UNHCR LOOKS FOR SHORT-TERM FUNDS FOR EASTERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001048 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, PRM, DRL STATE PASS AID/ANE CHRISTINE WEGMAN COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2014 TAGS: PREF PHUM EAID PINS PGOV BM NGO SUBJECT: UNHCR LOOKS FOR SHORT-TERM FUNDS FOR EASTERN PROJECTS REF: A. BANGKOK 5226 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. RANGOON 574 AND PREVIOUS ¶C. CHIANG MAI 139 AND PREVIOUS ¶D. RANGOON 405 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: CDA a.i. Ron McMullen for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) Summary: UNHCR's activities in the recently opened eastern border areas are gaining momentum. As the GOB expands its preparations for possible future repatriation of refugees in Thailand, the UNHCR is expanding its roving presence and basic infrastructure work. We support the UNHCR request for some short-term funds to get a larger expatriate presence in the region, a hotbed of human rights abuses, as soon as possible. End summary. GOB Gets its Act Together ¶2. (SBU) UNHCR's Rangoon representative Rajiv Kapur told the Chief of Mission on July 21st that UNHCR staff had just completed a fourth trip to the Thai border regions (areas of Karen and Mon States and Tanintharyi Division) since a February agreement with the GOB to allow UNHCR access to assess conditions for potential repatriation of refugees from Thailand (refs A and B). Kapur said he was very pleased to see that the various Burmese army regional and tactical commanders in the area, after initial suspicion and reluctant cooperation, had come to "accept UNHCR's mandate" and are now helpful in facilitating UNHCR's trips. Kapur reported no difficulties in going wherever and meeting with whomever he wanted. ¶3. (C) He also said that the GOB is going full steam ahead in preparing the area for the potential returnees. The government is actively upgrading 57 village tracts to sub-township level and planning for constructing schools, hospitals, and, naturally, offices for local "Peace and Development" Councils and Union Solidarity and Development Association (the regime's mass member organization) branches. Kapur, one of the savviest UN officials in Burma, said it was evident this development campaign was primarily to ensure the regime's immediate political control of returnees. Kapur said he has made it clear to GOB authorities that UNHCR would not support forced resettlement of returnees, when the time comes, to these sub-townships. Returnees must have the right to settle in the towns or in the surrounding countryside as they chose. UNHCR Outreach Gets Moving ¶4. (SBU) Nonetheless, Kapur was quite excited by plans for immediate UNHCR activity. Though planning repatriation would wait until the government had finalized a cease-fire with the Karen National Union (KNU; refs C and D),there is work to be done for UNHCR upgrading water systems, sanitation, and existing schools and clinics. He said the baseline conditions in the eastern border areas are far better than in northern Rakhine State (on the Bangladesh border) where UNHCR had to start from scratch building infrastructure for repatriated Rohingya refugees. ¶5. (C) A positive element of these UNHCR advance missions is the regular visitation of expatriate officials into these previously off-limits areas -- hotbeds of human rights abuses. Kapur pointed out that only ICRC and MSF-Holland have limited permanent expatriate staff in the eastern regions. Senior Karen officials in Rangoon told us that they very much support having some UNHCR presence in the region. They said that Karen refugees and IDPs trust the UNHCR the most, even before their own political and military leaders. Balance of Power in Karen State ¶6. (C) Kapur commented that during the course of his four trips he has had some revelations on the political balance of power in these border regions. Particularly he described the weakness of the KNU, which controls only patchy and economically unviable areas around Myawaddy and in the Douna mountain range and is often surrounded by large detachments of GOB troops and rival militias. Conversely, he noted, elements of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA; a splinter KNU group allied with the SPDC) are "everywhere" and their arrogant postures telegraph an intent to stay "indefinitely." ¶7. (C) On the economic side, Kapur noted that the DKBA is a major economic player in the region, particularly in the import-export business. He said DKBA convoys bringing trade goods to and from the Myawaddy border crossing are commonplace. An interesting twist, he said, is that the DKBA and KNU often pay protection money to each other to ensure safe passage through each other's zones of control. The Pitch: The Sooner the Better ¶8. (C) Kapur made a pitch for immediate funds to expedite the formation of a larger and more permanent assessment officers' presence in the eastern region. He said that the EC, the Japanese, and the Australians have already contributed $400,000 each and he is hoping for $250,000 from the United States for the rest of CY 2004. The money is needed now because there is nothing in the UNHCR's 2004 budget for the eastern border activities (as they were not foreseen during UNHCR's previous budget discussions) and UNHCR headquarters is unwilling to give additional funds for non-emergency extra-budgetary projects. According to an August 3rd letter from Kapur, U.S. monies would be used for the salaries of six UNHCR international protection staff members ($239,600), travel expenses for assessment missions to the border region ($5,980),two satellite phones ($2,520),and one laptop computer ($1,900). Comment: A Worthy Cause ¶9. (C) It does not appear that there will be a formal UNHCR appeal for funding from HQ in Geneva. Thus, we urge PRM and USAID to take a look at UNHCR-Burma's request. We support expanding UNHCR's temporary international presence in this poorly understood area, which has been a hotbed of some of the GOB's most egregious human rights abuses in the past decades. Likewise, active UNHCR participation in the GOB's preparatory work for returnees will help prevent any untoward activities and may diminish the risk of forcible repatriations. Finally, we have been very impressed with UNHCR's work in Burma under its current management, which is quite firm with the GOB and avoids the rose-tinted glasses that often afflict UN operations here. End comment. McMullen