Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04MADRID4492
2004-11-24 16:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:  

MEETING ON WITH DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER ON IRAQ,

Tags:  MARR PGOV PREL SP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

241634Z Nov 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004492 

SIPDIS

EUCOM PASS TO ODC SPAIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL SP
SUBJECT: MEETING ON WITH DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER ON IRAQ,
AFGHANISTAN, SUBMARINE CONTRACTS

REF: STATE 236268

Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) an
d (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004492

SIPDIS

EUCOM PASS TO ODC SPAIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL SP
SUBJECT: MEETING ON WITH DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER ON IRAQ,
AFGHANISTAN, SUBMARINE CONTRACTS

REF: STATE 236268

Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) an
d (D).


1. (C) Summary. Deputy Defense Minister Francisco Pardo told
Charge that the MOD will take the lead in promoting
"excellent" bilateral ties between Spain and the U.S.
Regarding the tender for the S-80 submarine weapons system,
Pardo indicated a GOS decision would be forthcoming soon. He
strongly implied that the GOS was leaning towards awarding
the contract to one of the two U.S. bidders, but made clear
that the MOD,s decision was not yet final. On Iraq, Charge
pressed the GOS to support common funding for the NATO
training mission and to allow Spanish officers assigned to
NATO commands to deploy to Iraq (REFTEL). Pardo stressed
continuing GOS political sensitivities over Iraq, making
clear that the Zapatero administration would be very leery of
the deployment of Spanish forces to Iraq under any rubric.
This tracks with what we have heard from Chief of Defense
General Sanz and MOD Director General for Policy Admiral
Torrente (the number three MOD official) in recent meetings.
Pardo was slightly more flexible with respect to additional
Spanish troop commitments to Afghanistan, saying no increases
were contemplated but that the GOS could "study" new
proposals.


2. (C) This meeting confirms reports that the GOS hopes to
use defense issues to smooth relations with the USG. This
bodes well for our core defense interest in Spain )
continued unimpeded access to Spanish military bases.
However, on political lightning rods such as Iraq, we see
little chance of progress with the GOS, at least until the
Iraq elections. In Afghanistan, Spain won,t lead a PRT but
they might be convinced to participate in one. End Summary.

//MOD WANTS TO PROMOTE STRONG TIES WITH USG//


3. (C) Deputy Defense Minister Pardo met with Charge on 11/22
accompanied by his chief of staff Jose Pablo Sabrido
Fernandez and technical advisor General Juan Martin Villalon.
Charge was accompanied by Political Counselor, Defense
Attache, ODC, and poloff. Pardo led off by expressing the

Zapatero Government,s desire for improved relations with the
USG, "relations that can only be good, very good, or
excellent." He noted that, contrary to speculation in the
press and by the opposition that Zapatero would be weak on
defense issues, the Socialists have proven even stronger on
defense than their Popular Party predecessors, submitting a
request for a 4.2 percent increase in the defense budget for

2005. Pardo insisted that media claims of anti-American
sentiments within the GOS were without foundation. He said
the MOD was strongly in favor or close relations with the USG
and would do what it could to cement bonds of friendship.
Charge welcomed Pardo's comments and said the USG stands
ready to improve bilateral relations.

//S-80 SUBMARINES: CLOSE TO A DECISION//


4. (C) The Charge raised the matter of the long-awaited GOS
decision on the contract for weapons systems for Spain,s two
S-80 submarines. Pardo said the GOS was close to making a
final decision, though he would not be pinned down on a
specific timeframe He said he understood the desire of both
U.S. companies to get a rapid decision and, while he noted
that there could be only one winner, he said that the USG
likely would be "pleased" by the Spanish decision. (NOTE:
Other defense sources have told us a decision would be
announced within weeks, perhaps in early December. Pardo,s
forward-leaning comments are a positive sign, but we cannot
be certain that either U.S. company will be awarded the
contract. END NOTE.)

//IRAQ AND NATO//


5. (C) The Charge said the USG understands that the Zapatero
administration will not be budged on the issue of deploying
Spanish troops to Iraq, but requested Spanish flexibility on
the issues of NATO funding and the participation in Iraq of
Spanish forces assigned to NATO commands. Charge said it was
our understanding that Spain had lifted its block on the use
of common NATO funds for housing construction to support the
NATO mission in Iraq, but that Spain, along with Belgium,
Germany, and France continued to block common funding of the
APODS. He underscored the importance to the USG, NATO, and
the international community in general of a successful
rebuilding effort in Iraq. Pardo said he was not aware of
the details of the debate in the NAC regarding the use of
common funds, but would endeavor to find out. He assured the
Charge that Spain,s position was technical in nature and not
due to political concerns.


6. (C) However, on the matter of deploying Spanish officers
assigned to NATO commands, Pardo said political
considerations were the key factor underlying Spanish
concerns. He said the Iraq issue remained "polemic" in Spain
and that the GOS was under strong public pressure to renounce
the deployment of any Spanish forces to Iraq, regardless of
whether they were sent by Madrid or by NATO headquarters. He
asked for USG understanding of the political sensitivities
involved. Asked whether the MOD, like the Spanish MFA, saw
Iraq,s January elections as a possible turning point that
would permit greater Spanish activism, Pardo was
noncommittal. Pardo said, however, the GOS was looking for
"flexibility" on the issue of lifting the caveat on Spanish
members of NATO commands to participate in the NATO training
mission (NOTE: MOD number three, Admiral Torrente, told
Polcouns Nov. 18 that the GOS would prefer not to be among
the first from NATO commands to be deployed to Iraq. END
NOTE).

//AFGHANISTAN//


7. (C) Charge said Spain and the USG should be proud of
having worked with others in the international community to
liberate Afghanistan from the Taliban. He thanked Pardo for
Spain's participation thus far and said we would be looking
to Madrid for additional commitments and hoped that Spain
would make a decision on its participation in a PRT prior to
the Force Generation Conference in Brussels next week. Pardo
said that Spain was pleased with the role it had played in
Afghanistan, but cautioned that the GOS did not contemplate
additional deployments or new missions there. He said that
in the Spanish political context, any deployment was
potentially controversial and would require close
consultations with Parliament. He said, though (also
reflecting comments by Torrente) that the issue was still
open regarding additional deployments or new missions such as
a PRT.

//COMMENT//


8. (C) This meeting confirms other indications that the GOS
hopes to use defense issues to smooth relations with the USG,
friction that has left them open to opposition criticism that
Zapatero is mishandling one of Spain's key relationships.
Pardo is a good interlocutor and gave every indication of his
readiness to engage in a positive manner. This bodes well
for our core defense interest in Spain ) continued unimpeded
access to Spanish military bases. However, on political
lightning rods such as Iraq, we see little chance of progress
with the GOS, at least until the Iraq elections. In
Afghanistan, meanwhile, Spain probably won't lead a PRT but
they might be convinced to participate in one.
MANZANARES