FRANCE'S EU/CUBA POSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 008227 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2014 TAGS: PHUM PREL FR CU SUBJECT: FRANCE'S EU/CUBA POSITION REF: A. STATE 228300 ¶B. STATE 223497 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Poloff delivered reftel demarche and non-paper to MFA Cuba Desk Officer Eric Chaux and U.S. desk officer Jean-Charles Bou on November 12. Chaux opened by saying that even if there were a change in the EU common policy toward Cuba, the GoF would remain critical of the Castro regime's human rights record and stress that the gesture of releasing seven of the imprisoned dissidents for health reasons was not sufficient. Additionally, he continued, the GoF saw no reason to change its position on Cuba at the UN. Chaux asserted that the GoF had been considering its position on the EU policy with regards to Cuba in light of Spanish efforts to change approaches, but had not yet reached any conclusions. Chaux added that France would use the upcoming November 16 COLAT meeting to debate the merits of the sanctions put in place in June 2003 and reach a common decision with the other EU member states. However, despite his insistence that the GoF was still undecided, Chaux seemed to be letting us know that the GoF would likely support changes to EU policy proposed by Spain. End summary. ¶2. (C) Chaux underlined that the U.S. and EU shared the same goal for Cuba: improvement in the human rights situation and peaceful evolution to democracy. The November 16 debate would be an opportunity for the EU to evaluate the effectiveness of its policy in making progress towards these goals. Chaux noted that some EU countries felt that the freezing of communications between the GoC and European Embassies in Havana as a result of the June 2003 sanctions had cut off their ability to work with more moderate, non-hardline members of the Cuban government. He emphasized that if the EU policy changed, it would not be because the EU was less critical of Cuba or that the GoF would stop working with the opposition. In fact, Chaux hypothesized, a change in policy might allow more interaction with the opposition, albeit in a less visible and symbolic manner than inviting then to national day celebrations. The EU would have to weigh the "gains" of these symbolic invitations against the "loss" of access to some members of the GoC. Chaux remarked that the GoF had not specifically considered any of the recommendations proposed in the U.S. non-paper, but that these proposals would likely be a part of the November 16 discussions. Comment: We believe that Chaux's "hypothetical" musings indicate that the GoF is seriously considering supporting, if not already planning to actively support, the Spanish proposed changes to EU policy. End comment. ¶3. (C) Poloff mentioned that new MFA Director for the Americas Daniel Parfait would be traveling to Washington in December and had requested meetings with A/S Jones and A/S Noriega, and that Cuba would likely be a topic of conversation. Chaux hoped that the meetings would be an opportunity to reinforce U.S./French common goals for Cuba and an occasion to brainstorm together about Cuba's future. As subjects for discussion, Chaux specifically mentioned the roles of dissidents and the Florida diaspora after the dictatorship as well as U.S. strategies for the various possible scenarios in a post-Castro Cuba. Wolff NNNN