UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 NEW DELHI 007026

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE/PM FOR DAS KARA BUE
STATE/PM FOR MICHELE MARKOFF
DOD FOR OASD/NII TIM BLOECHL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KCIP TINT PREL ECPS KCRM IN US
SUBJECT: INDO-US CYBERSECURITY FORUM PREPARATORY
CONSULTATIONS IN NEW DELHI

REF: A. NEW DELHI 5577

B. NEW DELHI 6980


1. (SBU) Summary: On October 14-18, 2004, Department Senior
Coordinator for International Critical Infrastructure
Protection Policy Michele Markoff and DOD Director of
International Information Assurance Programs Tim Bloechl
participated in preparatory meetings with the GOI for the
November 9-10 Cybersecurity Forum in Washington. Arvind
Gupta, Joint Secretary, National Security Council
Secretariat, and Commander Mukesh Saini, Deputy Director

SIPDIS
(Information Security), NSCS, hosted the consultations and
will lead the GOI delegation. Discussions included the
Cybersecurity Forum's (CSF's) overall structure; designating
co-chairs and selecting agenda topics for the five working
groups; industry participation; site visits; and training and
capacity building. The director of India's Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) briefed on his
organization's capabilities. Markoff asked Gupta for GOI
support for a US-drafted UNGA Resolution calling for all UN
Member States to join the 24/7 Cybercrime Point of Contact
Network, while Gupta and Saini shared their vision to
"inculcate a culture of cybersecurity" in India's IT sector.
End Summary.

Getting to Know You (Again)
--------------


2. (SBU) Noting the long interval since the CSF last
convened in April 29-30, 2002, Joint Director Gupta welcomed
Markoff and Bloechl, and noted that much has changed in the
field of cybersecurity technology, in the US and India's
cybersecurity organizations, and in India's technical
capabilities. Markoff remarked on the successful
ITAA-NASSCOM India-US Information Security Summit 2004, at
which she delivered the closing keynote address. Both
Washington and New Delhi emphasized the importance of
including the perspectives of both software developers and
clients. Markoff listed a few key industries that rely
heavily on secure and reliable IT systems: banks, health
care, utilities, and transportation. Observing that the
issue of cybersecurity is no longe

r "in the weeds," she said
it is now recognized as an important part of US-India
interdependence that is larger than the IT sector.

WG1: Legal Cooperation and Law Enforcement
--------------


3. (SBU) Markoff began by listing topics the USG wants to
discuss in the area of cybersecurity legal cooperation and
law enforcement:

-- How the GOI is organized to fight cybercrime;
-- Updates on relevant legislation;
-- Any plans to facilitate a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
for computer crime;
-- The Council of Europe model cybercrime legislation;
-- How Indian law enforcement agencies approach cybercrime
investigations and prosecutions; and
-- If India participates in, or plans to participate in, the
24/7 Cybercrime Point of Contact Network.


4. (SBU) Arguing for the inclusion of intrusion detection of
Indian infrastructure to the agenda, MHA Joint Secretary
Renuka Muttoo recalled a recent incident in which an American
criminal/hacker allegedly misused an Indian proxy server to
engage in credit card fraud and the printing of fraudulent
certificates. Noting that the incident was reported to the
US DOJ, she asked how such reporting could be
institutionalized. Markoff indicated that the 24/7 Cybercrime
Point of Contact Network, of which India was already a
member, was the conduit for cyber crime reporting. Muttoo
appeared unfamiliar with the 24/7 POC cybercrime network and
Markoff promised to provide the name of the GOI contact.
(NOTE: Embassy later passed GOI contact information via MEA.)


5. (SBU) Gupta queried whether this 24/7 network would be
used to report all cyber incidents. Markoff indicated that
the U.S. has set up two separate 24/7 POCs -- one for watch
and warning information sharing (US-CERT/NCSD), the other for
law enforcement cooperation (DOJ) -- as a more effective way
to ensure that information flows between professionals who
understand each others priorities. Of course, the US and
Indian CERTs would also pass crime-relevant information to
appropriate law enforcement contacts within their respective
countries should they receive it.


