GOF LAUNCHES ANOTHER PROPOSAL TO FOSTER MORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 009159 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2014 TAGS: KISL PREL PGOV PTER KDEM FR SUBJECT: GOF LAUNCHES ANOTHER PROPOSAL TO FOSTER MORE MODERATE "FRENCH" ISLAM AMID FRENCH MUSLIM COUNCIL DISARRAY REF: 2003 PARIS 3213 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Internal power struggles continue to plague the Council for the Muslim Faith (CFCM),the GoF-created umbrella organization which serves as the official French Muslim interlocutor with the government. Meanwhile, in the political arena, two leading contenders in the 2007 presidential race have offered competing proposals to foster the integration of France's estimated five to seven million Muslims. Newly-elected President of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) Nicolas Sarkozy has advocated that the seminal law of 1905, which officially separated the church from the French state, be amended to allow for the state to finance mosques and train imams. Interior Minister Dominique de Villepin followed with a counterproposal to create a state-supervised foundation that would oversee the collection of money for the construction of centers of worship and expand efforts to educate imams in the French language, institutions, and culture. The main objectives of the Villepin plan are to foster a more moderate "French Islam" through training of imams which could eventually become a condition for visa issuance, and to seek greater control over foreign and domestic financing of Islamic projects (including mosque construction and halal meat sales) in France. Though MOI officials stress that the Villepin plan will begin slowly and expand gradually, the same officials suggest a "take it or leave it" approach with opponents of the plan, including the fundamentalist-leaning Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF). End summary. CFCM SPLIT -------------- ¶2. (U) The CFCM has been beset by infighting, based both on doctrinal and national origin differences, since its creation by then-Minister of Interior Nicolas Sarkozy in April 2003 as an official interlocutor for the Muslim faith with the GoF (ref A). New elections to the council are expected to occur on June 5, 2005. Current president Dalil Boubakeur has announced that he will not run for re-election and it is unclear whether delegates from his moderate Federation of the Grand Mosque of Paris will participate in the June vote. Boubakeur has argued that the CFCM's rules penalize his federation and favor the more radical UOIF and National Federation of French Muslims (FNMF). In addition to the differing degrees of orthodoxy espoused by France's three principal Muslim groups, each is also aligned with a different country or outside movement, which tends to intensify differences. Boubakeur and the Grand Mosque are linked with the Algerian government, while the FNMF is close to Morocco, and the UOIF maintains ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and, according to press reports, garners significant funding from Saudi and Gulf donors. ¶3. (U) Boubakeur's position was weakened in September when he was unable, for health reasons, to take a leading role in French Muslim efforts to assist in the liberation of the French hostages in Iraq. Instead, leaders from the UOIF and FNMF took center stage in the highly publicized mediation attempts. Further injury was added to insult when the head of the Moroccan-linked FNMF met and openly embraced Abbas Madani, exiled founder of the radical Algerian Islamic Front of Salvation (FIS). Meanwhile, comments by Interior Minister Villepin suggest increased impatience with CFCM infighting and questioning of its relevance, which may reflect concern about a radicalized CFCM emerging from its June elections. In a recent interview, Villepin asserted that the CFCM did not represent the "diversity and moderation" of Islam in France, and that some 40 percent of French Muslims were not affiliated with the main groups making up the CFCM. Villepin's criticism is partly motivated by a desire to upstage his predecessor at the Interior Ministry, ruling Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) President Nicolas Sarkozy. SARKOZY PROPOSAL -------------- ¶4. (U) Just prior to leaving his position as Finance Minister in the Chirac government, Sarkozy published a book titled "La Republique, les religions, l'esperance" (The Republic, Religions, Hope). In it Sarkozy proposed changing the 1905 law that formally separated church and state in France in order to permit state funding of Muslim religious institutions thereby lessening the influence of Arab States and radical movements on France's Muslim population. Sarkozy argues that Islam was almost non-existent in France prior to 1905 and thus was not considered, as were the Christian and Jewish faiths, in the law's dispositions. Sarkozy has also advocated affirmative action proposals ("positive discrimination" in French) to provide opportunities for minorities, particularly Muslims. (Note: President Chirac has rebuffed publicly the idea of "positive discrimination" as contrary to republican values and encouraging sectarianism. End note.) MOI ON VILLEPIN PROPOSAL -------------- ¶5. (C) Newly appointed Ministry of Interior Cabinet Advisor on Religious Affairs Michel Lafon recently briefed us on Villepin's various plans to foster a more moderate "French Islam" and keep better tabs on financing of Islamic projects in France. Lafon prefaced his remarks by criticizing the legacy of Villepin's MOI predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, whom Lafon described as having created the CFCM in a rushed fashion, "by forceps." As a result, in Lafon's view, the CFCM was known more for its internal discord rather than concrete accomplishments. One of Villepin's first actions as Interior Minister