FRANCE: UPDATE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 009137 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/WE-JLEVIN, EB/TRA-ARADETSKY, DS-JHAWLEY DHS FOR TSA-INTL AFFAIRS-DTIEDGE, CHINN AND AVIATION OPS ICE FOR FOREIGN OPS DIVISION CBP FOR OIA-KTHOMSEN FBI HQ WASHINGTON FOR COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION-SSA KVONKLEINSMID AND INTL OPERATIONS-SAC TFUENTES FBI NY FOR SAC CFRAHM AND CSSA NDONOVAN BRUSSELS FOR TSA AND USEU-SCRISTINA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2014 TAGS: EAIR PTER FR SUBJECT: FRANCE: UPDATE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY AMENDMENTS; ACTION REQUEST RE IPSI FOR AIR FRANCE REF: A. STATE 170673 ¶B. PARIS 4556 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ALEX WOLFF, EMBASSY PARIS FOR REASONS 1.4B AND D. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: Following considerable Embassy effort to bring about GOF coordination, the French Government finally has issued a directive requiring air carrier compliance with the No Fly and Selectee Emergency Amendments (EAs). The directive effectively gives Air France (AF) the long-sought green light to implement security procedures described in the EAs issued by the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA),as modified by mutual agreement (reftels). With French compliance on the No Fly and Selectee lists now in implementation, Embassy requests that TSA reassign the procedural notification and air carrier contact function in cases where a French carrier has boarded a suspected no-fly passenger on a flight for the U.S., from the International Principal Security Inspector (IPSI) in Brussels to the TSA Attache in Paris. Post,s experience with No-Fly cases in the month of November showed that the existing IPSI arrangement risks confusing lines of communication painstakingly worked out with the GOF regarding implementation of the EAs and GOF/French airline notification to the Embassy in No Fly cases. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Colonel Henri Schlienger, Aviation Security, General Secretariat for National Defense (SGDN) informed the Embassy SIPDIS Paris TSA attach on December 13 that Prime Minister Raffarin had signed a directive to the French Border Police (PAF) and the Ministry of Transport to require French airlines, immediate compliance with outstanding Emergency Amendments on the use of No Fly and Selectee Lists. The Directorate General for Civil Aviation (DGAC) issued a directive on December 10 to all French air carriers with flights to the U.S. to comply with the No-Fly and Selectee procedures. Economic Minister-Counselor confirmed with Air France officials on December 14 that they had received the directive. ¶3. (C) The issuance of the two directives by the Prime Minister and DGAC follows extensive Embassy efforts with the Foreign Minister, SGDN, the Interior Ministry, DGAC and Air France in recent weeks to bring about effective GOF coordination and the drafting of written procedures, insisted upon by Air France. Embassy will monitor closely GOF and Air France implementation of the Emergency Amendments. A follow-up meeting between Legatt, TSA, Econoffs and the Border Police (PAF) took place on December 20. Since then, AF and PAF have been huddling daily with TSA and Legatt to solve technical impediments. ¶4. (C) With full Air France implementation of the Emergency Amendments, Embassy sees the need to change the designation of the IPSI for Air France in cases where it is determined that a French carrier has boarded a no-fly passenger and French authorities must be notified. The role of notifier in such cases is currently TSA Brussels. However, post discovered during the three November No-Fly incidents involving Air France that the current arrangement risks confusing the lines of communication carefully worked out between Embassy Paris, the GOF and Air France for the handling of suspected No Fly and Selectee cases. ¶5. (C) Current TSA procedures have TSA Washington notifying the IPSI for a designated airline when that airline is suspected to have boarded a passenger whose name appears on the No Fly list. In the two No Fly cases involving Air France on November 20, TSA Washington notification was made to the IPSI at TSA Brussels. TSA Paris was only notified subsequently. Our arrangement with the GOF and Air France, developed in conjunction with TSA Washington, relies heavily on communication between the Embassy (TSA, Legatt DCM),GOF (SGDN and PAF) and Air France. The GOF has insisted that there be a strong GOF-Embassy connection in the implementation of the Emergency Amendments. Unless Embassy Paris (via the TSA Paris attache) is notified immediately and directly by Washington of suspected No Fly violations, we put at risk effective coordination and cooperation with the GOF. ¶6. (C) ACTION REQUEST. Embassy requests Department assistance in working with TSA Washington to reassign the procedural notification and the air carrier contact function of the International Principal Security Inspector (IPSI) in Brussels to the TSA attach in Paris, in cases where a suspected no-fly passenger has boarded a French carrier bound for the United States. It is understood that this unique transfer of duties would give the TSA attach the sole responsibility of contacting the designated air carrier and resolving any issues concerning suspected no-fly and selectee passengers thus streamlining communication between the USG, GOF and Air France. Wolff