SPAIN: VIEWS ON IRAQ RESOLUTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002096 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV SP SUBJECT: SPAIN: VIEWS ON IRAQ RESOLUTION REF: A. STATE 121748 ¶B. STATE 121718 Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY Spanish MFA Political Director Dezcallar, who now has overall Iraq responsibility in the MFA, told us June 3 that Spain appreciated the constructive and positive attitude evident in the US-UK revised text. He said Spanish President Zapatero personally had instructed Spanish UN Perm Rep to be "helpful" in seeking to forge consensus. On the revised text, Spain would like to see further clarification of the end date of the MNF mandate, but is willing to discuss pros and cons of leaving the date "indeterminate." The GOS wants a specific reference to "international humanitarian law," but Dezcallar insisted that the kind of clause Spain would desire would be forward-looking, not refer to past events (e.g. prisoner abuse allegations). Spain would also welcome further clarification on the relationship between the IIG and the MNF, and seeks language on this relationship to reinforce, not undermine, Iraqi sovereignty. The GOS would prefer a 3-month schedule for MNF reports to the Security Council, rather than the 6-month schedule envisaged in the current text. Dezcallar professed that none of these issues was a deal breaker for Spain, but identified the IIG-MNF relationship as the most serious issue for the GOS. The Zapatero government clearly wants the US to see Spain as a positive factor in developing the UNSC resolution on Iraq; however, the GOS will not hesitate to raise difficult "details." END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) In a June 3 meeting with MFA Political Director Dezcallar, who has overall responsibility for Iraq in the MFA, and will take over Iraq responsibilities formerly housed in the MOD, PolCouns reviewed USG thinking on the revised Iraq UNSC resolution (ref a) and urged strong GOS support, including in public statements, for the new Iraqi interim government (ref B). PolCouns noted USG,s desire to move quickly in adopting the resolution, as a firm expression of international support for the new government. ¶3. (C) As have previous GOS interlocutors over the past several weeks, Dezcallar said that President Zapatero had personally instructed the MFA to play a constructive role in crafting the new UNSC resolution. "We have learned our lessons from past mistakes," Dezcallar noted, clearly referring to the Villepin parallel text process during the negotiations of 1483. Dezcallar expressed appreciation for the positive U.S. and UK attitude, clearly reflected in the elements of the revised text that sought to meet concerns expressed previously by Council members. He asked when the USG might want to put the text to a vote; PolCouns responded that the USG preferred to move sooner rather than wait for discussions to take place among non-Council members such as Iraq,s neighbors, as other members of the Council had suggested. She added that while these views were important, the priority was to demonstrate support for the new government and the political transition process. Dezcallar did not further comment on Spain,s view on timing. ¶4. (C) Dezcallar identified several key concerns for the GOS (roughly paralleling issues raised by the Spanish Perm Rep in New York),as detailed below. ¶5. (C) Reference to "International Humanitarian Law:" The GOS wants a specific reference to "international humanitarian law" in the text; the Spanish Perm Rep has made this point in NY; subsequent to the conversation with Dezcallar, Foreign Minister Moratinos, in a press conference in Finland, said the text should include such a specific reference. Dezcallar told us that, unlike the "Chinese proposal," which referred to past actions in Iraq (e.g. prisoner abuses),Spain's preference would be for language that looked forward to the future. He said that the U.S. should welcome, not fear, such a reference, and thought that the U.S. should have as much interest in seeing it included as Spain or any other Council member. Dezcallar opined that the UK supported some language referring to humanitarian law. ¶6. (C) We asked why the reference to "international law" that is already in the text was not sufficient, since it obviously incorporates humanitarian law. In addition, preambular language also refers to human rights. Dezcallar responded that it would be important for the Iraqis to have the Council specifically to refer to humanitarian law. He indicated that this might well be handled in preambular language rather than in the operative portion of the text. Dezcallar also took the opportunity to note that Spain understood the prisoner abuses were undertaken by a few, and that in our transparent democratic system they were being prosecuted in accordance with due process. He noted President Zapatero,s comments to that effect on the margins of the EU-Latin America summit, in which Zapatero also said that the U.S. government was not to blame for the prisoner abuses. ¶7. (C) MNF reporting schedule: As the Spanish Perm Rep noted in UNSC informals, Spain would like the MNF to report every three months to the Council, which the SYG would also be called upon to do. Dezcallar said that a three-month schedule would be a very good signal on the part of the MNF to the Iraqis. He noted that on a six month schedule, the MNF might end up reporting only once to the Council (say, if MNF mandate ends with elections at the end of this year or early next year). Again, this is not a deal breaker, Dezcallar indicated, but something Spain wants to be considered and would like to see incorporated in the text. ¶8. (C) IIG-MNF relations: By far this is one of the most important issues for the GOS, Dezcallar said. Spain would like more clarification on how the U.S. would envisage this relationship, and noted that the resolution language on this issue must not be seen in any way to undermine Iraqi sovereignty. Dezcaller referred to a meeting between Deputy Secretary Armitage and Secretary-General, EU High SIPDIS Representative Solana on this issue, in which Armitage had identified a number of scenarios in which the IIG and the MNG would have to develop arrangements. According to Dezcallar,s readout, Armitage and Solana noted that operations on which all agreed would not be problematic, nor would defensive operations in which MNF troops clearly had to conduct an operation to defend themselves. The most problematic, would be an offensive operation which the IIG did not approve. ¶9. (C) PolCouns noted that the USG certainly shared Spain's desire to reinforce, not undermine, Iraqi sovereignty in the resolution text. She also noted Secretary Powell's June 2 interview at the Middle East broadcasting center in which he identified excellent examples of how this can be worked out with a sovereign nation, such as with Germany and Korea where our troops have been based for the past 50 years. When asked whether Spain wanted more specific language on the relationship issue, Dezcallar was unclear, but said the GOS would welcome further details on USG thinking on the arrangements between the IIG and the MNF. We discussed the exchange of two letters process, in which the IIG would communicate with the UNSC to express its desire for the MNF to remain, and the lead MNF nation would send a letter also outlining in general terms the process by which relations would be developed. ¶10. (C) End of MNF mandate: Dezcallar noted Spain,s concern that the closure of the MNF mandate remains too "indeterminate" in the current text, which envisages the mandate to end at the end of the political process leading to democratization. Dezcallar acknowledged that flexibility on the date might be beneficial, but said the Council should discuss pros and cons of further clarifying the sunset clause. (FM Moratinos in Finland subsequently said publicly that "the sooner we give the Iraqi people a clear sign that the multinational troops will leave Iraq, the better."). Dezcallar declared the GOS "flexible" on this issue, however, but would welcome further discussion in New York. ¶11. (C) Comment: The Zapatero government clearly wants us to view Spain as helpful in the UNSC on the Iraq resolution - even as it raises "details" that could be difficult to work out. ARGYROS