6. (SBU) Gupta indicated that the U.S. had not been
responsive to all past bilateral requests for law enforcement
cooperation. Markoff suggested that Gupta supply a list of
unanswered requests. It would be useful for the CSF to
review India's status in cybercrime substantive law (what
activities are criminalized) as well as cybercrime procedural
law (how far Indian authorities are allowed to cooperate on
cross-border incidents). As an example, Markoff described a
possible intrusion that could be routed through servers in
several countries; in trying to trace back an attack, any gap
in bilateral cybercrime cooperation would stop the
investigation dead in its tracks.


7. (SBU) Gupta mentioned that the range of Indian law
enforcement agencies with a potential role in cybercrime
enforcement was larger than the delegation they could bring
to the CSF, and offered to host a joint cybercrime law
enforcement workshop in early 2005. He envisioned a two-day
workshop that would look at problems and possible
collaboration in cyber-forensics, mutual legal assistance,
and computer-based investigation, noting that this could be
another venue for private industry to join the
government-to-government dialogue. Markoff responded that
DOJ has participated in similar workshops, and suggested the
proposal be discussed further at the CSF. Gupta said that
the issue could also be pursued in the Law Enforcement Joint
Working Group, and that the GOI Department of Information
Technology had already held one working group on cyber law
and cyber-crime.


8. (SBU) Gupta requested that DOJ brief on how high-tech
crime is pursued, "from the start, conducting the
investigation, through convictions, a complete walk-through"
at the November CSF. Gupta's deputy, Commander Mukesh Saini,
suggested that DOJ's Websnare Operation could be a useful
case to profile.

WG2: Research and Development
--------------


9. (SBU) Markoff asked that India's Working Group 2
delegation report how New Delhi is poised for and can foster
critical infrastructure protection research and development,
outreach to industry and academia on CIP, and what
cybersecurity issues the GOI sought to underline. She told
Gupta that the InfoSec Research Council prepared a "Hard
Problems List" of the technical hurdles in cybersecurity that
need to be overcome (NOTE: Embassy later delivered a copy of
the "Hard Problems List" to Saini). Markoff suggested that
the USG and the GOI might partner in resolving some of these
problems.


10. (SBU) In response, Gupta asked if the India-US Science
and Technology Forum, which began in March 2000, might be a
more appropriate venue for new R&D workshops in
cybersecurity. In such an eventuality, the S&TF could
provide POCs for science collaboration in several research
areas, such as systems-oriented research architecture for
dependability and survivability, systems
management/monitoring/control, human monitoring,
authentication, communications protocols, network security,
accountability, and foundational research (logical languages
and tools to develop systems). The most promising areas,
Gupta said, were in applying cryptography for authentication
and privacy, language-based security (i.e. voice
recognition), diverse redundancy, and catastrophe-resistant
architecture.


11. (SBU) Department of Information Technology Senior
Director S. Basu said that working-level GOI R&D interests
are focused on cryptography and crypto-analysis, network
systems security, security architecture, operating system
security, vulnerability detection and monitoring, and
cyber-forensics. He expressed interest in reviewing the
"Hard Problems List." Basu added that proposed topics for
collaboration could include cyber forensic tools,
authentication, speaker (voice) recognition, cryptography,
and quantum cryptography.


12. (SBU) Dr. G. Athithan of the Defense Research and
Development Organization (DRDO)/Center for Artificial
Intelligence and Robotics said that DRDO and DIT had been
working on IT security for 3-4 years. They have access to
software developers in Bangalore through the marriage of
"government money and private sector brains," while critical
tasks are handled by government-funded laboratories, which
also conduct field-testing. Athithan underlined the GOI
desire for tools to help monitor network traffic and capture
keywords. He remarked that intercepting and reading
Internet-based e-mail (webmail) was a difficult problem, and
that webmail was developed by an Indian programmer to
sidestep firewalls because it was more difficult to detect.
After Athithan expressed his interest in "carnivore" software
(to allow law enforcement agencies to read intercepted
e-mails) Markoff and Bloechl -- as well as Gupta and Saini --
steered the conversation toward possible cooperation on
cracking packet header data and session information, and away
from reading intercepted text. Athithan proffered additional
GOI R&D priorities: intrusion detection, modeling
statistically normal network behavior to create a baseline,
hacker tracing, and, again, viewing electronic content, "to
help infer the origin and identity of an attacker."


