214TH MEETING OF THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 OTTAWA 003048

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR WHA/CAN AND P(HUNT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR MCAP PTER PINR CA NATO
SUBJECT: 214TH MEETING OF THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON
DEFENSE, OCTOBER 20-21, 2004

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Brian Flora. Reason 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At its October 21-22 meeting in Ottawa,
the U.S.-Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD)

-- recommended expeditious negotiation of an agreement to
replace the current NORAD agreement expiring May 2006, with a
further recommendation that the new Agreement have no
termination date;

-- recommended that the functions of the Bi-National Planning
Group (BPG) be made permanent under a bi-national entity and
that the U.S. and Canada explore the future placement of
those functions during the NORAD renewal negotiations;

-- recognized the need for enhanced bi-national maritime
defense cooperation and recommended defining avenues to
achieve that goal. Both governments were invited to provide
a progress report at the next PJBD meeting;

-- recommended that the long-term requirements of the North
Warning System be actively considered, inviting the North
Warning System Office and the Air Defense Responsibility
Sharing Working Group to update on developed options at the
next PJBD meeting;

-- supported the efforts of the Canadian Government "to
identify specific problems arising from insufficient
information sharing" and encouraged both governments to
"consider ways to improve information sharing";

-- agreed to expand its membership to include U.S. Northern
Command and the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff on a permanent
basis.


2. (SBU) Representatives from the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
Canada (PSEPC) participated in meetings for the first time as
observers and briefed the Board on the structure and mandates
of their respective agencies. Canada's new co-Chairman, M.P.
Judi Longfield, officiated for the first time. She voiced
great appreciation for U.S. co-Chairman Jack David's service
and regret that this was his last meeting.

CO-CHAIRMEN'S REMARKS


3. (C) Hon. Judi Longfield, in her debut as Canada's
co-Chairman and host of the meeting, spoke of the
"indivisible cooperation and security" between the U.S. and
Canada that she witnessed at first hand on her introductory
visit to NORAD in September. She welcomed the August 5
signing of the Amendment to sanction NORAD's air warning
functions (ITW/AA) in support of missile defense as
reinforcing NORAD's vital role in defense of the continent.
Mrs. Longfield provided assurances that formal approval of
the BPG extension would be forthcoming very soon. She cited
other benchmarks relevant to shared defense, including
Canada's April 2004 rollout of a comprehensive national
security policy and the Canadian government's commitment,
over several years, of C$8 billion in support of security
objectives. Similarly, she highlighted the presence of DHS
and PSEPC representatives at the PJBD as a noteworthy
development. Longfield added that the new government's pledge
to increase Canadian armed forces by 5,000 active duty and
3,000 reserves, and C$7 billion to modernize the military,
was another manifestation of Canada's commitment to
continental defense and security and the desire to be more
effective overseas. She alluded to the government's ongoing
defense and policy review which may identify other areas for
improvement.


4. (C) U.S. co-Chairman Jack David welcomed first-time U.S.
participants to the PJBD. He commended the successful
conclusion of ISAF V under the leadership of Lieutenant
General Hillier and the Canadian contributions to
stabilization efforts in Haiti. Alluding to the excellent
work of the Bi-National Planning Group (BPG),Mr. David said
the U.S. and Canada have a historic opportunity to transform
NORAD. With reference to the "long-overdue review" of
Canada's defense capabilities, the U.S. co-Chairman hoped
that the review would provide Canada with resources to
"project power to the farthest reaches of the globe." On the
topic of missile defense, he said the U.S. is open to
Canadian participation, but recognizes it is a decision for
Canada alone to make and is "not pushing" on this; the U.S.
would press ahead to meet necessary deadlines regardless of
Canadian participation. At the same time, he concluded, the
missile defense concept "makes sense for Canada and
continental defense."

MISSILE DEFENSE


5. (C) Barbara Martin, Acting Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC)
Director General for International Security, expressed
appreciation for the U.S. co-Chairman's comments on missile
defense. Acknowledging that political momentum for a
Canadian decision on the U.S. missile defense program had
slowed considerably due to domestic political developments,
Martin thought that a parliamentary debate (the third this
year) and non-binding vote later this Fall nonetheless would
likely produce a favorable outcome. At the same time, Martin
concluded, the political environment for the minority
government at this time was "complex and difficult."


6. (C) Martin cited the January 2004 letter of intent to
explore missile defense cooperation with the USG and the
August 2004 NORAD Agreement amendment as two important
milestones for Canada. She asserted the current government's
rejection of Canadian opponents to MD that the program is
merely "Star Wars" under another name, that the ABM Treaty
prohibits establishment of national defense systems, or that
a missile defense system will stimulate an arms race. Though
the Canadian government continued to oppose the
"weaponization of space" as a core belief, Martin concluded,
Canadians also supported collaboration with the U.S. in the
defense of North America.

NORAD'S ROLE IN MISSILE DEFENSE


7. (C) Lt. Col. Doug McCarty presented a briefing on NORAD's
role in missile defense which reviewed the operational impact
of the January 2004 Letters of Intent and the NORAD Agreement
amendment. Though the amendment did not explicitly enable
Canadian operational training (for ITW/AA) alongside the
U.S., a separate OSD policy memo subsequently paved the way.
Lt. Col. McCarty noted that integration worked well up to the
point of a "defendable missile event." In such a situation,
a Canadian Command Director (CD) at NORAD,s Combined Command
Center must defer to the senior U.S. officer on duty, who
would then relay assessments to USNORTHCOM. A U.S.
NORAD-assigned CD can recommend action to USNORTHCOM. State
Department Representative Terry Breese reminded that missile
defense execution for North America is assigned to USNORTHCOM
by POTUS but questioned the interpretation given the NORAD
Agreement amendment with respect to a CD's advising
USNORTHCOM. He undertook to review the issue in Washington.

