their organizations can be declared unlawful. SNLD leader Hkun Htun Oo declined to speak with Emboffs on May 17 and an intermediary said the UNA chairman was "laying low" over fear of arrest. Comment: What Next? -------------- ¶8. (C) The Department's statement of May 14 effectively brought attention to the NLD's (and the UNA's) decision to boycott the Convention, the regime's failure to improve the political environment, and the need for substantive discussions. We note that UNSYG Kofi Annan took a similar approach and also allowed that there may be additional time for the parties concerned to reach an agreement. As of May 17, the opportunity for further negotiations appears to be very slim, although the next few days will likely be reserved for little more than logistical housekeeping at the Convention. Given that the UN has not yet abandoned hope for a compromise, the most helpful role for the U.S. may be to protect what little space exists by continuing to draw attention to the regime's long-standing promise to release all original Depeyin detainees (only ASSK and U Tin Oo remain in detention) and to reopen NLD party offices (returning to the status quo prior to May 30, 2003). ¶9. (C) However, if by the end of this week there are no signs that the SPDC intends to budge, we would advise a hard-hitting statement that dismisses the utility of a constitutional-drafting process that excludes representatives who have a legitimate claim to represent the majority of the Burmese people (the NLD and the UNA member parties won a combined 89% of the seats in the 1990 legislative elections). Without an open, deliberative, and participatory National Constitution, the regime's road map lacks any credibility as a plan for a transition to democracy. End Comment. Martinez