13. (SBU) Gupta suggested Internet traffic monitoring and
database analysis as areas for possible cooperation, noting
that the GOI wishes to be able to profile and summarize data
and databases, as well as profiling online user sessions
(e-mail traffic and clustered browsing) over multi-day
periods. Gupta then asked how the US monitors Internet
traffic. Markoff said that US law does not permit general
monitoring of Internet traffic; instead, if there is evidence
of a crime, a court order can permit law enforcement to
investigate relevant e-mail traffic.


14. (SBU) Bloechl suggested that the defense cooperation
working group could discuss the issue in a military context,
and echoed Markoff's statement that the USG does not monitor
content, instead focusing on analysis, such as the case of
worms or viruses indicated by packet header data. He
explained that there is a great need to avoid violating US
law by collecting information on US persons outside of a
sanctioned law enforcement investigation.


15. (SBU) Gupta shared that the GOI,s interest was not in
reading the data itself, but in technology to warehouse and
analyze it. The GOI was interested in unclassified
technology, as classified data is handled under separate
procedures. Athithan interjected that he was interested in
R&D, not law enforcement, and that the technology would be
deployed toward a watch and warning function that would be in
place prior to any legal permissions being sought for
attempted intrusion or attack. He restated his interests as
summarizing and profiling data, traffic analysis, and cluster
analysis; Gupta added that the Indo-US Counterterrorism Joint
Working Group was the appropriate forum for tools that would
support actionable intelligence, while Athithan pushed for
the technology to implement watch, warning and emergency
response functions, as well as handling and storing digital
evidence.

WG3: Critical Infrastructure Protection
--------------


16. (SBU) Markoff told Gupta that the Acting Director of
DHS's National Cyber Security Division, Andy Purdy, will
co-chair the Third Working Group, and will lead on watch and
warning issues. Its presentation will include an overview of
the capabilities and activities of the US Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT, which NCSD oversees), its mandated
mission, its watch-and-warning capabilities, and a review of
its public/private/academic/international outreach and
partnerships. The USG sought a reciprocal briefing on the
capabilities and activities of India's CERT-In. The working
group will also explore collaboration opportunities, and
welcomed a discussion on the following issues:

-- How was CERT-In created?
-- What is its mandate?
-- What alert and advisory systems are in place?
-- Is CERT-In operating in a 24/7 capacity for emergency
responses? If not, will it do so in the future?
-- What kinds of international outreach does CERT-In pursue?


17. (SBU) Markoff then listed some potential avenues for
collaboration between the two CERTs:

-- Designating POCs for bilateral communications;
-- Coordinating on cybersecurity incident responses;
-- Partnering on hard issues such as attribution and software
assurance;
-- Sharing watch and warning information;
-- Fostering international cooperation beyond the bilateral
relationship; and
-- Technical training assistance.

Other possibilities include exchanges of periodic reports on
global Internet status, including trends, vulnerabilities,
and incidents.


18. (SBU) Markoff reported that the USG has been considering
architecture for an incident alert and management system, and
is consulting with other allies in this regard. The system
would need to have real-time warning capabilities. Because
CERT-In is India's designated national CERT, the two teams
could begin sharing basic cyber watch and warning information
almost immediately, she added. Markoff explained that
CERT-In must be the government's authorized CERT and be able
to share reciprocal information with US-CERT on a 24/7 basis,
to qualify for this level of partnership.