ENHANCED NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY AND NORAD RENEWAL


8. (C) Presentations by Lt. Col. Creig Rice, from the Joint
Staff, Col. Mike Hache of the Department of National Defense
(DND) and NORAD Plans Director, Major General William
Hodgkins, USAF, set the stage for discussion of enhanced
North American security and NORAD renewal. From the Canadian
perspective, issues to discuss in the renewal process
included information sharing, maritime surveillance and
control, land surveillance and control, defense support for
civil authorities, military assistance to civil authorities,
and information operations.


9. (C) Col. Hache and Major General Hodgkins noted the
importance of establishing and sticking to milestones in the
NORAD renewal process. Assuming extension of the Bi-national
Planning Group mandate to May 2006, the expiration date of
the current NORAD Agreement, milestones would include:

-- government mandates to negotiate by December 2004
-- bilateral negotiations January-July 2005
-- U.S. and Canadian internal government reviews in Fall 2005
-- final NORAD Agreement ready by December 2005.

ENHANCED MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION


10. (C) In the lively discussion of options for enhanced
maritime security cooperation, Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) representative Mr. Matthew Broderick argued
that much work would be needed for Washington to agree, by
Fall 2005, to give to NORAD responsibility for maritime
defense threat warning and control, similar to its role in
aerospace defense. While NORAD had demonstrated an
unprecedented level of U.S. collaboration with a foreign
government, he said, it remained unclear that this type of
fusion necessarily was "desirable" in the maritime domain.
Moreover, in his view an incoming vessel that posed a threat
was more "homeland security" than "defense." Colonel Hache
and others noted that there clearly was need to better
monitor the maritime domain because the vulnerability existed
and some form of bi-national cooperation was needed to
address the vulnerability.

BI-NATIONAL PLANNING GROUP


11. (C) In her introductory remarks on the Bi-National
Planning Group briefing, Ms. Longfield regretted the delay in
Canada's formal agreement to the BPG extension. The document
was "in the works," she said, awaiting the signatures of the
Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers. USAF Col. Lauri Cross
and CF Col. David Fraser provided an update on
accomplishments within the Enhanced Military Cooperation
Agreement mandate of the BPG. These included establishment
of the Bi-National Document Library; improved conference
procedures; updated basic security document (and interim
adoption pending completion of Canadian Defense Policy
Review); progress on the blueprint for bi-national mil-to-mil
support to civil authorities; ongoing work to update and
further develop the existing plan for the combined defense of
the CANUS region, such that it accounts for the current and
future security environments and allows for synchronization
across multiple domains; a range of activities in support of
the mandate; and the BPG Interim Report, which captures ideas
for enhanced military cooperation and identifies 42
additional areas for study.


12. (S) Col. Fraser added that the BPG was "mapping" U.S. and
Canadian organizations to find gaps in the flow and
coordination of information between/among them. In the
ensuing discussion, Maj. Gen. Hodgkins noted that
"releasability" was the biggest impediment to the flow of
information, and that bureaucratic inertia must be overcome.
OSD Representative Jim Townsend observed that not all
classified information qualified as "intelligence." He noted
that whereas the BPG had done its job in identifying gaps in
the information sharing process, it was up to each of the
different "communities" to implement the remedy. The BPG
position was that each of the different communities needed
incentives or directives to help them find remedies for
sharing, not just within their communities but across
agencies and the border, from senior leadership to action
officers.


13. (C) Mr. Victor Tise, of the BPG, guided Board members
through a table top exercise designed to increase awareness
of CANUS bi-national challenges and issues that can be
expected while confronting asymmetric threats. His notional
scenario centered on two events in the Puget Sound area: the
sinking of a ferry with 2,500 passengers on board by an
explosive-laden fast boat, and the attack on a nuclear
submarine at Bangor Submarine Base by two seaplanes. Within
this context, the Board discussed the likely response, both
by civilian and military authorities; measures for ensuring
that necessary intelligence/information sharing was available
for Dod and DND elements to act; and a responsive public
affairs strategy to calm fears and ensure that Canadian and
American national authorities send the same or complementary
messages to the public related to these acts of terrorism.


CANUS THREAT ASSESSMENT


14. (C) Yves Levesque, DND Directorate of Strategic
Intelligence, briefed on the cruise missile threat to North
America, arguing that cruise missiles today pose the greatest
missile threat to the continent. He noted that there is
little difference in the technology for a 1000-KM cruise
missile and that of a short-range missile; and while there
are more than 200 documented types of UAV in some 85
countries, only 22 of those countries are members of the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Moreover, most of
the MTCR controls are geared to ballistic missile
proliferation. Though the MTCR covers the guidance systems
used for cruise missiles, monitoring and control of the
latter poses a serious challenge due to ready availability of
components. Levesque said that the future asymmetric threat
to the continent lay in the use of unconventional platforms
for missile launches, proliferation behavior by state and
non-state actors, and dual use technologies.

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