RAZALI'S HOPES FOR BURMA MEETINGS IN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001268 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV BM SUBJECT: RAZALI'S HOPES FOR BURMA MEETINGS IN NEW YORK REF: A. RANGOON 914 (RAZALI REP SAYS UNSYG WILL PURSUE BURMA MTG) ¶B. KUALA LUMPUR 3400 (ENVOY PROPOSES CONSULTS IN NY) ¶C. RANGOON 1237 (NEW FOREIGN AFFAIRS TEAM) Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: According to UN Special Envoy Razali's Rangoon-based liaison, broad consultations on the margins of the UNGA at the end of September will be a difficult undertaking, but are essential in order to achieve a greater consensus on "what is absolutely necessary for the (Burmese) regime to gain credibility" with their road map. However, the regime's declining regard for a UN or international community role means that the New York meetings are unlikely to produce meaningful results inside Burma. Nonetheless, a tighter international consensus would be a helpful outcome. End Summary. ¶2. (C) COM and P/E chief met on September 21 with Leon de Riedmatten, Rangoon-based liaison for UN Special Envoy Razali. De Riedmatten will join Razali for a round of Burma-related meetings in Washington and New York September 27-October 1. According to de Riedmatten, Razali has made "six or seven" unsuccessful requests to visit Burma since his March trip, but the regime has declined "because they have nothing to offer and fear subsequent criticism" should Razali visit and leave empty-handed. ¶3. (C) De Riedmatten said that UNSYG Kofi Annan will chair consultations on Burma in New York on September 29, in a session "restricted to fourteen or so countries," including the United States. Senior UN official Danilo Turk will chair a larger Burma session the following day, September 30, as a reinvigoration of the International Consultative Group on Myanmar (ICGM). Prior to the New York meetings, de Riedmatten said, Razali plans to consult at the Department with Deputy Secretary Armitage, EAP A/S Kelly, and others as well as officials at the NSC, although he plans to limit his time in Washington "in order to avoid drawing too much attention to his Burma dialogue with the United States." ¶4. (C) Although Burma is not invited to the UNSYG-chaired meeting, de Riedmatten said the session will be difficult because countries in the Southeast Asia region believe their participation "will jeopardize relations with the regime." De Riedmatten said there were already indications that China, which prefers the "safer" Bangkok process, might decline the New York invitation. ¶5. (C) De Riedmatten said that Razali would approach the New York meetings as a way to achieve a greater consensus on "what is absolutely necessary for the (Burmese) regime to gain credibility" with their road map. He added that it would be important for the Western countries and the Asian countries to reach some agreement on how to approach the regime. "It will be helpful if the neighborhood agrees on the fundamentals," said de Riedmatten, "which Razali can bring to the table with the SPDC." De Riedmatten emphasized that, from his and Razali's perspective, the outcome of the New York meetings depends entirely on the interest and engagement of the international community. "At the moment, Burma is far from a top priority," de Riedmatten said, "but we need to pull together" on this issue. ¶6. (C) The COM observed that the regime will never agree to even the most minimal steps necessary for forward movement, such as releasing ASSK and allowing the NLD to operate freely. De Riedmatten agreed, and added that the SPDC is squarely focused on concluding political arrangements with the ethnic cease-fire groups and "has no intention" of giving space to the pro-democracy movement. ¶7. (C) Comment: De Riedmatten has had low expectations for several months that the New York meeting(s) will produce meaningful results inside Burma (ref A). The recent appointment of two active duty military officers, with absolutely no foreign affairs experience, as Foreign Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister (ref C) are additional signs of the regime's declining regard for a UN or international community role in helping to achieve an inclusive political dialogue. However, a tighter international consensus would be helpful and perhaps the UNSYG's August 17 statement on Burma, criticizing the National Convention process, can create a framework for the New York discussions and efforts to define what would make a legitimate political transition. Martinez