19. (SBU) CERT-In Operations Manager Anil Sagar briefly
presented on CERT-In's capabilities. He stated that CERT-In
is GOI funded, 24/7 capable, and provides both pull (website:
http://www.cert-in.org.in) and push (e-mail) alert services.
He confirmed that it is the GOI-designated national CERT for
all computer security incidents, government and
private-sector, and has been operating since January. In
response to Markoff's query as to CERT-In's membership in any
regional agreements, Sagar said that CERT-In Director Dr. KK
Bajaj was at that time engaged in membership consultations
for the Asia-Pacific CERT (APCERT). CERT-In,s "wish list,"
according to Sagar, includes:

-- Knowledge-sharing with US-CERT of any discovered operating
systems or applications vulnerabilities,
-- Updates on viruses and worms in circulation;
-- Assistance in vulnerability analysis;
-- Capabilities of incident handling;
-- Traffic monitoring;
-- Intrusion trends and warnings;
-- Hacker profiling; and
-- Assistance in testing patches for upcoming software
vulnerabilities (NOTE: Sagar explained that CERT-In tests
commercially-available patches before posting them on their
website, because, he explained, they are very careful about
preserving CERT-In,s reputation and do not wish to be
associated with faulty patches.)


20. (SBU) In exchange, Sagar said that CERT-In could share
the following with US-CERT: best practices on systems
hardening; co-development of security applications; and
information-sharing on systems vulnerabilities information.

WG4: Defense Cooperation
--------------


21. (SBU) Bloechl explained that robust cybersecurity for
the US Defense Department and the military is already in
place, under the auspices of a four-star general at US
Strategic Command. A Joint Task Force (JTF) was created in
1998 as the primary computer network defense organization for
the Defense Department. Other agency and military CERTs
report to it, and it works in parallel with the US-CERT under
the Department of Homeland Security as its defense sector
counterpart. Bloechl invited the Working Group 4 delegation
to visit the CSF early and tour the JTF/Global Network
Operations Center in Washington, at which time the two
delegations could discuss common goals and objectives for
bilateral cooperation. Of key importance, he stressed, is
that any organization the DOD partners with must be able to
protect the information on its own networks.


22. (SBU) Bloechl then asked about the status of India's
military CERT -- whether it has 24/7 intrusion detection, an
R&D budget, details about its network security and if the
military uses simulation modeling to test the security,
indicators and warning capability, and pre-attack warning
capability. Saini responded that each service (Army, Navy,
Air Force) currently maintains its own independent computer
networks, each overseen by its own "semblance of a CERT."
Over time Saini planned to "grow the existing CERTs until
they are fully functioning," primarily by enlarging and
training their staffs, a goal he hopes to reach by 2007. Not
even the Integrated Defense Staff yet possesses an integrated
network -- the stress is to have adequate security in place
before linking networks even at the IDS level. Furthermore,
beyond the three service networks, the military has only a
relatively small number of separate, Internet-accessible
workstations. Despite pressure from within the military to
expand Internet access, especially leading to broadband
access, Saini's preference was to do so only after the
military CERTs are fully functioning.


23. (SBU) Commodore J Jena of India's Integrated Defense
Staff, who introduced himself by saying that "cybersecurity
is my main activity," said the need for an expanded awareness
of cybersecurity within the Indian military's Intranets
remained acute. He asked whether USG networks were secured
with commercially-available products or were manufactured
within the government. Bloechl responded that classified
systems are secured by USG agencies, including the NSA. Jena
then asked what algorithms US classified networks use, and
how reliable they are considered to be. Bloechl took the
question and will pass to appropriate US offices for
potential future action.


24. (SBU) In exchange for US-funded cybersecurity training,
Jena said the Indian military was prepared to share the
following with the US:

-- Counterterrorism/low intensity conflict training and
expertise;
-- A mode to tap into India's pool of IT talent; and
-- Its share in a bilateral cyberwarning function.


