SPANISH DEFENSE MINISTER PREVIEWS POSSIBLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002181 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV SP SUBJECT: SPANISH DEFENSE MINISTER PREVIEWS POSSIBLE AFGHANISTAN INCREASE REF: A. STATE 111287 ¶B. MADRID 1864 ¶C. MADRID 1867 Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Ambassador Argyros, accompanied by DCM and PolCouns, met June 8 with Spanish Defense Minister Jose Bono to reinforce NATO's and the USG's requests for Spanish support in augmenting ISAF and coalition operations in Afghanistan. As Bono's schedule permitted this meeting only several weeks after receipt of Ref A, Embassy had conveyed our points earlier to senior officials in Zapatero's office and at the MFA. We understand that OSD officials also shared our views with the Spanish Embassy in Washington and with lower level Spanish MOD officials (Ref B and C). Ambassador Argyros stressed to Bono the importance of a robust Spanish response, both for NATO and for the success of ISAF in Afghanistan. ¶2. (C) Bono reiterated, as Spanish officials have been telling us for several weeks, that no decision would be taken on Afghanistan increases until after the June 13 European Parliamentary elections, in which the Socialist party and the government seek a major victory in order to vindicate the March 14 national election results just after the Madrid terrorist attacks. However, Bono said that Spain likely would commit transportation capabilities such as helicopters and an advanced medical unit. Bono said that Spain also likely would augment current troop levels to same 800. (Comment: We thought there was some "fuzzy math" here yet to be determined.) Bono told the Ambassador he could not say any of this publicly yet, adding that the MFA had also to approve the increase. He said the government would "consult" with the Spanish Parliament. ¶3. (C) Bono said the Spanish public and others needed to be reminded that Afghanistan was not "just about Bin Laden," but about ridding the country of the Taliban and getting a handle on drug trafficking in the region. He said these broader issues were also very important (note: we have seen recently in the Spanish press an apparent attempt by the GOS to lay the groundwork for a decision to augment Spanish troops in Afghanistan). ¶4. (C) However, Bono repeatedly stressed that the USG, including Secretary Rumsfeld, must understand that any increase in the Spanish presence in Afghanistan would not be undertaken to "make up for" withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. Bono said that this was also important for the Spanish public. The Ambassador underscored that the USG fully understood this point and was not making such a connection. ¶5. (C) Both Bono and the Ambassador agreed on the need to move forward after difficult rhetoric during Spain's national election and European Parliament campaigns, US disappointment over Spain's rapid decision to withdraw its troops from Iraq and other irritants. Bono posited that it might be useful for him to meet with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld during the NATO Summit in Istanbul in order to dispel the image of difficulties in the US-Spanish relationship and between him and Secretary Rumsfeld personally. Bono stressed he was not necessarily asking for a meeting, but wanted us to think about the idea. The Ambassador undertook to convey this thought to Washington. ¶6. (C) At the close of the meeting, Bono raised recent local press reports related to a possible drawdown of Spanish civilian personnel at the naval base at the Rota Naval Base in Andalucia. The Ambassador explained the context of the USG's global force posture review and said that no decisions regarding Spain or other nations had been taken yet. Bono also raised several other issues related to the base, and he and the Ambassador agreed to remand these to lower levels to work out. ¶7. (C) While noting he had said nothing publicly on the issue, Bono mentioned press reports alleging Secretary Rumsfeld, during his recent trip to Asia, had mentioned a possible continuing terrorist threat to Spain following the March 11 attacks. The Ambassador said that he personally had read every readout of Secretary Rumsfeld's comments in Singapore, Japan and on the aircraft and he had not specified a threat to Madrid. The Ambassador stressed that Rumsfeld had quite rightly noted the need to remain vigilant after the attacks in the US September 11, the Madrid bombings and the terrorist attacks in Istanbul and Bali. ¶8. (C) Comment: Bono is a media hound and we don't yet know how much of what he says is for the good of the GOS or for his own personal aggrandizement. He readily admitted to the Ambassador he has much to learn as Minister of Defense, and has had a very short time to do so. However his lack of experience has not stopped him from making public pronouncements. We do not know how much to expect from the MOD under his leadership. Our first reaction is not to believe anything until we see it and not to expect much until he has a better grounding of his portfolio. ARGYROS