EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 11/06/2004

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 001954 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/OSAC, CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI, NP/PTR, A/LM/PMP/DPM, DS/SPC/WMD E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1 TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KHLS KNNP MNUC PARM KCRM AMED TBIO ABLD KSAF MU EAC SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 11/06/2004 REF: A. MUSCAT 1943 ¶B. SECSTATE 234883 ¶C. SECSTATE 235088 Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III. Reason: 1.4(c). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (U) The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the core Emergency Action Committee ("EAC") on November 6 to reassess the Embassy's security posture following the local weekend, to discuss any potential security implications in the event that Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Yasser Arafat passes away, and to address the information contained in reftels B and C. -------------- Weekend Trespassing Incident -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The EAC reviewed the known facts regarding an incident involving an apparent criminal trespass that occurred over the local weekend. On 11/05/2004, an Embassy employee observed an unidentified Indian male in his yard peering into the windows of the residence. The employee immediately notified the Embassy's MSG Post One who summoned assistance. The individual was subsequently apprehended by the Royal Oman Police (ROP) without further incident. The motives for this incident are unknown and the ROP's investigation is continuing. RSO re-emphasized the importance of immediately reporting such suspicious activity or security-related incidents to Post One. -------------- -------------- Response to the Possible Death of the PLO's Yasser Arafat -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The EAC discussed reports of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat's deteriorating health. The EAC determined that Arafat's death from natural causes would have little to no/no security implications for the Embassy. The EAC noted that the Embassy's already heightened security posture continues to remain appropriate and that Arafat's death is not expected to resonate significantly with the Omanis. -------------- - Mail Screening and Nuclear Smuggling Reporting -------------- - ¶4. (SBU) RSO briefed all Country Team members as to the contents of reftels B and C. Embassy section heads were advised to remind their staffs that until a separate mail screening facility can be established, Embassy personnel should refrain from opening all personal mail within the Chancery. RSO also reiterated that all locally delivered mail and/or parcels be pre-screened in the Embassy's Pedestrian Access Control area separate from the main Chancery. In addition, RSO distributed copies of reftel C to all Embassy sections, including the duty officer, MSG Post One, and the local guard force. RSO emphasized that under no circumstances should any alleged nuclear material be brought into the Embassy compound, nor should Embassy personnel attempt to examine any such material. -------------- Local Threat Environment -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) The EAC concluded that there has been no change in the local security environment since its last meeting held on November 3 (reftel A),and that the Embassy's FPCON remains appropriate. Nonetheless, the EAC remains acutely aware of the need to monitor both the regional and local security environments, and is prepared to take the necessary countermeasures should changes to either occur. AMB, DCM, A/RSO, ESO, RMAS, CONS, P/E, PAO, MGT, MSG, DAO, OMC (USDR), and the Executive Coordinating Agency (USCENTAF) participated in the meeting. BALTIMORE