25. (SBU) Jena asked about adding additional areas to the
discussion agenda, such as using endochromatic radioactive
material-embedded hardware and software for security, cyber
deterrence, and how to test for and sanitize malicious code.
Markoff and Bloechl answered that the key to deterrence is
cracking the attribution problem. After Jena asked about
hardening systems to withstand an electro-magnetic pulse and
how to reconstitute after such an attack, Markoff advised
that such issues might be better addressed in the CTJWG.
Bloechl added that some elements in DOD might be looking at
such problems, but not his office. Bloechl and Jena agreed
that data in languages other than English posed a hard
problem, one that Markoff said was recognized at the World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).

WG5: Standards and Software Assurance
--------------


26. (SBU) Markoff opened discussion on Working Group 5 by
stating that Dr. Ron Ross of NIST would provide the CSF with
a high-level overview of NIST's guidelines on security
standards; show how the standards have international
applicability; and outline the benefits of ongoing
collaboration. Dr. SL Sarnot (Director General,
Standards/Testing/Quality Certification Directorate, Ministry
of Communications and Information Technology) stated that he
had held a prior discussion with Dr. Ross, on common criteria
for software assurance, and that both sides of the working
group should be able to work well together. The GOI would
seek cooperation in implementing NIST assurance protocols,
and Sarnot said the US document is more "elaborate" than
India's current program. He also asked for assistance in
assurance frameworks and training to implement the common
framework.

A Role for Private Industry
--------------


27. (SBU) Markoff and Gupta agreed that if the private
sector and industry associations participate in the CSF, they
would be included in the plenaries and could make their own
presentations in that venue. Markoff suggested that in
addition to IT industry representation, IT clients and firms
involved in critical infrastructure (banking,
telecommunications, utilities, and transportation, for
example) should be invited. The delegation need not be huge,
but American firms want to engage with their Indian
counterparts, to foster deeper relations, but with a
government component as the framework to facilitate an
industry-to-industry dialogue, she stated. Gupta replied
that the 2004 NASSCOM-ITAA conference had set the stage, and
cybersecurity awareness has risen dramatically since the 2002
CSF. Markoff observed that the private sector must be part
of the solution, as states cannot legislate strong
cybersecurity protections into existence.


28. (SBU) Gupta observed that once private firms realize how
much business will be tied to firms that work in a secure
environment, they might end up pressuring governments into
action. A few years ago there was marked resistance to
adopting the common criteria for software assurance, he said,
but now "all objections are gone." Many firms are only now
beginning to understand the difference between information
technology and information security. Markoff replied that as
more firms lose productivity and business through
cyber-attacks, worms, viruses, etc., fewer will require
convincing.


29. (SBU) Markoff said that US industry participation would
be based in part on the Indian list. She also offered that
there could be sector-based break-out sessions for the
commercial delegates. Specifically, Markoff said US firms
would like to have Indian companies like TATA, WIPRO, and
InfoSys represented, as well as national universities and
research laboratories. Gupta promised to forward an Indian
private-sector list, but cautioned that if they were unable
to form a good delegation, they may rely on CII or NASSCOM
representatives who could then report back to their members.


30. (SBU) Markoff suggested a list of possible issues and
topics that would interest private industry, and that private
sector participants could brief on:

-- E-signatures;
-- Bilateral certification authority;
-- Security procedures;
-- Technical and language skills;
-- Outsourcing;
-- Business activity disruption/disaster recovery;
-- Help desk/call center operations;
-- E-security with handheld devices;
-- Cybercrime laws;
-- Enforcement of privacy laws/standards;
-- Data privacy (including why India does not need to adopt
the EU Privacy Law);
-- Need to enforce IPR;
-- Data protection laws;
-- Online database protection;
-- Physical security, including biometrics and closed circuit
monitoring;
-- GPS issues;
-- Public safety concerns;
-- Outreach to small and mid-sized firms; and
-- Protecting financial data.

Site Visits
--------------


31. (SBU) Markoff, Bloechl and Gupta agreed that appropriate
site visits would be of great value. Bloechl suggested that
the defense WG could visit the Joint Task Force on November
8, before the plenary. Markoff added that a visit to US-CERT
could also be planned for some of the other working groups.
Both parties agreed that site visits would take place on
November 8, on the basis of a list of sites the Indian
delegation would like to visit.