was to bluntly tell the CFCM members that they had to work together, come up with a plan of action, and reverse the organization's negative image. According to Lafon, the CFCM's most pressing problem was not how to resolve the elections dispute between Boubakeur and other organizations, but rather to demonstrate the CFCM's usefulness to the French public. (Comment: Lafon's dismissiveness of the CFCM did not square with Villepin's heavy reliance on the organization in the initial GoF response to the crisis involving two French journalists in Iraq last August. In this instance, the CFCM not only sent a delegation to Baghdad, but offered a united front against the hostage-takers' initial demands that France rescind its ban on religious symbols. This CFCM position of solidarity with the GoF, particularly by the powerful UOIF component, which had been a vocal opponent of the headscarf ban in schools, eased the start of the fall 2004 school year for the GOF. Upon liberation of the hostages on December 21, the hostage takers cited intervention from Muslim groups as a factor behind the release. End comment.) ¶6. (C) Adding to the criticism of Sarkozy, Lafon noted that Villepin arrived in office only to find a lack of clear-cut government intelligence on the realities "on the ground" involving the French Muslim community. Villepin commissioned an urgent, 15-day study by French security services and police to determine the number of Muslim places of worship in France, who frequents such mosques, the number of Muslims relative to the overall French prison population, and other relevant indices. Echoing remarks made by Villepin to the press, Lafon asserted that the MOI study found that of the approximately 1,200 imams in France, most were poorly trained and educated, 75 percent were not French, and only 30 percent of the total could speak French. (Note: Villepin has stressed other statistics in public remarks to suggest that France's Muslim population is more moderate than generally believed, including the claim that only 10 percent of France's 5 million Muslims are practicing and that of the 1,685 mosques in France, less than 50 can be regarded as radical. End Note.) Lafon conceded that one surprise in the MOI study was the finding that some 45 to 50 percent of the French prison population is Muslim; the GoF had previously estimated this figure to be 30 to 35 percent. The overriding implications of the MOI study were that the GoF had been too slow in responding to the need to assert greater control over financing of Islamic projects in France, and the need to ensure that imams in France speak French and are properly trained and conversant in French civic values. PLAN FOR STATE SUPERVISED FOUNDATION -------------- ¶7. (C) Lafon described the Villepin plan for establishing a state-supervised foundation as a means to ensure transparency and assert greater control over foreign financing of mosque construction in France, while remaining respectful of the principles of the 1905 law. Lafon estimated the total of such foreign financing to be in the range of "tens of millions" of euros. The proposed foundation, which Villepin publicly pledged to set up by April 2005, would accept both domestic and foreign donations on a voluntary basis; the GOF would not contribute funds to the foundation. The foundation would be made up of three "colleges," to include in group one, members designated by the CFCM; in the second group, GoF representatives from the ministries of Interior, Social Affairs, and Foreign Affairs; and in group three, "persons of quality," who were of Muslim origin but known for their accomplishments in non-religious fields, such as sports, politics, the arts and entertainment. Lafon noted that the President of the foundation would likely come from group three, with some input on the choice from the CFCM representatives. He added that the MOI had made good progress in identifying potential participants in all three groups; the remaining questions to be settled were whether the UOIF would participate and which additional "persons of quality" might be invited to join the third group. Offering an example of the type of person the GoF had in mind for group three, Lafon cited the captain of the French national rugby team, who is Muslim and had financed the construction of a local mosque. ¶8. (C) Lafon asserted that the foundation would make decisions on matters involving the construction of new mosques as well as renovation of existing ones. He expressed confidence that the foundation would be able to attract sizable funding, despite its voluntary nature. According to Lafon, the GoF had already approached a number of unnamed Middle Eastern governments, and found them amenable to the idea of channeling donations through the foundation, which could help boost such governments' image and ensure that donations did not fall into the wrong hands. Villepin would continue to pitch the foundation during future visits to countries in the region. Lafon did not offer a clear strategy on soliciting private foreign donors' contributions for the foundation, beyond noting that a process of elimination would reveal which private donors were choosing the route of transparency via the foundation and which declined to cooperate. He added that tax benefit schemes could encourage private and corporate donors in France to channel funds via the foundation. While stressing that the foundation would begin slowly, Lafon expressed confidence that the foundation could have at minimum 10 million euros in donations on hand by summer 2005. ¶9. (C) Lafon said that in addition to foreign financing of mosque construction in France, the GoF was preoccupied by fundraising for muslim institutions through halal butcher shops. Halal butcher shops are common in muslim neigborhoods throughout France. The GoF is considering an official certification process to insure