TORRIJOS TEAM BEGINNING TO LOOK AHEAD TO NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PANAMA 000615 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USTR FOR AGASH AND JWOLFE E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2009 TAGS: PREL PINR ETRD MASS PM LABOR HUMAN RIGHTSPOLMIL SUBJECT: TORRIJOS TEAM BEGINNING TO LOOK AHEAD TO NEW ADMINISTRATION REF: A. PANAMA 0564 ¶B. 03 PANAMA 3173 ¶C. 03 PANAMA 2895 Classified By: Ambassador Linda E. Watt for reason 1.5 (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Still leading in the polls, Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) presidential candidate Martin Torrijos is starting to consider what his administration might look like, well aware of our interest in key PRD appointments. Meeting with PolOff, senior advisor and "friend of Martin" Ubaldino Real, said he is confident that Torrijos can control his party's factions and assured us of continued close cooperation if Torrijos wins. Real added that Torrijos has dropped plans to appoint a former uniformed officer to head Panama's National Police (PNP),and that he had recently journeyed to Taiwan to assure Taipei that Torrijos plans no change in diplomatic relations. -------------- The Envelope Please -------------- ¶2. (C) On March 2, PolOff met with Ubaldino Real, chief financial officer and senior advisor for Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) Martin Torrijos' presidential campaign. According to Real, PRD internal polls show Torrijos 15% ahead of Solidaridad presidential candidate Guillermo Endara. (Note: This tracks with published polls, with the most recent showing Torrijos nearly 18 points ahead of second-place Endara, See ref A. End note.) The PRD believes it can win (with its Partido Popular ally) 40 legislative seats, giving it a one-vote majority in the 78-seat Legislative Assembly. Real predicted that the PRD would win 35 spots and coalition partner Popular Party would win 5 spots. ¶3. (C) Real said that, until recently, Torrijos' had been unwilling to concentrate on anything but the campaign-- partly out of fear of jinxing his chances-- but added that the two had begun to "pencil in" names for an estimated 200 high-level GOP positions (ministers, vice ministers, directors, commissioners, ambassadors and consuls general). Real (a naturalized AmCit and close personal friend of Martin) is considering a standing offer from Torrijos to be Minister of the Presidency, a position similar to the President's Chief of Staff. Real was well aware of the GOP posts "of particular interest to the United States"-- Executive Secretary of the Public Security and National Defense Council (Consejo),Minister of Government and Justice (MOGJ),and the Directors of Panama's Police (PNP),Air Service (SAN),Maritime Service (SMN),Institutional Protection Service (SPI),Maritime Authority (AMP) and Immigration (among others, such as Foreign Minister, Minister of Commerce, and Ambassador to Washington). -------------- Balancing PRD Factions -------------- ¶4. (U) Real dismissed speculation that once in power Torrijos will have difficulty balancing the PRD's three competing factions-- "old guard" (about 40% of the party),"new guard" (about 60% of the party) and "friends of Martin." "This is Martin's party," and he will make the choices. (Comment: The campaign is heavily skewed in favor of "new guard" and "friends of Martin," reflecting the shift in power from former President Perez-Balladares. End Comment.) Real emphasized that unlike with Torrijos' 1999 run or Perez-Balladares' 1994-1999 term, the PRD presidential candidate has not had to bargain with the various factions before turning to the general election. Nevertheless, Real conceded that Torrijos will have to engage in some horse trading to placate factions or individuals who might otherwise interfere in important policy areas. PolOff expressed the hope that positions "of particular interest to the United States" will not be involved in this patronage politicking. -------------- Jump on the Bandwagon -------------- ¶5. (C) Several members of Panama's Arab community have recently expressed interest in donating to the Torrijos campaign, Real said, but he has stalled, claiming the campaign is flush with money (which is not the case). Real said the campaign is avoiding donations from "suspicious" individuals for fear of making "a mistake." -------------- Backpedaling -------------- ¶6. (U) Real commented that Torrijos was unlikely to push hard for his proposed institutional reforms to Panama's Public Force (PPF) and other public and national security agencies (ref B),such as appointing career officers as PPF service directors. In hindsight, Real said, those proposals were politically ill-conceived and not fully thought out. Real confirmed that Daniel Delgado, the author of the proposals, still leads the campaign's security policy team, but was unsure whether Delgado's time and efforts would translate into an administration position. -------------- Don't Sign the FTA Without US -------------- ¶7. (U) Real fully expects a Torrijos administration to conclude a US-Panama free trade agreement (FTA) and to be involved in the negotiations. It would be "irresponsible" for the Moscoso Administration to sign a bilateral FTA before the September 1 inauguration, he said. Real implied that Alejandro "Andy" Ferrer, Jr. would lead the new administration's FTA negotiators. (Note: Also mentioned as a possible foreign minister in a Torrijos administration, Ferrer negotiated Panama's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO),serving as Panama's Special Ambassador to the WTO and as Vice Foreign Minister. He has a law degree from the University of Michigan and is one of the stars in Torrijos' progressive pro-business faction. End note.) -------------- Taiwan: Status Quo Will Continue -------------- ¶8. (C) Just back from a 2-day trip to Taiwan, Real said that the Taiwanese had pressured Torrijos for months to send a high-level, personal representative to allay their concerns and respond to persistent rumors that Torrijos will switch diplomatic recognition to China if he wins. Real was instructed to assure Taiwan unequivocally that a Torrijos administration would maintain the status quo (ref C). -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The Torrijos team is well aware of our interest in certain high-level PRD appointments, and we anticipate having more intensive discussions on that topic after the May 2 election. On the FTA and on other important bilateral issues (such as security),Embassy is making plans with Department to brief transition teams from the victorious party. From the perspective in Panama, we believe it's unlikely that FTA talks could be wrapped up before September 1. Torrijos' decision not to carry out his publicly announced plan to reform the security services (which was not well received among the electorate because it could have centralized too much power over the security forces) or to appoint a former uniformed officer to head the PNP were welcome moves. On the other hand, the fact that he delivered a less than fully cleared speech suggests that those who charge that Torrijos allows others to put words in his mouth may have a point. WATT