EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 12/22/2004

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 002246

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/OSAC,
CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1
TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KSAC KHLS MU EAC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 12/22/2004

REF: A. TD-314/70393-04

B. JEDDAH 2937

C. MUSCAT 2200

D. MUSCAT 2130

Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III.
Reason: 1.4(c).

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Summary
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1. (SBU) The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the core
Emergency Action Committee December 22 to review the
Embassy's security posture prior to the local holiday
weekend. Members of the EAC noted no substantive changes in
the local security environment since the last meeting.
Accordingly, the EAC agreed that the Embassy's already
heightened security posture and FPCON remain appropriate.
End Summary.

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Security Environment
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2. (SBU) On December 22, the Ambassador chaired a meeting
of the core Emergency Action Committee ("EAC") to review the
Embassy's security posture prior to the local holiday
weekend. The meeting opened with a discussion of the local
security situation, which the EAC continued to characterize
as stable. Members concurred that there have been no
substantive changes in previously reported assessments of the
security and threat environments.

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Unsubstantiated Threat Information
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3. (S/NF) RMAS briefed the EAC on an unsubstantiated threat
to the American manager of Hunt Oil Company in Oman (reftel
A). In short, information alleges that, as of early October
2004, the U.S. oil company received an anonymous letter (in
the U.S.) requesting the withdrawal of their American Manager
in Oman, who was in danger (NFI). RMAS advised that they
(RMAS) are in the process of attempting to verify the
existence and/or content of the alleged threat letter at the
headquarters level. RMAS added that it remains unclear what,
if anything, transpired with respect to the alleged threat.


4. (S/NF) P/E noted that since early October 2004, his
office has maintained routine contact with Hunt Oil's General
Manager ("GM") in conjunction with Muscat American Business
Council activity. During this time, however, the GM did
not/not express concern or awareness of any threats on him or
Hunt Oil operations in Oman. RSO and CONS, who also maintain
limited contact with Hunt Oil's GM, affirmed the same. It
was also noted that the GM is an active affiliate member of
the Muscat Employee Association's recreation facility, a
venue that offers social contact with Embassy staff and
families, as well as others from the private-sector American
citizen community. The fact that the GM does not appear to
have discussed the alleged threat may call into question the
threat's veracity, or supports the idea that he was not made
aware of the threat, should it actually exist. NOTE: Prior
to the EAC meeting, the Economic/Commercial Officer attempted
to contact Hunt Oil's GM on an unrelated matter; he was told
that the GM was currently in the U.S. on holiday (NFI). END
NOTE.

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Events, Holiday Services, and Vigilance
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5. (SBU) The EAC again conducted a review of the private
and official events scheduled for the remainder of the
holiday season. DAO highlighted the upcoming visit of the
U.S.S. Barry (DDG 52),a non-saluting Destroyer, to Port
Sultan Qaboos in Muscat from December 23-28. As with all
U.S. military ship visits to Oman, security is being closely
coordinated with the Royal Oman Police ("ROP") Coast Guard.


6. (SBU) RSO confirmed that a list of religious holiday
services expected to have a significant American attendance
was forwarded to ROP Operations. RSO also took the
opportunity to reiterate that members of the EAC must
continue reinforcing to both their staffs and family members
the need for vigilance regarding all aspects of personal
security, including the need to maintain a low profile and to
remain unpredictable. Likewise, RSO re-emphasized the
importance of immediately reporting suspicious activity or
security-related incidents, especially those involving
suspected surveillance, to Post One.

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Lessons Learned from Jeddah
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7. (SBU) RSO distributed copies of, and led a discussion on
reftel B, regarding lessons learned from the December 6
terrorist attack on U.S. Consulate General Jeddah. In
addition to actions already taken in response to previous
reporting of the attack, e.g., incorporation of an additional
safehaven/area in the motorpool (reftel D),the EAC will use
Jeddah's lessons learned to assist with their ongoing review
of avenues to enhance and sustain the Embassy's security
posture.

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EAC Conclusion
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8. (S/NF) The EAC concluded that there have been no
substantive changes in the local security environment since
the last meeting held on December 18 (reftel C),and that the
Embassy's FPCON and already heightened security posture
remain appropriate. Nonetheless, the EAC remains acutely
aware of the need to monitor both the regional and local
security and threat environments, and is prepared to take the
necessary countermeasures should changes to either occur.
AMB, A/DCM, RSO (Duty Officer),RMAS, P/E, CONS, A/MGT, DAO,
OMC (USDR),and ECA (USCENTAF) participated in the meeting.
BALTIMORE