Training Requests and Funding
--------------


32. (SBU) The most important item on New Delhi's training
agenda is capacity building, Gupta reported. He emphasized
the desire for expert exchanges and hands-on, side-by-side
training. Admitting that funding, scheduling, and logistics
for sending Indian cybersecurity professionals to the US were
issues that needed to be worked out, Gupta offered to host
American cybersecurity experts "for three days, or two
months, or more" at Indian cybersecurity facilities and
classes. Markoff and Gupta agreed that this would be a good
issue for the CSF working groups to firm up. When Gupta
pressed for working exchanges and hands-on training for
CERT-In personnel at US-CERT, or vice versa, Bloechl
cautioned him that most of the military CERTs, operations
are at the top secret level, though there might be
opportunities to observe operations at lower classifications.



33. (SBU) The US and Indian delegations briefly reviewed the
September 3 GOI request for cyber forensics training (Ref A).
When Gupta asked about funding, Markoff responded that there
were few options due to budget constraints. She remarked
that there may be opportunities, however, and noted that INL
had funded training in Mumbai in 2003, but there is no clear
answer yet on USG funding for non-military cybersecurity
training. Markoff, Bloechl, Saini and Jena discussed the
possibilities and limitations of funding via IMET, FMS and
the DOD CT Fellowship Program. Markoff reported that several
military training facilities that offer the kinds of courses
the GOI sought now qualify for IMET. Markoff also suggested
that the Monterey Naval Postgraduate School could customize
senior-level courses for GOI groups. ODC Maj. Greg Winston
added that Mobile Training Teams were another option, which
could be brought to India under defense cooperation programs.
He added that some IT-related courses are now covered under
IMET. Two important hurdles, however, were that India's
total IMET allocation for 2005 will be $1.4 million, and that
courses must be at least five weeks in duration. Both
delegations agreed to continue the discussion in Washington.

Lobbying for 24/7 Cybercrime POC Resolution
--------------


34. (SBU) Markoff asked Gupta for GOI support for a
US-drafted UNGA resolution calling for all UN Member States
to join the 24/7 Cybercrime Point of Contact Network
originally created by the G-8. She said it would be the
fifth resolution on cybersecurity. Gupta reacted positively
and asked for a copy of the draft resolution. (NOTE: Embassy
forwarded the draft resolution via the MEA.)

GOI's Cybersecurity Vision
--------------


35. (SBU) Gupta's short-term vision for GOI,s cybersecurity
posture is to have dedicated cybersecurity officers in all
government sectors capable of handling all ministry-related
aspects of cybersecurity, whether a cyber attack occurs
within a ministry or in the private sector areas the ministry
oversees. This platform would then grow to include a fully
functioning CERT for each sector, with all reporting to and
deriving training from CERT-In. Gupta acknowledged that a
dearth of trained personnel was slowing progress, which was
the impetus behind what he called "inculcating a culture of
cybersecurity into the private sector," first by mandating a
cybersecurity requirement in engineering college curricula.
Saini elaborated that he would like to see cybersecurity
training represent 5 percent of education within the IT
sector, up from his estimate of 0.01 percent, by 2008.
Eventually, he hoped that every IT professional would
consider cybersecurity to be part of his bailiwick. Saini
acknowledged that this would represent a massive investment
by both the government and private industry, and that it
would have to be a joint effort and not two parallel tracks.

High-Level Policy Support
--------------


36. (SBU) Noting that cybersecurity enjoys high-level
support from NSA Dixit, chairman of the National Information
Board (NIB) which keeps cybersecurity as a top-level policy
interest, Gupta described the NIB as "very big," comprising
MEA, MHA, Finance, MOD, DIT, the economic sectoral
ministries, and law enforcement agencies. It meets every
three months.

