Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04MUSCAT2130
2004-12-07 13:01:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:
EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 12/07/2004
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 002130
SIPDIS
NOFORN
DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/OSAC,
DS/OPO/FPD, DS/IP/SPC/MSG, CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1
TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KHLS MU EAC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 12/07/2004
REF: A. SECSTATE 259800
B. MUSCAT 2125
Classified By: DCM William R. Stewart.
Reason: 1.4(c)(g).
-------
Summary
-------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 002130
SIPDIS
NOFORN
DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/OSAC,
DS/OPO/FPD, DS/IP/SPC/MSG, CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1
TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KHLS MU EAC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 12/07/2004
REF: A. SECSTATE 259800
B. MUSCAT 2125
Classified By: DCM William R. Stewart.
Reason: 1.4(c)(g).
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (SBU) Summary: The Ambassador convened the Emergency
Action Committee December 7 to review updated reporting on
yesterday's terrorist attack against Consulate General
Jeddah. After a careful review of the facts surrounding the
attack, the EAC discussed existing countermeasures and
avenues for further mitigating the threat of a similar
attack. EAC members noted no new threat reporting specific
to Oman, and concurred that there have been no substantive
changes in previously reported assessments of the local
security and threat environments (reftel B). The EAC will
continue to meet and report regularly. End Summary.
--------------
Review
--------------
2. (C) The Ambassador convened the Emergency Action
Committee ("EAC") December 7 to review updated reporting on
yesterday's terrorist attack against Consulate General
Jeddah. The meeting opened with a discussion of the known
facts, including the contents of reftel A. The EAC further
discussed existing countermeasures, such as operating
procedures for the Chancery vehicle entrance's double set of
anti-ram vehicle gates and Delta barriers, and their control
via both Post One and a 15-minute FEBR local guard booth. To
mitigate the threat to security, motorpool, facilities, and
other staff performing functions in or adjacent to the
motorpool, which lies between the aforementioned sets of
gates/barriers, the EAC agreed on the necessity of creating
an alternate safehaven in the carpenter shop (accessible via
the motorpool). The alternate safehaven would provide cover
for staff who, based on the circumstances, might be caught in
the motorpool between the two sets of barriers an be unable
to escape attack through the Chancery hard-line. The EAC
further agreed on the necessity of scheduling an Embassy-wide
combined intruder/safehaven drill.
3. (S/NF) As previously reported (reftel B),immediately
following the attack against Consulate General Jeddah, RSO
requested ramped-up Royal Oman Police (ROP) coverage at both
the Chancery and in residential neighborhoods; RMAS did the
same via their Omani government counterparts. Marine
Security Guard, Surveillance Detection Unit, and local guard
personnel were also briefed accordingly.
--------------
MSGQ
--------------
4. (C) Specifically addressing the Marine Security Guard
Quarters (MSGQ),a low-visibility, nondescript -- but not
unknown -- residence located in a residential neighborhood
approximately four miles from the Chancery, the EAC
recommended and agreed to immediately increase guard coverage
from one to two guards. The augmentation will enhance access
control of the MSGQ, by allowing one guard to monitor the
street and approaching pedestrian/vehicle traffic, while the
other manually operates the pedestrian and/or vehicle gates.
RSO will coordinate this EAC decision with DS/OPO/FPD. NOTE:
Currently, the MSGQ maintains only one 24/7 guard position.
This guard must single-handedly control access, screen
visitors and vehicles, and monitor CCTV monitors. The guard
is therefore unable to rove, take hygiene breaks, or respond
to emergencies or other security-related requests for
assistance without leaving his post. In addition, the guard
relies heavily on the Surveillance Detection Unit to respond
to calls for assistance, as there is no daytime roving
patrol. END NOTE.
--------------
Conclusion
--------------
5. (S/NF) After carefully consideration, and noting no new
threat reporting specific to Oman, the EAC concluded that
there has been no substantive change in the local security
environment, and that the Embassy's FPCON and already
heightened security posture remains appropriate. The EAC
remains acutely aware of the need to monitor both the
regional and local security situation, and is prepared to
take the necessary countermeasures should changes to either
occur. AMB, DCM, RSO, ARSO, RMAS, P/E, PAO, CONS, MGT, MSG,
DAO, OMC (USDR),and ECA (USCENTAF) participated in the
meeting.
