Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04NEWDELHI7053
2004-11-05 05:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

LOOKING AHEAD TO ASEAN: INDIA ENGAGES EAST ASIA

Tags:  PREL TH VM BM LA KS JA IN ASEAN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 007053 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2014
TAGS: PREL TH VM BM LA KS JA IN ASEAN
SUBJECT: LOOKING AHEAD TO ASEAN: INDIA ENGAGES EAST ASIA

REF: A. NEWDELHI 6983

B. NEWDELHI 6472

Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 007053 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2014 TAGS: PREL TH VM BM LA KS JA IN ASEAN SUBJECT: LOOKING AHEAD TO ASEAN: INDIA ENGAGES EAST ASIA REF: A. NEWDELHI 6983 ¶B. NEWDELHI 6472 Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (C) Summary: The GOI has engaged actively with East Asian capitals prior to the November 30 ASEAN Plus One Summit in Laos. India's two-track approach to these states--multilaterally through organizations like ASEAN, and bilaterally--exemplifies New Delhi's strategy of expanding economic and geographic horizons, with a wary eye on China. Heading to Laos with Plus One status, India's Prime Minister Singh will look to assert India's significance beyond South Asia. We see competition with China as a growing factor in India's ASEAN calculus. End Summary. Two-Pronged Approach -------------- ¶2. (C) India's approach towards East Asia is "two-pronged" with both multilateral and bilateral tracks, according to Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses researcher Deba Mohanty. While pursuing bilateral cooperation such as preferential trade agreements (PTA),India works multilaterally through organizations such as BIMSTEC and ASEAN, he explained. The GOI is proceeding "incrementally," he said, courting only select countries, at first economically, and then politically. Recent Bilaterals: Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Burma, Japan -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) In October, senior GOI officials visited and hosted officials from a number of East Asian countries. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun traveled to New Delhi October 4-6, at the conclusion of which, the two countries signed a joint statement detailing cooperation in security, trade, and UNSC reform (Ref B). Earning a second Bangkok stamp in his passport in less than six months, FM Natwar Singh stopped in Thailand on October 14, enroute to Hanoi. While India has deepening economic ties with Thailand, such as the nascent PTA, there are also geostrategic components to India's interests in that country. According to JNU Professor of South East Asian studies Manmohini Kaul, Thailand encouraged the GOI to engage Burma ahead of Than Shwe's Delhi trip. ¶4. (C) FM Singh's trip to Vietnam October 15-18 was less significant in strategic terms, Kaul continued, describing that relationship as more "historical." The FM also made an effort to secure one more handshake in support of India's bid for permanent membership in the
UNSC. The IDSA's Mohanty noted that India sees Vietnam as a big market, but also as a "strategic balance between China and East Asia," which has resulted in "low level discomfort" in Beijing. ¶5. (C) Burmese military leader Than Shwe's October 24-29 visit to India was important in the context of Burma's position as India's gateway to East Asia (Ref A). Mohanty observed that "Look East" began with Burma. India will also follow a "two track policy," there of not alienating the government for economic reasons, but will attempt to "create space for democracy." Following the Japanese Foreign Minister's visit to New Delhi this summer, a Parliamentary delegation lead by Lok Sabha speaker Somnath Chatterjee traveled to Japan from October 31 to November 6 and met with Japanese officials including PM Junichiro Koizumi. The Japanese Embassy called the visit an attempt to "resuscitate Parliamentary exchanges," supporting Mohanty's observation that India is trying to "renew ties with Japan in a big way," after the relationship flatlined following India's 1998 nuclear tests. Multilateral Prong: ASEAN -------------- ¶6. (C) The GOI's recent bilateral exchanges with East Asia complement its outreach to ASEAN as an institution. Prior to Natwar Singh's departure for Bangkok and Hanoi, the MEA observed that Vietnam is part of ASEAN and India-Vietnam relations "have coincided with developments in India-ASEAN relations." Looking ahead to November's ASEAN Plus One Summit in Laos, Kaul said that despite India's early reservations about the organization because of conflicts with its historical non-aligned orientation, India appreciates its ASEAN Plus One designation as recognition of New Delhi's importance on par with the ASEAN Plus Three countries (South Korea, Japan, and China). Professor Kaul noted that the Plus One designation may be an attempt to stave off India, as few ASEAN members support India's fuller membership in the grouping. China vs. India: Heavyweight Matchup -------------- ¶7. (C) Our interlocutors stress the growing importance of China in India's calculations with respect to East Asia. Professor Kaul observed that East Asian leaders encourage India's greater involvement as a "balance" to China's growing influence: "other countries know that only India can stand up to China." The IDSA's Mohanty put it more simply: "the reason for "Look East" is China," even though it is a two-way exchange. India, concerned about Chinese encroachment into neighboring countries, such as Burma, is eager to insert itself into East Asia. While the dominant view here is of the two Asian giants butting heads strategically, Mohanty commented that CT interests could bring India and China together. Asked why India has not been invited to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),a CT grouping of China's creating, Mohanty said India is still unsure of Beijing's intentions with the SCO. ¶8. (C) Professor Kaul noted that India was welcome in East Asia because New Delhi "has not given any indication of having big brotherly or hegemonistic intentions." The difference between China and India in East Asia, she added, is that while "India makes announcements, China is striding ahead." As an example she offered the much touted but as yet non-existent Thailand, Burma, India highway, and asked rhetorically, "who will travel on it?" Mohanty observed that India will downplay the China factor in its "Look East" policy in favor of plugging economic initiatives. The UPA's Eastern Impetus -------------- ¶9. (C) Professor Kaul observed that the GOI has a Look Easter in the PMO's office in the form of Media Adviser Sanjay Baru who is known to be a strong proponent of BIMSTEC (the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Economic Cooperation). She argued that Baru would help to reinforce the government's East Asia emphasis. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Strengthening India's relations with East Asia presents New Delhi with an opportunity to assert its interests both economically and strategically, in a region where its motivations are not yet perceived as "big brotherly." This contrasts with the sense among India's immediate South Asian neighbors that New Delhi's intentions are over-bearing, if not hegemonistic. As India is already recognized as the big player in South Asia, strategic concerns vis-a-vis China are less salient. PM Manmohan Singh's immediate thrust at the ASEAN Plus One Summit is likely to be economic, as India beefs up its regional profile, but this will also be an opportunity for the little-traveled PM to engage with a broader cross-section of East and Southeast Asian leaders as he continues to define the Congress vision for international relations. MULFORD

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