EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 12/22/2004

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 002246 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/OSAC, CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1 TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KSAC KHLS MU EAC SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 12/22/2004 REF: A. TD-314/70393-04 ¶B. JEDDAH 2937 ¶C. MUSCAT 2200 ¶D. MUSCAT 2130 Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III. Reason: 1.4(c). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the core Emergency Action Committee December 22 to review the Embassy's security posture prior to the local holiday weekend. Members of the EAC noted no substantive changes in the local security environment since the last meeting. Accordingly, the EAC agreed that the Embassy's already heightened security posture and FPCON remain appropriate. End Summary. -------------- Security Environment -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On December 22, the Ambassador chaired a meeting of the core Emergency Action Committee ("EAC") to review the Embassy's security posture prior to the local holiday weekend. The meeting opened with a discussion of the local security situation, which the EAC continued to characterize as stable. Members concurred that there have been no substantive changes in previously reported assessments of the security and threat environments. -------------- Unsubstantiated Threat Information -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) RMAS briefed the EAC on an unsubstantiated threat to the American manager of Hunt Oil Company in Oman (reftel A). In short, information alleges that, as of early October 2004, the U.S. oil company received an anonymous letter (in the U.S.) requesting the withdrawal of their American Manager in Oman, who was in danger (NFI). RMAS advised that they (RMAS) are in the process of attempting to verify the existence and/or content of the alleged threat letter at the headquarters level. RMAS added that it remains unclear what, if anything, transpired with respect to the alleged threat. ¶4. (S/NF) P/E noted that since early October 2004, his office has maintained routine contact with Hunt Oil's General Manager ("GM") in conjunction with Muscat American Business Council activity. During this time, however, the GM did not/not express concern or awareness of any threats on him or Hunt Oil operations in Oman. RSO and CONS, who also maintain limited contact with Hunt Oil's GM, affirmed the same. It was also noted that the GM is an active affiliate member of the Muscat Employee Association's recreation facility, a venue that offers social contact with Embassy staff and families, as well as others from the private-sector American citizen community. The fact that the GM does not appear to have discussed the alleged threat may call into question the threat's veracity, or supports the idea that he was not made aware of the threat, should it actually exist. NOTE: Prior to the EAC meeting, the Economic/Commercial Officer attempted to contact Hunt Oil's GM on an unrelated matter; he was told that the GM was currently in the U.S. on holiday (NFI). END NOTE. -------------- Events, Holiday Services, and Vigilance -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The EAC again conducted a review of the private and official events scheduled for the remainder of the holiday season. DAO highlighted the upcoming visit of the U.S.S. Barry (DDG 52),a non-saluting Destroyer, to Port Sultan Qaboos in Muscat from December 23-28. As with all U.S. military ship visits to Oman, security is being closely coordinated with the Royal Oman Police ("ROP") Coast Guard. ¶6. (SBU) RSO confirmed that a list of religious holiday services expected to have a significant American attendance was forwarded to ROP Operations. RSO also took the opportunity to reiterate that members of the EAC must continue reinforcing to both their staffs and family members the need for vigilance regarding all aspects of personal security, including the need to maintain a low profile and to remain unpredictable. Likewise, RSO re-emphasized the importance of immediately reporting suspicious activity or security-related incidents, especially those involving suspected surveillance, to Post One. -------------- Lessons Learned from Jeddah -------------- ¶7. (SBU) RSO distributed copies of, and led a discussion on reftel B, regarding lessons learned from the December 6 terrorist attack on U.S. Consulate General Jeddah. In addition to actions already taken in response to previous reporting of the attack, e.g., incorporation of an additional safehaven/area in the motorpool (reftel D),the EAC will use Jeddah's lessons learned to assist with their ongoing review of avenues to enhance and sustain the Embassy's security posture. -------------- EAC Conclusion -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) The EAC concluded that there have been no substantive changes in the local security environment since the last meeting held on December 18 (reftel C),and that the Embassy's FPCON and already heightened security posture remain appropriate. Nonetheless, the EAC remains acutely aware of the need to monitor both the regional and local security and threat environments, and is prepared to take the necessary countermeasures should changes to either occur. AMB, A/DCM, RSO (Duty Officer),RMAS, P/E, CONS, A/MGT, DAO, OMC (USDR),and ECA (USCENTAF) participated in the meeting. BALTIMORE