BURMA'S GRUNTS VS. MI: ROUND ONE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 001345

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
COLOMBO FOR ECON MANLOWE
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2014
TAGS: PINS PGOV PINR MOPS ETRD ECON BM
SUBJECT: BURMA'S GRUNTS VS. MI: ROUND ONE?

REF: RANGOON 1337

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: An apparent up-country attack by the Burmese
army's regular forces on a once untouchable interagency unit
including military intelligence officers has led to
speculation that long-simmering hatred between MI and the
regular troops has begun to heat up. The incident is quite
extraordinary, but we are not quite ready to attach major
political significance to what could turn out to be an
isolated incident. End summary.

The Shot Heard 'Round Muse


2. (C) We've heard from a number of reliable sources about an
unprecedented attack in mid-September by elements of a
regional military command on a unit of NaSaKa officers at a
checkpoint near the Burma-China border at Muse. The soldiers
surrounded the NaSaKa unit, roughed them up, and arrested its
leadership. NaSaKa is an interagency group including
Customs, Immigration, and Military Intelligence (MI) that
operates, often corruptly and with impunity, in the border
regions. According to an active China border trader, this
particular unit controlled the Pang Hpak Man checkpoint just
south of Muse and was notorious for its corruption,
smuggling, and ruthless treatment of competing smugglers.


3. (C) Because of MI's control of information and its secret
files on all military officials, members of regional commands
are traditionally reluctant to take action against their MI
colleagues no matter the offense. This status quo has
apparently been approved at the highest levels -- where Prime
Minister General Khin Nyunt commands MI and SPDC #2 Vice
Senior General Maung Aye controls the regional military
commands. No one with whom we spoke about this incident
could remember another such attack occurring.


4. (C) The trigger for this action is not exactly clear.
There are rumors that this NaSaKa unit had knowingly
intercepted convoys carrying smuggled goods for very senior
VIPs in Rangoon. Other rumors claimed that the unit had
brutally killed a young Kachin smuggler who turned out to be
a relative of a senior official of one of the Kachin
cease-fire groups in Myitkyina. In either event, our sources
reported that the local military commander complained to
Rangoon about the actions of this NaSaKa unit. The word came
down from the highest level, then, that action should be
taken.

Comment: Nevermind Why


5. (C) Most of our sources insist that this move has
political significance as an attack by Maung Aye and Than
Shwe (representing the regional commands) against Khin Nyunt
(representing MI and NaSaKa). Indeed such an attack is
apparently unprecedented and would certainly require
authorization from the very top of the SPDC. However, we
haven't seen enough evidence to convince us this is the first
blow in a long-predicted open power struggle between the
military and MI. It could just be punishment of a previously
untouchable group of officials who went one step too far.
Further attacks along these lines, or any acts of "revenge"
by NaSaKa or MI, could add credence to the theory that turf
battles among the "Big Three" are escalating. End comment.
Martinez