that meat sold as halal is in fact prepared according to religious precepts. This certification process would be financed by per kilo surcharge on halal meat sold. Collecting the surcharge would permit monitoring of any fundraising activities through halal butcher shops. Remaining proceeds would go to the foundation. TRAINING, FIRST VOLUNTARY, THEN VISA REQUIREMENT? -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) An additional function of the foundation would be to promote training for France's some 1,200 imams, whom Lafon described as overwhelmingly non-French and not integrated into French society. The high percentage of non-French speaking imams was unacceptable; French imams must learn French and French values. The Villepin plan on training was twofold: on the one hand, theological education of imams should continue via private, non-governmental channels, such as the two theological institutes run by the UOIF and the more moderate Paris Mosque. At the same time, the GoF wanted to expand education of imams in French law, history and language, which remained a governmental responsibility and could be offered via French public universities. Lafon described a possible five-year education training program, under which trainee imams could study two years of French language and institutions at a university, and then proceed with three years of theological training overseen by institutions such as the CFCM or the still-to-be established foundation. The first such two-year civics/French language university diploma programs would start in Paris in September 2005, with about 60 to 70 students. Plans were underway to expand the diploma programs to Marseille and Lyon. ¶11. (C) When asked how the GoF could seek to impose requirements on training for imams when no hierarchy existed in Islam on designation of imams, Lafon responded by referring to French visa law. While the GoF would encourage participation in training courses on a voluntary basis in the next few years, it was conceivable that five years from now, the GoF could impose requirements for residence permits or visa issuance to exclude those imams who failed to have the necessary training or diplomas. When asked how the GoF would then deal with French-citizen imams who lacked or rejected the training being promoted by Villepin, Lafon responded vaguely that French nationals would be expected to adhere to the laws of the republic and those who did not would be dealt with accordingly. TOUGH TALK ON UOIF -------------- ¶12. (C) Lafon was relatively dismissive when asked about objections to the Villepin foundation plan from the UOIF, which has decried the foundation plan as an attempt to "nationalize" French Islam and insisted that its funding is largely French-origin and not dependent on foreign donors. Lafon reiterated that Villepin was taking a firm approach with the UOIF which would continue to "exist" only if it continued to respect the laws of the republic. Lafon reiterated that Villepin's message to organizations like the UOIF was that if they were ready to work with the GoF, the GoF was ready to help them; if they rejected French republican values, the GoF would deal with them accordingly. Lafon cited as an example the imam of Venisseux, whom Villepin had expelled from France after the latter made public remarks citing religious justifications for spousal abuse. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) Comment: We are at once impressed by and skeptical of the Villepin plan. On the one hand, the GoF is making an ambitious and far-reaching effort to offer education and training to foreign-origin imams, pursuing creative thinking to better track financing of Islamic projects in France, taking a firm stance against Islamic extremism, and seeking to broaden the role of prominent, secular French Muslims in representing the interests of France's varied and far from unified Muslim community. At the same time, however, we see very flawed reasoning behind Villepin's apparent assumption that mere exposure to French language and culture will transform the thinking of imams in training and result in a moderate, uniquely "French Islam." Similarly, there is little reason to expect that the new foundation will be less prone to disagreement and bureaucratic inertia than the CFCM, unless the group is GoF-controlled to the extent that it loses all semblance of independence and legitimacy. The voluntary nature of foundation donations also greatly limits the ability of the GoF to gain real control over foreign donors to Islamic causes in France, who may simply bypass the new entity. ¶14. (C) Comment continued: There is an undeniable political dimension to the competing Villepin and Sarkozy proposals, as both men are widely viewed as leading contenders for the 2007 presidential race. Now out of government, Sarkozy has the luxury of touting his plans without having to show they work. Villepin, however, is under pressure to show that his policies as Minister of Interior are effective. Sarkozy's proposal called for modifying the near-sacrosanct 1905 law that codified the French Republic's particular version of separation of church and state. Villepin, in his proposal, opted to leave the law intact -- even though his proposal appears to violate the spirit of the law. Additionally, Villepin, (moved by Chirac from the Foreign Ministry to Interior in order to bolster Villepin's credibility as a presidential contender),is under pressure to produce something concrete to address the Muslim issue. His previous efforts in the area have stumbled, including having to deport the same imam twice, after French courts overturned his first attempt. Villepin appears determined to distance himself from the Sarkozy-created CFCM and go one step further with his foundation in order to embellish his credentials and prove himself effective in the run-up to 2007. End comment. Wolff