SPAIN: CHARGE MEETS WITH CHIEF OF DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004677

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE
NSC FOR FRIED AND VOLKER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS SP NATO
SUBJECT: SPAIN: CHARGE MEETS WITH CHIEF OF DEFENSE

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires J. Robert Manzanares,
reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Charge met with Spanish Chief of Defense
General Felix Sanz December 9. Sanz said he will do all in
his power to strengthen U.S./Spain military ties. He agreed
it was not useful talk about whether the military
relationship between the two countries is "balanced," rather
Spain's permission given to the U.S. to use its bases is part
of Spain's contribution to global security. He hopes the
Spanish government will eventually agree to allow Spanish
troops attached to NATO to go to Iraq as part of a NATO
consensus mission to train Iraqi security forces. He is
optimistic Spain will help provide security for the next
round of Afghan elections, and said chances are good Spain
will participate in either in a Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT) or the Herat Forward Support Base (FSB),but
probably not both. Sanz said Spain has never had a close
military relationship with France and that is not likely to
change under President Zapatero. Although Sanz took pains
during the lunch to show he is pro-American and is optimistic
about Spain's participation in NATO missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan, he is not a policy maker and is more positive
about Spain's potential role in the NATO missions than is the
Zapatero government. End summary.


2. (C) Several members of Sanz's staff joined him at the
meeting, while from the embassy side defense attache, Office
of Defense Cooperation chief and poloff also attended. Sanz
said he will do all he can to strengthen U.S./Spain military
ties. He said there is no reason U.S./Spain mil-mil
relations should move backward and in fact, if they do not
improve significantly while he is CHOD, he "will consider
that a failure" on his part. He suggested he and the Charge
have monthly lunches and offered to host the next one.


3. (C) With respect to comments Sanz, Defense Minister Bono
and others have made in the last couple of months to the
effect that the U.S./Spain military relationship is tilted in
the U.S.'s favor, Sanz agreed it was not useful for either
government to think in those terms. Sanz believes that given
Spain's limited ability to project military force, one of the
best ways Spain can contribute to global security is by
allowing the U.S. to use bases on Spanish soil.


4. (C) Sanz said he hopes the GOS will eventually agree to
send Spanish troops to Iraq who are attached to NATO as part
of a consensus mission. He disagrees in general with caveats
to participation in NATO missions and thinks the Foreign
Ministry is doing its best to convince Zapatero to eliminate
or at least reduce national caveats to NATO missions. In his
words, "You are either part of the alliance or you're not."
He added chances are better Spain would send troops to Iraq
as part of a NATO force after Iraqi elections, because that
would give the Zapatero government political cover. Sanz
also said Spain will probably agree to train Iraqi security
forces in Spain at its anti-mining institute.


5. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, Sanz said Spain's
participation in ISAF has gone extremely well in every way.
As a result, he is optimistic Spain will participate in
ISAF's security mission for the next round of elections. On
Spain's possible role in a PRT or the Herat FSB, Sanz said
chances are good Spain will participate in one or the other
but not both. It would be useful, said Sanz, if the U.S.
could indicate to Spain which was more important from the
U.S. point of view. He thinks Spanish participation in the
FSB is more attractive from Spain's perspective but does not
rule out the possibility the GOS would eventually agree to
play a role (not necessarily the lead role, but a role) in a
PRT if the USG decides that is more important. Sanz said he
believes Spain's ambassador to NATO is working overtime to
persuade the Zapatero government that Spain should do all it
can in Afghanistan and in connection with the NATO training
mission for Iraq.


6. (C) Finally, Sanz commented on Spain/France mil-mil
relations, saying Spain has never had close military
relations with France and he does not expect that to change
under Zapatero. The Spanish military is far more interested
in maintaining close ties with the U.S. In general, he
thinks the French political-military outlook is evolving in a
positive direction for NATO and for European security.
France is realizing that its self-chosen exclusion from the
NATO military structure has meant that it essentially does
not speak the same language as the rest of Europe on military
matters. He thinks over the next several years France will
move closer and closer to NATO's military structure.


7. (C) Comment: Sanz is still smarting from having been
quoted in the press as saying the U.S./Spain military
relation is out of kilter in the U.S.'s favor. He took pains
during the lunch to point out that he and the Spanish
military are pro-U.S., want excellent relations with the U.S.
and believe Spain should do all it can to assist NATO
missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. We think he fairly
represented the view of the majority of the Spanish military.
Nonetheless, Sanz is not a policy maker and the Zapatero
government's interest in inserting Spain further into ISAF's
mission in Afghanistan and NATO's training of Iraq's security
forces is not equal to the Spanish military's.
MANZANARES