USOAS AMBASSADOR'S MEETING ON LATIN AMERICA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002958

SIPDIS

STATE PLEASE PASS TO USOAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV SP
SUBJECT: USOAS AMBASSADOR'S MEETING ON LATIN AMERICA

Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In his July 29 meeting in Madrid with
Spanish MFA Director General Sandomingo, USOAS Ambassador
Maisto urged Spain to send observers to the Venezuelan
referendum and to remain firm on Cuba. Maisto thanked the
GOS for its decision to send police/troops to Haiti with a
Moroccan contingent. End summary.

Haiti


2. (C) Sandomingo told Maisto the GOS had not yet
determined the exact composition of its joint participation
with Morocco in Haiti. Morocco's likely contribution would
be more in the form of troops, while Spain's would be Spanish
National Police, Guardia Civil and some force protection
elements from the military (press reports the Spanish Marines
might participate),Sandomingo said the total numbers of the
contingent would be some 200-240, but details were still
being worked out with the government of Morocco. Maisto
expressed USG appreciation for the Haiti contribution, noting
it had been well regarded in Washington. He and Sandomingo
noted the significance of the cooperation with Morocco, just
several years after the Perejil Island dispute between Spain
and Morocco. Sandomingo also emphasized the importance of
Spain's cooperation with an Islamic country. Maisto also
noted the importance of Brazil's contribution and leadership
role, and the multilateral nature of the effort, including
the UN, OAS, U.S., Canada, the Latin Americans and countries
like Spain and Morocco.

Venezuela


3. (C) Maisto expressed disappointment at the failure of
the EU to mount an observer mission for the Venezuelan
referendum. Sandomingo acknowledged this was a huge disaster
and failure for the EU commission, whose practices are far to
slow, rigid and bureaucratic. Maisto asked if Spain would
consider sending observers on a bilateral basis. Sandomingo
indicated Spain did not have the time nor the resources to
send a bilateral observer mission, but was considering
sending a group as part of the OAS observer mission. He said
Spain's participation would be in the form of technical
experts rather than political officials. Maisto strongly
encouraged Spain to send a technical team, noting that
presence of technical experts was equally or in fact more
important than that of political figures. Experts who could
detect fraud in voting machine operations, vote count tallies
and the like were very much needed, Maisto added.


4. (C) Maisto expressed concern about such problems as the
integrity of the voting process, including voter
intimidation; efforts to pack the Supreme Court and the
integrity of the electoral tribunal; voting registry
anomalies, including the 1.1 million new names on the
electoral registry; efforts to change the precincts or
polling locations of some one million people; the process of
issuance of citizenship cards; and untested touch-screen
voting technology. Sandomingo agreed with Maisto on the
importance of the presence of international observers.
Sandomingo said that if the international observers could not
verify the outcome, the referendum results would have no
value. He said that even Chaves probably understood this.
Maisto stressed that U.S. policy on Venezuela was completely
bipartisan, and this includes the Congress. Maisto
underscored that U.S. policy in Latin America in general --
including on Cuba and other issues -- is strongly bipartisan.

Cuba


5. (C) Maisto asked about Spanish policy in Cuba since the
release of the 15 political prisoners, including the
dissident Marta Beatriz. Maisto said that while the release
was a good gesture, it was reminiscent of the Soviet style of
repression, followed by token release of prisoners and demand
for some sort of reward or recognition. On the release,
Sandomingo noted the positive EU statement, which also
expressed desire for further steps by Havana.


6. (C) Sandomingo said that the GOS had some ideas of steps
in the medium term. The GOS would like to regain some
semblance of normal access to Cuban officials, which their
Ambassador in Havana currently does not have -- the fault of
Havana, not Madrid, Sandomingo acknowledged. One idea the
GOS was pursuing within the EU (which several other EU
members share) is to terminate EU policy of inviting Cuban
dissidents to the national days of EU member states. This
practice has been anathema to the Cuban government, which
objects to the symbolism of dissident presence at national
day celebrations, and to the simultaneous presence of the
dissidents with Cuban government officials. Sandomingo added
that many Cuban officials spurn contact with the dissidents
because they fear some of the dissidents may be double agents
for their own security service. Sandomingo said that as part
of this proposal, the GOS would propose a broader and more
meaningful EU program of outreach and dialogue with the
dissidents, which he said Havana would find easier to accept.
Havana might then lift the ban on contacts with Spanish and
other diplomats, which refuses such access in large part
because of the national day reception policy. The EU and its
members are paying a very high price for the policy that far
outweighs the benefits the dissidents receive by attending
the national day receptions. Currently, Spain and other
governments are prohibited from having contacts even with
lower-level Cuban officials who might play a role in any
future Cuban government.


7. (C) Sandomingo also said the GOS was "considering" for
the medium term (no decisions made) re-opening the Spanish
Cultural Center in Havana. Sandomingo expressed his view
that this would not necessarily be seen as an opening to the
Castro regime, as Havana despised the Spanish cultural center
because it feared the center, which welcomed all segments of
Cuban society. Maisto asked Sandomingo to keep the USG
informed as these ideas progressed. He said he had never
heard the argument that the Cuban government feared the mix
of dissidents with government officials at the national day
receptions, nor Sandomingo's concept of the Cuban view of the
cultural center.

Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE)


8. (C) Maisto thanked Sandomingo for Spain's active role in
CICTE, especially in Costa Rica, and asked for Spanish
support in the CICTE project on "Cooperation and Legal
Assistance Development," particularly in the area of
coordination and structural development. Sandomingo was
positive and said Spain likely would offer support. He noted
the importance of the terrorism issue for Spain and the
importance in Latin America of prominent U.S.-Spain
cooperation.

Dominican Republic


9. (C) Maisto noted that USTR Zoellick was signing today an
FTA with the Dominican Republic as an important step in
helping to stem deterioration there. Both agreed the
situation was of concern, particularly in the economic area.
MANZANARES