EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 11/06/2004

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 001954

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/OSAC,
CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI, NP/PTR, A/LM/PMP/DPM, DS/SPC/WMD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1
TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KHLS KNNP MNUC PARM KCRM AMED TBIO ABLD KSAF MU EAC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 11/06/2004

REF: A. MUSCAT 1943


B. SECSTATE 234883

C. SECSTATE 235088

Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III.
Reason: 1.4(c).

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SUMMARY
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1. (U) The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the core Emergency
Action Committee ("EAC") on November 6 to reassess the
Embassy's security posture following the local weekend, to
discuss any potential security implications in the event that
Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
Yasser Arafat passes away, and to address the information
contained in reftels B and C.

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Weekend Trespassing Incident
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2. (SBU) The EAC reviewed the known facts regarding an
incident involving an apparent criminal trespass that
occurred over the local weekend. On 11/05/2004, an Embassy
employee observed an unidentified Indian male in his yard
peering into the windows of the residence. The employee
immediately notified the Embassy's MSG Post One who summoned
assistance. The individual was subsequently apprehended by
the Royal Oman Police (ROP) without further incident. The
motives for this incident are unknown and the ROP's
investigation is continuing. RSO re-emphasized the
importance of immediately reporting such suspicious activity
or security-related incidents to Post One.

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Response to the Possible Death of the PLO's Yasser Arafat
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3. (SBU) The EAC discussed reports of PLO Chairman Yasser
Arafat's deteriorating health. The EAC determined that
Arafat's death from natural causes would have little to no/no
security implications for the Embassy. The EAC noted that
the Embassy's already heightened security posture continues
to remain appropriate and that Arafat's death is not expected
to resonate significantly with the Omanis.

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Mail Screening and Nuclear Smuggling Reporting
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4. (SBU) RSO briefed all Country Team members as to the
contents of reftels B and C. Embassy section heads were
advised to remind their staffs that until a separate mail
screening facility can be established, Embassy personnel
should refrain from opening all personal mail within the
Chancery. RSO also reiterated that all locally delivered
mail and/or parcels be pre-screened in the Embassy's
Pedestrian Access Control area separate from the main
Chancery. In addition, RSO distributed copies of reftel C to
all Embassy sections, including the duty officer, MSG Post
One, and the local guard force. RSO emphasized that under no
circumstances should any alleged nuclear material be brought
into the Embassy compound, nor should Embassy personnel
attempt to examine any such material.

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Local Threat Environment
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5. (S/NF) The EAC concluded that there has been no change in
the local security environment since its last meeting held on
November 3 (reftel A),and that the Embassy's FPCON remains
appropriate. Nonetheless, the EAC remains acutely aware of
the need to monitor both the regional and local security
environments, and is prepared to take the necessary
countermeasures should changes to either occur. AMB, DCM,
A/RSO, ESO, RMAS, CONS, P/E, PAO, MGT, MSG, DAO, OMC (USDR),
and the Executive Coordinating Agency (USCENTAF) participated
in the meeting.
BALTIMORE