BALTIMORE
SIPDIS
NOFORN
DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/OSAC,
DS/OPO/FPD, DS/IP/SPC/MSG, CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1
TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KHLS MU EAC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 12/07/2004
REF: A. SECSTATE 259800
B. MUSCAT 2125
Classified By: DCM William R. Stewart.
Reason: 1.4(c)(g).
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (SBU) Summary: The Ambassador convened the Emergency
Action Committee December 7 to review updated reporting on
yesterday's terrorist attack against Consulate General
Jeddah. After a careful review of the facts surrounding the
attack, the EAC discussed existing countermeasures and
avenues for further mitigating the threat of a similar
attack. EAC members noted no new threat reporting specific
to Oman, and concurred that there have been no substantive
changes in previously reported assessments of the local
security and threat environments (reftel B). The EAC will
continue to meet and report regularly. End Summary.
--------------
Review
--------------
2. (C) The Ambassador convened the Emergency Action
Committee ("EAC") December 7 to review updated reporting on
yesterday's terrorist attack against Consulate General
Jeddah. The meeting opened with a discussion of the known
facts, including the contents of reftel A. The EAC further
discussed existing countermeasures, such as operating
procedures for the Chancery vehicle entrance's double set of
anti-ram vehicle gates and Delta barriers, and their control
via both Post One and a 15-minute FEBR local guard booth. To
mitigate the threat to security, motorpool, facilities, and
other staff performing functions in or adjacent to the
motorpool, which lies between the aforementioned sets of
gates/barriers, the EAC agreed on the necessity of creating
an alternate safehaven in the carpenter shop (accessible via
the motorpool). The alternate safehaven would provide cover
for staff who, based on the circumstances, might be caught in
the motorpool between the two sets of barriers an be unable
to escape attack through the Chancery hard-line. The EAC
further agreed on the necessity of scheduling an Embassy-wide
combined intruder/safehaven drill.
3. (S/NF) As previously reported (reftel B),immediately
following the attack against Consulate General Jeddah, RSO
requested ramped-up Royal Oman Police (ROP) coverage at both
the Chancery and in residential neighborhoods; RMAS did the
same via their Omani government counterparts. Marine
Security Guard, Surveillance Detection Unit, and local guard
personnel were also briefed accordingly.
--------------
MSGQ
--------------
4. (C) Specifically addressing the Marine Security Guard
Quarters (MSGQ),a low-visibility, nondescript -- but not
unknown -- residence located in a residential neighborhood
approximately four miles from the Chancery, the EAC
recommended and agreed to immediately increase guard coverage
from one to two guards. The augmentation will enhance access
control of the MSGQ, by allowing one guard to monitor the
street and approaching pedestrian/vehicle traffic, while the
other manually operates the pedestrian and/or vehicle gates.
RSO will coordinate this EAC decision with DS/OPO/FPD. NOTE:
Currently, the MSGQ maintains only one 24/7 guard position.
This guard must single-handedly control access, screen
visitors and vehicles, and monitor CCTV monitors. The guard
is therefore unable to rove, take hygiene breaks, or respond
to emergencies or other security-related requests for
assistance without leaving his post. In addition, the guard
relies heavily on the Surveillance Detection Unit to respond
to calls for assistance, as there is no daytime roving
patrol. END NOTE.
--------------
Conclusion
--------------
5. (S/NF) After carefully consideration, and noting no new
threat reporting specific to Oman, the EAC concluded that
there has been no substantive change in the local security
environment, and that the Embassy's FPCON and already
heightened security posture remains appropriate. The EAC
remains acutely aware of the need to monitor both the
regional and local security situation, and is prepared to
take the necessary countermeasures should changes to either
occur. AMB, DCM, RSO, ARSO, RMAS, P/E, PAO, CONS, MGT, MSG,
DAO, OMC (USDR),and ECA (USCENTAF) participated in the
meeting.
BALTIMORE