BURMESE REGIME BEGINS RELEASE OF 4,000 PRISONERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001488 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2014 TAGS: PGOV PHUM BM SUBJECT: BURMESE REGIME BEGINS RELEASE OF 4,000 PRISONERS REF: A. USDAO RANGOON IIR 6812001505 25OCT04 ¶B. RANGOON 1462 AND PREVIOUS ¶C. RANGOON 1409 Classified By: CDA a.i Ronald K. McMullen for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Citing "irregularities" of deposed Prime Minister Khin Nyunt's recently disbanded National Intelligence Bureau (NIB),the Burmese regime commenced on November 18-19 to release nearly 4,000 prisoners, including an unknown number of political detainees. Although some observers speculate that the regime's move is an attempt to improve its standing with the international community, the SPDC is more likely focused on the domestic political scene. Criticism of the NIB is yet another assault on Khin Nyunt and the next step in an ongoing campaign to blame the country's ills on the former Prime Minister. We see no signs that the gesture to release prisoners represents a fundamental change in the regime's posture toward the democratic opposition. The NLD does not have immediate expectations that the prison release will include party leaders Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo. See para 11 for press guidance recommendations. End Summary. ¶2. (U) In a brief statement issued on November 18, the SPDC announced that it had suspended the prison terms of 3,937 "convicts," with plans to release all of them from their respective prisons. The announcement referenced an October 22 order issued by SPDC Chairman Than Shwe dissolving the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) (ref A) and "observed" that investigations had revealed the NIB may have committed "irregularities," presumably associated with the arrest and imprisonment of thousands of Burmese individuals over the past 16 years. ¶3. (SBU) The prison release list, which the regime has not made publicly available, includes at least some, if not many, of Burma's estimated 1,400 political prisoners, the majority of whom were originally rounded up by agents from the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI, known simply as "MI."). MI dominated the NIB, an inter-departmental entity that coordinated the activities of four regime intelligence and investigative units and the entire MI apparatus has been the target of a massive purge underway since the October 19 ouster of former OCMI chief, and Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt (ref B). ¶4. (U) It is uncertain how many of Burma's political prisoners will be affected by the massive release. NIB detainees include not only "traditional" political prisoners such as political party members and student activists, but also armed insurgents and other ethnic minorities; perpetrators of politically motivated violent acts; violators of immigration law; and many white-collar criminals. Although prison authorities may assist some released prisoners with transportation, it is likely that many will have to fend for themselves and it could, therefore, take days or weeks to learn the fate of prisoners held in many remote locations. Burma's total prison population is unknown, but is reported to be in the tens of thousands. ¶5. (SBU) On November 19, Embassy sources indicated that officials at several of the 45 known regime prisons throughout Burma had already begun to release prisoners in accordance with SPDC instructions. Among those observed departing prisons or reported to have joined their families at home were the following well-known political prisoners, several of whom have been the object of international campaigns seeking their release (Note: One source claimed that Min Ko Naing, a student leader during the 1988 pro-democracy movement and perhaps the most well-known of Burma's political prisoners, had been released from prison in Rakhine State, but this could not be confirmed by COB. End note). From Insein Prison (Rangoon): --U Win Tin, a famous 75 year-old journalist and founding NLD member from Rangoon (imprisoned since 1989); --U Kyaw Sann (Hsan),NLD MP-elect from Sagaing (since 1998); --U Ohn Maung, NLD MP-elect from Bago (1998); --U Toe Po, NLD MP-elect from Thanintharyi (1998); --Dr. May Win Myint, female NLD MP-elect from Rangoon (1997); --U Aung Zin, NLD member from Lashio; --U Htwe Myint, journalist and leader of the "Democracy Party" from Rangoon (1995). From Swebo Prison (Sagaing): --U Khun Sai, NLD supporter. From Thayet Prison (Magwe): --U Nyan Hla, NLD member from Rangoon. --Min Zaw Thein, youth activist from Rangoon. ¶6. (SBU) On November 19, Emboffs visited Insein Prison in northern Rangoon, Burma's most notorious destination for political prisoners. A crowd of 150-200 family members and political party supporters were gathered at the prison entrance, waiting with hope and anticipation that their loved ones would be among those released. Witnesses confirmed that prison authorities had already released dozens of political prisoners, as well as numerous common criminals, and were expected to release some 1,000 prisoners by the end of the day. The release operation was orderly, but prison officials were noticeably tense and vigorously questioned Emboffs, insisting they cease taking photographs at the scene. ¶7. (C) We also spoke briefly with NLD Secretary U Lwin, who was pleased about the prison releases but had no immediate expectation that the SPDC would release party leaders ASSK or U Tin Oo anytime soon. He observed that the general prison release was a step in the right direction, but "only a first step" that does not address the larger issues of political dialogue and reconciliation. U Lwin opined that the regime had ordered the releases not as a goodwill gesture, but rather as a malicious action directed at military intelligence. Comment: Not the Strategic Move It Appears to Be ¶8. (U) Burmese leaders have a long tradition of periodically offering amnesty for prisoners, usually as a means of gaining religious merit in this predominantly-Buddhist culture or in order to curry political favor with one segment or another of this diverse and fractious country. The current regime is no exception, having released large numbers of prisoners, including political detainees, on several occasions in the 1990s. However, the November 18 announcement, if fully implemented, is without precedent in its scale and apparent scope. ¶9. (C) International observers are likely to speculate that the Burmese regime has undertaken this massive prison release in a calculated move to soften potential criticism at the ongoing International Labor Organization Governing Body meeting in Geneva and at the upcoming ASEAN Summit in Vientiane. However, from our perspective, the SPDC is purely motivated by the domestic political situation. Citing "irregularities" of the National Intelligence Bureau is yet another frontal assault on Khin Nyunt and the next step in an ongoing campaign to blame the country's ills on the former Prime Minister and his expansive empire, which included his once-powerful military intelligence network as well as broad commercial interests. ¶10. (C) It would not appear that the gesture to release prisoners represents by any means a change in the regime's posture toward the democratic opposition or dissenters in general. To the contrary, harassment of opposition supporters has continued in recent months (ref C),including the arrest on November 5 of three NLD members in Irrawaddy Division for possession of party position papers on education and health. End Comment. Recommended Press Guidance ¶11. (SBU) We recommend the Department welcome the inclusion political prisoners among the general prisoner release, with several important caveats: for this step to have genuine meaning, all of Burma's political prisoners and detainees must be released, including ASSK and U Tin Oo as well as recently arrested pro-democracy activists; the SPDC must cease the arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention of individuals for their peaceful political activities; the regime must improve its overall human rights record, in particular by allowing and improving freedoms of association and speech; and, substantive political and economic progress in Burma will not be achieved unless the SPDC fosters a meaningful and fully inclusive political dialogue aimed at a genuine transition to democracy. End recommendations for press guidance. MCMULLEN