Other Cybersecurity Relationships Pale In Comparison
-------------- --------------


37. (SBU) Gupta said that although cybersecurity is clearly
an issue of international importance, the Indo-US CSF is New
Delhi's only substantial bilateral cybersecurity
relationship. There had been some efforts at cooperation
with Canada and Israel, "but they never took off." He also
dismissed GOI efforts to foment cybersecurity cooperation
with Russia without elaborating on them.

CSF Framework
--------------


38. (SBU) Markoff and Gupta agreed on the following
structure for the five working groups and their co-chairs as
follows:

Working Group 1: Legal Cooperation and Law Enforcement. USG
co-chair Anthony Teelucksingh (Computer Crime and
Intellectual Property Section, DOJ), GOI co-chair Ms. Renuka
Muttoo, Joint Director, Ministry of Home Affairs.

Working Group 2: Research and Development. USG co-chair Stan
Riveles (Office of the S&T Advisor to the Secretary), GOI
co-chair Dr. AK Chakravarti (Advisor, Department of
Information Technology, Ministry of Communications and
Information Technology) (NOTE: The GOI co-chair was later
changed to Dr. N Sitaram, Director Defense Research and
Development Organization (DRDO)/Center for Artificial
Intelligence and Robotics (CAIR) END NOTE.).

Working Group 3: Critical Infrastructure Protection, Watch,
Warning, and Emergency Response. USG co-chair Andy Purdy
(DHS National Cyber Security Division), GOI co-chair Dr. KK
Bajaj (Director/CERT-In). (NOTE: "Emergency Response" was
added to working group name to facilitate Bajaj's
participation. END NOTE.)

Working Group 4: Defense Cooperation. USG co-chair Tim
Bloechl (DOD Director of International Information Assurance
Programs), GOI co-chair Mr. SK Sharma (Joint Secretary,
Ministry of Defense).

Working Group 5: Standards. USG co-chair Dr. Ron Ross
(NIST), GOI co-chair Dr. SL Sarnot (Director General,
Standards/Testing/Quality Certification Directorate, Ministry
of Communications and Information Technology).


39. (SBU) The two-day government-to-government forum was
tentatively agreed to be structured as follows:

-- 11/9 morning: A comprehensive plenary session with all
delegates attending. Working groups give short presentations
of key challenges and accomplishments in their fields.
-- 11/9 afternoon: Plenary continues. Working groups
continue their briefings.
-- 11/10 morning: Working groups break out into separate
meetings.
-- 11/10 afternoon: Plenary reconvenes for lunch. Working
groups report progress and road maps outlining next steps.
Prepare joint statement.

USG Participants
--------------


40. (SBU) The following USG personnel participated in the
preparatory consultations:

Michele Markoff, Senior Coordinator for International
Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy, State/PM
Tim Bloechl, Director of International Information Assurance
Programs, DOD
Linda Hall, US Embassy New Delhi, ORA
Howard Madnick, US Embassy New Delhi, POL
Maj. Greg Winston, US Embassy New Delhi, ODC

GOI Participants
--------------


41. (SBU) The following GOI officials participated in the
preparatory consultations:

Arvind Gupta, Joint Secretary, NSCS (Ref B)
Commander Mukesh Saini, Deputy Director (Information
Security), NSCS (Ref B)
Rajesh Mohan, Joint Director, National Security Council
Secretariat

SIPDIS
Commodore J Jena, HQ Integrated Defense Staff/DACIDS
(Information Warfare/Information Technology)
Renuka Muttoo, Joint Director, Ministry of Home Affairs
Dr. G Athithan, Defense Research and Development Organization
(DRDO)/Center for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
Dr. SL Sarnot, Director General Standards/Testing/Quality
Certification Directorate, Ministry of Communications and
Information Technology, Department of Information Technology
S Basu, Senior Director, DIT
ASA Krishnan, Director R&D, DIT
Anil Sagar, Operations Manager, CERT-In
Sabyasachi Chakrabarty, Scientist B, CERT-In, DIT


42. (U) Senior Coordinator Michele Markoff cleared this
message.
MULFORD